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SUMMARY
This thesis analyses the recurring law and policy issues o f nuclear power as an 
alternative source o f low carbon energy supply in the United Kingdom (UK). In so 
doing, it starts by examining the justifications for the use o f nuclear power in the twenty- 
first century. These include: the issue o f climate change and energy security; both of 
course have been extensively debated at the international and national levels to require 
urgent action.
However in light o f the recent Fukushima nuclear power disaster in Japan, this 
thesis explains that there has been a rethinking o f the use o f nuclear power by some 
countries, while others such as the UK are adamant to expand its use despite the safety 
concerns that are associated with it. Against the background o f these concerns and its 
inherent issues, I consider in depth the various international, European Union (EU), and 
national regulations that are applicable to the safe use of nuclear power.
Thus, this thesis concludes that these safety concerns and its inherent issues must 
be addressed for nuclear power to have a place in the UK society.
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FOREWORD
Nuclear power has been talked about for decades because o f its environmental 
attractions as nations are beginning to fret about the effects o f the approaching scarcity 
o f energy from fossil sources that take millions o f years for their renewal, and also the 
concern over climate change. The development and use o f nuclear power is, therefore, 
one o f the solutions expected to solve these enormous problems.
A comparison o f government awareness reinstates that nuclear power is a 
preferred solution to the issues o f climate change and energy security. For example, the 
European Union (EU) proposed a transparent and objective debate on the future role of 
nuclear power for those Member States concerned. So also is the United Kingdom (UK) 
government, which has concluded that nuclear power has a role to play in energy 
generating mix alongside other low carbon generating options. Having said this, the 
nuclear power option is in danger o f being phased-out. Beside the impacts o f the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster which casts doubts on the continuous use of nuclear power, 
the recent Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan has also impacted the way the public and 
the government of some nuclear states see the use of nuclear power. O f course and as 
explained in this thesis, this is in contrast to the situations in the early 1950s where 
nuclear power was seen as an attractive source o f energy supply.
As to the above, the more obvious concerns which the Fukushima nuclear power 
disaster clearly illustrates are the risks that are associated with the use o f nuclear power 
which sometimes appear too great to comprehend. As a result, it is of great concern for 
lawyers and environmentalists that these risks may present some legal and practical 
challenges in environmental risk regulation. With regards to this, one is poised to 
analyse the law and policy issues of the safe use of nuclear power.
My analysis o f the UK nuclear power safety regulations on one hand also 
matches the actual importance o f nuclear power in the UK considering the slow growth 
of other low carbon sources o f energy. On the other hand, the reason for my choice of 
country also lies in the fact that despite the safety concerns that are associated with the 
use o f nuclear power (these include: the risk o f the occurrence of a catastrophic disaster;
the release o f radioactive materials during the transportation o f nuclear materials; some 
substantial national security issues; and also, the risk o f the release of radioactive 
materials from nuclear waste) the arguments for its development remains the same in the 
UK. From this stand point, one area that has been analysed specifically is the issue of 
nuclear waste management because it appears not to reflect developments o f the safe use 
o f nuclear power in the UK. As such, this thesis considers this aspect as the foremost 
and currently insurmountable concern o f the development and use o f nuclear power in 
the UK. This even becomes more interesting as it is yet to be seen whether recent 
developments in nuclear waste management in the UK can actually succeed in 
addressing the waste challenges and promote the development o f nuclear power, perhaps 
to include also the issue o f public acceptability of its risks.
In light of the above, my aim is to contribute to the study of nuclear safety in the 
UK. In so doing, what this thesis does is to examine the justification of the use of 
nuclear power and the scale o f challenges that beset the nuclear power industry, upon 
which it then examine a number of nuclear power safety regulations at both the 
international, EU and national level.
CHAPTER 1
NUCLEAR POWER, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY SECURITY
1.1. INTRODUCTION
This research attempts to give answers to the “problem of legitimacy” arising from the 
development and use o f nuclear power as an alternative source of low carbon energy 
supply in the United Kingdom (UK). By saying “problem of legitimacy”, this research 
examines the concern over the safe use o f nuclear power. This is o f great importance 
because energy plays an important role in the economy o f all nations as it is used in 
almost all daily human activities such as transportation, domestic heating and electricity. 
Arguably, just like transportation or other core major infrastructural sectors o f the 
economy, if the energy industry does not function, much o f the rest o f the economy 
cannot function.
Having noted the relevance o f energy, it should be noted that societies have 
always sourced for various means o f generating the required energy to cater for their 
needs. The common source of energy supply is through carbon fuels -  particularly, coal, 
petroleum, and natural gas. However more recently, nations are now beginning to seek 
alternative means because o f the environmental concerns that are associated with the use 
of carbon sourced energy as well as energy security concerns. This stems on one hand 
from the fear that carbon source energy is being depleted and that it would take millions 
of years to be renewed. The second concern stems from the impact of carbon fuels on 
climate change.
Regarding the climate change concerns, the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate 
Change1 (IPCC) established in 1988 by the World Metrological Organization (WMO) 
and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) which provides information 
relating to global warming, concluded that it is likely that anthropogenic warming has 
had a discernible influence on the environment. It also concluded that the most observed
1 Alcamo, J., et al, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution o f  Working 
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report o f the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. 
Parry, et al, Eds., (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 2007)
1
increase in the globally average temperature is very likely due to the observed increase 
in human-induced activities in Green-House Gas (GHG) concentrations, to which coal 
fired power stations and burning o f fossil fuels make a significant contribution. The 
IPCC report states that the effects o f temperature increase affect marine and freshwater 
biological systems; snow ice systems (that is, melting glaciers and changes in the arctic 
system); hydrologic systems (increased and earlier runoff and warming o f waters); and 
terrestrial biological systems (earlier springs, pole ward and upwards shifts in ranges of 
plants and animals). The report adds that further future impacts o f climate change are 
projected to be increased droughts in many areas, increased frequency of heavy 
precipitation and flooding, increased extinctions and also death and injury to humans.2 
Findings also reveal that Europe is sensitive to extreme condition o f climate change. For 
example, there may be extreme seasons particularly exceptional hot and dry summers 
and wild winters, short duration events such as windstorms and heavy rains, long-term 
changes in climate which among other impacts, will put particular pressure on coastal
'y
areas. In addition to this, the environmental effects o f climate change have also been 
linked to both global and national security. There are arguments that the varying impacts 
of climate change such as the rising sea levels, widespread shortages of food and water, 
and other driving migrations presents climate change as a more serious issue in the 
fragile parts o f the world. This is based on the assumption that the likely social, political 
and economic consequences o f the impacts o f climate change might in turn interact with 
each other and lead to further challenges such as environmental insecurity and conflict.4
On the other hand, the debate about the security of energy supply has also risen 
up the global energy policy agenda during the past few years. There are many reasons 
for this. This includes the rapid increases in oil and gas prices, heightened awareness of 
terrorism, national security concerns in oil producing countries (for example, tension in 
the Middle East), and the blackouts that have hit several security networks. The key
2 Ibid, Chapter 17
3 Ibid
4 Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, Climate 
Change and International Security, 14 March 2008, S /113/08. Page 2
2
threats are however the price o f energy and its availability.5 Also in particular 
jurisdictions such as the UK, energy security has been driven by the decline in coal 
production and projections of declining production o f oil from the North Sea. This has 
resulted in projections o f rapidly rising dependence upon imported fossil fuels.6
In light o f the above, there are arguments that by providing domestic supplies of 
electricity through low carbon energy sources the government could reduce the concerns 
over climate change and energy security. Helm7 for example argues that using nuclear 
energy may on one hand ease Europe’s growing gas dependency from Russia, and over 
time as electricity provides a greater share o f the transportation sector, it will also reduce 
reliance on oil imports too. On the other hand, he adds that the use of nuclear energy 
may also help mitigate the environmental effects o f climate change because it is one of 
the very few large-scale deployable technologies producing low carbon energy.
In this regard, there is a continuous worldwide debate as to whether nuclear 
energy really addresses the above carbon concerns. The position o f the UK government 
is that it does. This has been encouraged by the expected closure o f most o f its existing 
nuclear power stations by the year 2023 as they reach the end o f their expected working 
lives, coupled with the possible closure o f coal and oil power stations over the next 
decade. The government maintains that without existing nuclear power stations, the 
UK’s total annual carbon emissions from all energy use would be 5-12% higher than 
they are today if gas or coal power stations had been built instead.8 In its Nuclear Energy
5 J. Watson and A. Scott, New Nuclear Power in the UK: A Strategy fo r  Energy Security?, 
Upergen/RCEP/UKERC Conference: Sustainable Energy UK: Meeting the Science Engineering 
Challenge, (Oxford, May 2008)
6 M. Grubb, et al, Diversity and Security in UK Electricity Generation: The Influence o f  Low Carbon 
Objectives, University o f Cambridge (Cambridge Working Papers in Economics), available at 
<http://www.dspace.cam.ac.Uk/bitstream/l 810/131626/1 /ep74.pdf> last accessed 10 November 2011
7 D. Helm, Nuclear Power, Climate Change, and Energy Policy, in D. Helm and C. Hepburn, The 
Economics and Politics o f  Climate Change, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) 253
8 Department o f  Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), Meeting the Energy Challenge: A 
White Paper on Nuclear Power, CM 7296, (The Stationery office (TSO), 2008) Para. 14. Oldbury 1 and 
2(started operation in 1968 and it is expected to shut down by February 2012; Wylfa 1 and 2 (started 
operation in 1971-2 and expected to shut down by the end o f  2012 or September 2014; Dungeness B 1 and 
2 (started operation in 1985-6 and it is expected to shut down 2018); Hartlepool 1 and 2 (started operation 
in 1984-5 and it is expected to shut down 2019); Hinkley Point B 1 and 2 (started operation in 1976-8 and 
it is expected to shut down by 2016); Sizewell B (started operation in 1995 and it is expected to shut down 
by 2035) -  See World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom ’ at 
<http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf84.html> last accessed 11 o f  August 2011
3
White Paper, the government adds that “nuclear energy should have a role to play in the 
country’s energy portfolio alongside other low-carbon sources in meeting green house 
gases (GHG) emissions targets, and that it would be in the public interest to allow 
energy companies the option o f investing in new nuclear power stations, with the 
government taking active steps to facilitate this”.9 While this is the U K’s current view on 
the use o f nuclear energy, it should be remembered that this is not the first time the 
government is treading the nuclear path.
In the 1950s, the UK government embarked on a programme of nuclear power 
for electricity generation. It published a White Paper10 -  “A Programme fo r  Nuclear 
Power” which highlighted the growing energy demand and proposed three programmes 
in it.11 It is also during this period that cooperation among European States in nuclear 
energy production began. This ultimately led to the creation o f the European Atomic 
Energy Community Treaty 1957,12 signed by six founding members namely: Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands. At this point, nuclear energy 
seemed to be the fuel o f the future and the Joint European action on the nuclear front 
appeared as an attractive prospect in the mid-1950s to reduce dependence on Middle 
East oil and American coal, and also the worries o f the cutting off of Europe’s oil
i  o
supplies in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis.
Having said this, the use of nuclear energy has nevertheless been on the back 
foot for some time now because o f environmental safety concerns such as the 
proliferation of nuclear materials and reactor accidents which exposes humans to the 
various risks that are associated with the use o f nuclear energy. The problem of 
proliferation is the risk o f the production o f nuclear weapons to cause havoc to the
9 Ibid, p.7. See also: House o f  Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology: Nuclear Research and 
Development Capabilities: 3rd Report o f Session 2010-2012 (TSO, London. November 2011)
10 Ministry o f  Fuel and Power, A Programme o f  Nuclear Power, (1954-55) (Cmd. 9389) HMSO
11 The first programme dealt with the construction o f  two nuclear power stations which were to start in 
mid 1957, followed by the construction o f  two further power stations in 1958, and the third programme 
was a proposed construction o f  four more stations which were to commence in 1960 with a further two in 
1961. Note: the government also published -  The Second Nuclear Power Programme, (1964) (Cmnd. 
2335) HMSO
12 The European Atomic Energy Community Treaty (EURATOM) 1957
13 M.J. Dedman, The Origins and Development o f  the European Union 1945-95, (Routledge, London 
1996) 98
4
environment. This includes the destructive use o f nuclear power through the act of 
terrorism. This has gained global condemnation, and it remains one o f the leading issues 
on the international security agenda that was created by the end o f the Cold War and the 
break-up o f the Soviet Union.14 With respect to reactor accidents there is a fear o f the 
release of radioactive materials into the environment and this has been heavily 
scrutinised by the public over time especially after incidents such as the Windsacle 
accident o f 1956, the Three Mile Island accident (TMI) of 1979 and o f course the 
Chernobyl disaster o f 1986. These accidents and other environmental safety concerns 
have however led to the creation o f various nuclear power laws and policies as a 
response.15 In part also, the creation o f these laws and policies has not only served as a 
constraint to the development o f nuclear energy but in some instances promote its 
development.16 In what turns out to be a more recent event is the Fukushima nuclear 
power disaster in Japan which put these nuclear power laws and policies back into the 
spotlight.
For present purposes, the extent to which the Fukushima nuclear power disaster 
may impact environmental safety concerns o f the use and development of nuclear power 
is better construed through an examination o f the events prior, during, and after the 
disaster.
1.2. THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER AS A MATTER OF 
PERSPECTIVE
The earthquake and tsunami waves that struck Japan on March 2011 led to widespread 
devastation across a large part o f Japan, with more than 14,000 lives lost and at least 
10,000 people remain missing, with many more being displaced from their homes as 
towns and villages were either destroyed or swept away. As well as other industries and 
economic infrastructures, several nuclear power facilities were affected by the severe 
earthquake and large multiple tsunami waves; The Tokai, Higashi Dori, Onagawa, and
14 M. B. Maerli and S. Lodgaard, Nuclear Proliferation and International Security,(Routledge, London 
2007)2
15 For example, see Chapter Four below for international conventions and regional safety measures 
adopted after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster
16 P. Cameron, ‘The Revival o f  Nuclear Power: An Analysis o f the Legal Implication’, J. Environmental 
Law (2007) 19(1): 71-87, 14
5
TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni nuclear power plants were all affected. The 
large tsunami waves affected all these nuclear facilities to varying degrees, with the 
most serious consequences occurring at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi.17 The disaster 
however surpassed other nuclear power disasters in that it shows a new way in which 
nuclear power disasters may occur.
Due to the large tsunami waves that swept through the Japanese province, the 
disaster was principally a result o f flooding. At the time o f the earthquake, the three 
reactors operating at Fukushima shutdown automatically and the shut down cooling 
systems commenced as they were designed to do until some minutes later when the 
tsunami hit the site. As a result, all power to the cooling systems for the reactors and 
reactor fuel ponds were lost including that from backup diesel generators. Consequently, 
the operators were faced with unprecedented operational difficulties with no power, 
reactor control or instrumentation, and severely affected communications systems both 
within and external to the site. They had to work in darkness with almost no 
instrumentation and control systems to secure the safety o f the reactor, associated fuel 
pool, and spent fuel storage facilities. With no means to control or cool the reactor units, 
the reactor units that were operational up to the time of the earthquake quickly heated up 
due to usual reactor decay heating. Despite the brave and sometimes novel attempts of 
the operational staff to restore control and cool the reactors and spent fuel over days, 
several large explosions and fires occurred. This was as a result o f the fuel heating up 
the fuel cladding, and reacting with water, steam, and hydrogen being released. The 
explosions caused considerable damage to the reactors as the site struggled to put 
cooling water into the reactors and the reactor fuel ponds by previously untried and 
unplanned means for over a week. These explosions caused further destruction at the 
site, making the difficulties faced by the operators even more demanding and dangerous, 
with radioactive materials also spreading into the environment. These events were later 
determined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be o f the highest 
rating on the International Nuclear Event Scale.18
17 IAEA, Fukushima Nuclear Accident Update Log. Available at
<http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.html> accessed last 15 September 2011
18 Ibid
6
Earlier on in the chain o f events, the Japan authorities instigated severe measures 
around the site area. It imposed a 3km evacuation zone, then a 10km zone, and later a 
20km mandatory evacuation zone around the sites, including the evacuation of people 
from certain more distant towns and villages. In similarity to the Chernobyl disaster, 
there were also restrictions on agricultural food stuffs and drinking water at distances 
more than 100km, and further measures on environmental monitoring and its 
evaluation.19
Arguably, the impact of the earthquake and tsunami on the Japanese nuclear 
plants was no surprise. This is because of the nature and design o f the nuclear reactors at 
Fukushima which shows the lack of preparedness for a nuclear disaster. The tsunami 
which was larger than 14 meters high and was clearly in excess o f the design o f the 
Fukushima plants which is only designed to withstand tsunami waves of approximately 
6 meters high. Ideally in this regard, one would have thought that the Sumatra- 
Andaman earthquake in the Indian Ocean, with an estimated 9.2 magnitude resulting to a 
tsunami that caused more than 200,000 fatalities, should have provided adequate 
evidence to Japan’s nuclear regulators that wide spread and unimaginable devastating 
earthquakes are possible along the Pacific Rim, and that facility accident response 
capabilities should be strengthened against this kind o f natural threat.21 In addition to 
this, the fact that the reactors was also designed to accommodate spent fuel in ponds on 
site may have exacerbated the impact of the disaster. For example, hundreds of 
thousands o f tons o f highly radioactive spent fuel rods were stored on site just like most 
o f other nuclear power nations, and it is believed that a number o f spent fuel related 
activities were also carried out on site at any particular time. With these activities been 
carried out on site, it was clear that a catastrophic disaster was inevitable as the tsunami
19 IAEA <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/iapan-report/chapter-5.pdf> last accessed 1 
November 2011
20 M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Station Blackout Accident, available at 
<https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mragheb/www/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engin 
eering/Fukushima%20Earthquake%20and%20Tsunami%20Station%20Blackout%20Accident.pdf> last 
accessed 10 December 2011
21 H. L. Hall, Fukushima Daiichi: Implications for Carbon-Free Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation, and 
Community Resilience, Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management, Vol.7, No.3, pp.406-408, 
406
waves, which reached areas deep within the reactor units, left little hope o f assistance in 
shielding the spent fuel stored on site.22
Surely it is too early to fully determine the effects (to include trans-boundary 
effects) o f the Fukushima nuclear power disaster because threats o f these kinds have 
unknown effects that often take years to manifest. The disaster nevertheless provides a 
strong argument for reconsidering nuclear power policy among different countries. It has 
been a warning sign to alert countries that had been planning to build new nuclear power 
plants, or extend the lives of existing ones, about the risks and spatial dimension o f the 
dangerous situations that may arise from a nuclear power disaster. As a matter o f fact, 
the disaster has helped these countries to rethink their plans on how best to protect their 
citizens from not only the possible effects o f the trans-boundary release o f radioactive 
materials into the environment as a result o f a nuclear disaster, but also to prevent any 
future nuclear power disaster from occurring. For example, China which is developing 
no less than twenty-seven o f the world’s sixty-two new reactors have proclaimed a 
suspension o f nuclear expansion programme. In response to the aftermath of the 
Fukushima disaster, the government has suspended the approval o f all new nuclear 
power stations, with further plans to carry out comprehensive safety checks on all 
existing plants, and also review all nuclear projects including those under construction. 
Reports however indicate that China would still continue with its plan to build further 
nuclear power stations because the government believes that Chinese nuclear power 
stations are newer and safer than those in Japan.24 So also is the United States (US) 
which announced that it would conduct a review o f its nuclear power reactors so as to 
identify obvious and potentially critical issues posed by the Fukushima disaster, and then 
a longer term assessment to identify other less obvious issues.25 On the other hand the 
UK, which currently has a programme to commission eleven new reactors, also kept the 
situation in Japan under review. Based on its policy to favour nuclear power, it is not 
surprising that the government in its Fukushima report concluded that the situation in
22 M. Ragheb, n 20 above
23 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, China Nuclear: Response to Fukushima, (British Embassy Beijing, 
March 2011)
24 Ibid, Para. 2
25 C. Clement-Davies, The After-Shocks o f Tsunami: Nuclear Loss and Renewable gain? I.E.L.R. 2011, 3, 
63-64, 63
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Japan does not have any substantial implication on its nuclear industry, but admitted that 
this does not stop the industry from taking further preventive measures both for natural 
accidents along coastal regions in relation to erosion and flooding possibilities.26 Despite 
the regulator’s assurance that a nuclear accident on the scale o f Fukushima could never 
happen in the UK mainly because o f its geographical location, it is nevertheless still a 
matter o f concern that the risks o f accident from operation o f nuclear reactors cannot be 
completely ruled out. This is because of human behavioural factors in operation 
management which may induce accidents. Also because most o f the functioning reactors 
in the UK are not o f modern design; although they are o f different design from those 
used at Fukushima. This is based on a shared stand point o f nuclear pioneers (to include 
the government) that modern nuclear reactor designs are expected to reduce the very 
small risks o f accident still further.27
Also within the sphere o f environmental protection from the harmful effects of 
the risks o f nuclear power, anti-nuclear groups in the form o f the wider public28 and 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) continue to argue to halt its development in 
that the environmental negativities attached to the use o f nuclear power makes it unsafe 
no matter where the reactors are built or how they are built.29 As explained further in this 
thesis, the involvement o f these groups in nuclear safety discourse is a material 
consideration in terms o f decision-making and the acceptability o f the use of nuclear 
power.
1.3. TH EM A TIC STRUCTURE
Considering the sequence o f events above, this research argues that the safety issues of 
nuclear power recur and as such may hinder its development as an alternative source of 
low-carbon energy supply; with an attempt to find a solution to these issues at the 
international, regional, and national level. The reason for this is because it is clear that
26 Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: Implications fo r  the UK Nuclear 
Industry: Final Report, September 2011. Available at <http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/fukushirna/final- 
report.pdf> lasted accessed on 4 November 2011. See: Para. 386-401, 549, and Annex F respectively
27 DTI (2006), Energy Review. The Energy Challenge, (Cm 6887) July, HSMO. Para. 5.121
28 European Commission, EUROBAROMETER 234: A Report on Europeans and Nuclear Safety, March
2010. Page 11
29 Greenpeace International, “Safety”
<http://www.greenpeace.org/intemational/en/campaigns/nuclear/safetv/> last accessed 20 November 2011
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there are still major environmental safety concerns associated with the use of nuclear 
power. The Fukushima disaster has shown that there are important safety lessons to be 
learnt, and ideally such safety lessons should ultimately help in shaping further our 
understanding of how to prevent and manage a nuclear power disaster.
As to the above, this research examines: the inherent characteristics that make 
nuclear power distinct from other low carbon sources o f energy; the role o f law in 
ensuring the safe use o f nuclear power; the adequacy and effectiveness nuclear power 
safety regulations; and whether we need to review these safety regulations.
In addressing these issues, this research is divided into six chapters, this 
introduction being the first. Chapter Two is risk-based and it examines societal 
responses to the risk o f nuclear power. It looks at the risk o f nuclear power as a social 
issue; and the approach taken in environmental risk decision-making, to include inherent 
issues such as public participation. Chapters Three and Four looks at the legal responses 
to the risk o f nuclear power. However to avoid repetition, the former examines the 
principles o f environmental risk regulation. It starts by examining the various risks that 
are associated with the use o f nuclear power, so as to put into context the principles of 
environmental risk regulation in light o f the threats posed by these risks. The latter 
however examines nuclear power safety regulations. It looks at international, EU, and 
national nuclear safety regulations, so as to determine whether there is need for 
regulatory review. Chapter Five is a case study. It looks at the UK nuclear power 
planning regime and the issue o f public participation which is far becoming an 
unavoidable part o f discussions on the development o f nuclear power. Chapter Six 
which is the conclusion summarizes the arguments o f all chapters.
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CHAPTER 2
SOCIETAL RESPONSES TO THE RISK OF NUCLEAR POWER
2.1. INTRODUCTION
As discussed in the introductory part above, the defining features of this century, that is, 
the issue o f climate change and energy security has changed nuclear power’s place in the 
UK. This should not come as a surprise. It is because nuclear energy has been tipped to 
reduce the concerns of global warming caused by self induced human activities in the 
environment, and also to help in the diversification of energy supply. However while 
nuclear energy may stand to address these concerns, there are arguments that nuclear 
energy is not entirely carbon free. For example, Ping argues that in energy production, 
use, and disposal, “There Ain’t No Such Thing as a Free Lunch” (TANSTAAFL). In his 
analysis, he explains that no form of energy provides us a “free lunch” energy use that is 
free from negative environmental, public health, and other social costs. With no 
exception, he argues that nuclear energy produces carbon from the mining of uranium, to 
the transportation o f nuclear materials, and also in the construction o f nuclear reactors.1 
Nonetheless, one may still find it easy to contend that nuclear energy is far less carbon 
consuming because it produces carbon only from the processes mentioned above, and 
not in reactor operation.
Having said that, the inherent characteristics o f the environmental risks that are 
associated with the use o f nuclear energy clearly differentiates it from other fossil or low 
carbon energy source. These include: risk to human health, the environment, and 
national security; and they are present in the different stages o f the nuclear process 
starting from uranium extraction, to fuel fabrication, to accidental release from plant 
sites, to transportation accidents, and nuclear waste.2 The outcome o f the existence of 
these risks has been that in general, fear has alternately preoccupied the minds o f the 
wider public, and as a result there are varying views on the continuous use o f nuclear
1 G Pring, A. Hass and B. Drinkwine, ‘The Impact o f  Energy on Health, Environment, and Sustainable 
Development: The TANSAAFL Problem’ in D Zillman, and Others, (Eds) Beyond the Carbon Economy, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 15. The adage TANSFAAFL means individuals and societies 
cannot get something for nothing.
2 Ibid. See Chapter Three below for further analysis o f the risks o f  nuclear power
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energy. The accidents of Windscale, the TMI, the Chernobyl, and the Fukushima nuclear 
power disaster have seemed to ignite their fears as it shows that there are unavoidable 
risks across national boundaries. In this regard, there is also continuous opposition by 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) towards the development o f nuclear power, 
and it seems inevitable as it is with most major environmental infrastructural projects 
that the participation o f these groups may continue to lead to legal challenges in various 
aspects o f its development of nuclear power.3 At the same time, the nature of the risks 
that are associated with nuclear energy and the participation o f both the NGOs and the 
wider public, also broaden the possibility for environmental re-examination of risk, with 
increasing questions o f risk more likely to be raised in the various nuclear development 
processes.
However in the present context, it is more or less impossible to have any 
discussion on risk without discussing Beck’s influential theory o f the “risk society”.4 His 
work put into context the heightened concern over risk, particularly technological risks 
as it is based on the idea that post-industrial risk which is caused by innovations in 
science and technology is far more multifaceted than that o f pre-modernity.
Beck’s contribution that the risk we face in contemporary society are 
manufactured5 coupled with our wider understanding o f  the risks o f nuclear power opens 
a discussion on risk in the twenty-first century. This chapter thus examines the societal 
responses to the risk of nuclear power in the UK. How these responses affect the 
acceptability of risk and the development of nuclear power also remains an objective 
within the premise o f this chapter. In so doing, it is divided into three parts. Across these 
parts, I focus respectively on risk as a social issue; how we deal with risk in the society; 
and also the issue o f public participation and the acceptability o f risk.
3 For example, see Chapter Five o f this thesis for discussion in environmental planning context. Also, S. 
Tromans, Nuclear Waste Management and New Build, Environmental Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 (2009) 
233-245, 233
4 U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage Publications, London 1992)
5 Giddens refers similarly to contemporary risks as ‘manufactured risk’. See A. Giddens, ‘Risk and 
Responsibility', (1999) 62 Modem Law Review 1-10, 4
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2.2. RISK  AS A SO CIETAL ISSUE
Risks both natural and man-made are part o f the human society. We seem to be 
bombarded with risk and information about risk because there is a degree o f risk in 
everything we do. For example, there is risk in the mode o f travel we embark on, in the 
food we eat and also in the air we breathe. As a consequence, we are afforded with 
opportunity to participate in environmental risk discussions and perhaps to examine 
scientific/technical information;6 either through active or passive engagement.
Where nuclear energy is concerned as an example, the public view is that its use 
for electricity generation poses risks to the environment.7 Attention has however been 
drawn to this and it is continuously been argued by nuclear pioneers and regulators that 
nuclear material and technology also hold the promise of significant benefits in a variety 
o f fields, from medicine to the agricultural industry.8 Nonetheless, there is still wide 
spread disbelieve among the public.
To gain further understanding o f risks that are imposed on societies as a whole, 
attention will now be drawn to Ulrich Beck’s contribution. For sociologists such as 
Beck, a central feature o f contemporary society is the introduction of risks. In his 
seminal work, he argues that new technologies and their related risks are creating a new 
era o f advanced modernity that we live in, and as a result he adds that the society is 
freeing itself from the formations o f the classical industrial society and establishing a
6 J. Parkins and R. Mitchell, ‘Public Participation as Public Debate: A Deliberative Turn in Natural 
Resource Management’, Society and Natural Resources (2005), 18: 529-540, 531
7 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Public Opinion on Electricity Options, October 2007, 
Number 294
8 IAEA, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/radlife.html> last accessed 14 October
2011. Note: there are other environmentalists who support the use o f  nuclear energy with perhaps 
considerable expertise. An example James Lovelock, a writer, scientist and an advocate o f nuclear power 
who is hardly mainstream with his ideas gave his view that radiation does not affect wild plants and 
animals. While this may sound too extreme to anti-nuclear groups, he backed up his writing by arguing 
that the best sites for nuclear waste disposal are the tropical forests and other habitats in need o f a reliable 
guardian against their destruction by hungry farmers and developers. In his recent publication, he adds that 
unreasoning fear prevents an immediate build o f  new power; voicing out concerns over what he referred to 
as ‘concatenation o f  lies’, and that the risks associated with nuclear power are massively exaggerated. He 
concluded that while nuclear power may not be an ideal solution to the problem o f non-polluting power 
sources in respect to the waste produced, it is the most efficient at present if  handled properly. See J. 
Lovelock, The Revenge o f  Gaia: Why the Earth is Fighting Back -  and How We Can Still Save Humanity 
(Penguin Books, London 2006) 91; and also, J. Lovelock, The Vanishing Face o f  Gaia: A Final Warning 
(Penguin Books, London 2009)
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new phase. This phase he called the “risk society”; which is also a third stage o f his 
analysis on social change, following pre-modernity and simple modernity as reflexive 
modernity.9
In his analysis, Beck explains that the risk society is a new phase of development 
where the logic o f risk production and distribution replaces the logic behind wealth. At 
the same time, he agrees that risk is not new in the society; however, he argues that 
techno-scientific risks are different.10 In so doing, he puts forward an interesting claim. 
He contends that in pre-modernity, social order was centred on the distribution of goods 
which were directly tied to social class; while the risk society is no longer concerned 
with this distribution o f these goods but rather with the distribution o f risks that poses far 
greater hazards because o f their global nature. It is to this that he was able differentiate 
the hazards o f early modernisation which includes famines, plagues and other natural 
disasters which he perceived as non-human forces that have been continually reduced 
compared to those that are associated with the risk society, which includes 
environmental hazards such as radiation exposure, toxins, and the risks inherent in our 
everyday lifestyle, which are introduced by industrial decisions on the development of 
agents such as nuclear power and genetic modified organisms (GMOs).11
Although Beck did not explicitly suggest that the risk society is more hazardous 
than the pre-modem society, he however argues that contemporary risks challenges the 
basis o f calculations of environmental risk.12 That is, a situation where risks elude the 
control and protective measures of the society. Arguably, this is an important point 
where one agrees with Beck when assessing the effects and impacts o f risk in the 
society. For example, there is little doubt that the characteristics o f a nuclear disaster has 
pointed out to a symbol o f risk society where everyone is potentially exposed to man- 
made technological disasters.13 That is, nuclear power has created a global connectivity 
through the creation of risks that we are all exposed to. Surely, this may be in the event
9 U. Beck, n 4 above 9
10 Ibid
11 Ibid 183
12 Ibid 22
13 A. Liberatore, The Management o f Uncertainty: Learning From Chernobyl, (Gordon and Breach 
Publishers, Amsterdam 1999) 2
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of the occurrence of the release o f radioactive materials into the environment from 
nuclear power installations which affects the society at large. For example, there are 
signs that there are still a number o f farms that are affected by the aftermath of the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster across Europe. Indications are that, places such as Cumbria 
in England are still being tested for radiation twenty three years after the incident which 
polluted the ground with radioactive substances.14 Additionally, it is also the case that 
these risks have uncertain distributional effects on the environment as they are not 
contained in one locality.15 In their nature, they may be unpredictable and catastrophic 
but when they occur they have no regard for members o f society. This is perhaps what 
Beck explains as new forms o f risk which can act back upon the producers o f risk in the 
society. According to him, these risks sooner or later strike those who produce or profit 
from them, and that the rich, poor, and powerful members of the society are not safe 
from their effects because they are hazards that affects the whole society equally.16 In 
other words, everyone is a potential victim in the risk society. Considering the uncertain 
nature and spatial dimension o f contemporary risks as seen here, it is not surprising that 
Beck argues that these risks challenge society control measures. Arguably, this is 
because as seen in Chapter 3 below, it is still the same society which has developed 
management basis for dealing with visible problems such as famine that will also adapt 
itself to address the invisible problem of risk that is created by the society itself. As 
such, it is perhaps right to say that the society is pressurised to minimize risks and 
manage them effectively.
In sharing Beck’s view, Giddens adds that these risks are expanding in most 
dimensions o f human life. He agrees that risk is associated with a side o f science and 
technology which the early industrial society did not foresee, and that science and
14 Andrew Simms, ‘Unnatural Disasters’ available at
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2003/oct/15/guardiananalvsispage.climatechange> accessed 8 
September 2010. There are also indications that nuclear power causes a problem it cannot resolve. An 
example is the radioactive contaminated areas in Scotland will remain polluted despite attempts made.
See: R. Edwards, Scottish Nuclear Fuel Leak ‘will Never be Completely Cleaned up’, available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/sep/2l/scottish-nuclear-leak-clean-up> assessed 22 
September 2011
15 S. Jasanoff, Learning from  Disaster: Risk Management After Bhopal (University o f Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia 1994) 122
16 Beck n 4 above 23
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technology create many uncertainties which cannot be solved in any simple way by yet 
further scientific advance.17 So also is Luhman who accepts that we live in a society that 
has no choice but to run risks; although his view on critical sociology o f risk varies.18 
However, the concern over risk management takes us back to the fundamental question 
o f environmental safety measures because safety and risk run alongside. As discussed 
further below for present purposes, any ineffectiveness in dealing with technological risk 
may lead to lack o f public confidence in the government and consequently in 
environmental risk decisions that are made.
While it has been established above that Beck’s theory brings to fore the 
formation o f contemporary risks, it has however not been without criticisms. Turner19 
for example argues that Beck’s arguments would be to suggest that risk has not changed 
so profoundly and significantly over the last three centuries. For example, he questions 
whether the epidemics o f syphilis and bubonic plague in earlier periods are different 
from the modem environment illnesses to which Beck draws our attention; or whether 
his criteria o f risk, such as their impersonal and unobservable nature, really stand up to 
historical scrutiny. Besides, some commentators also find Beck’s theory o f the risk 
society difficult to recognise in that it lacks empirical studies. For example, Olofsson 
and Ohman20 carried out a survey by comparing people with different life contexts and 
experiences, so as to investigate how these people view risk, and if new risks are 
perceived differently. Their findings reveal that new risks are not something people 
worry about, and that risk is associated with personal experiences and life context. A:s 
such, they argue that this indicates a traditional or at least modem way of viewing risk:, 
and it contradicts the idea o f Beck’s view of risk.
Nevertheless, Fisher21 points out that the nature and existence o f thie 
distributional effects o f technological risk often depends on human behaviour. Shie 
explains that a cause o f any particular adverse effect may be the combination o f
17 A. Giddens, n 5 above 4
18 N. Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological theory (Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin 1993) 218
19 B.S. Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism  (Routledge, London 1994) 180
20 A. Olofsson and S. Ohman, Views o f Risk in Sweden: Global Fatalism and Local Control-An Empirical 
Investigation o f Ulrich Beck’s Theory o f  New Risks, Journal o f  Risk Research, Vol. 10, No. 2, 177-19<6, 
March 2007
21 E. Fisher, Risk Regulations and Administrative Constitutionalism  (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 8
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mutually interacting variables, such as that of the TMI and Chernobyl disasters, where 
accidents occurred due to numerous inter-linked factors including management, 
maintenance, operational error and technical failures, and the design o f the technology. 
The Fukushima disaster however raises further concern by identifying a new way in 
which risk may occur. The earthquake and tsunami disaster that struck Japan and cut out 
the electricity that powers the cooling system o f Fukushima nuclear reactors demonstrate 
that the occurrence o f technological risks may also be triggered by both natural disasters 
and human behaviour. As a result, it is far more apparent that we do not fully understand 
the nature o f the occurrence o f the risk that we face even though we may be able to 
estimate or predict their pattern o f occurrence.
This therefore raises a dilemma in environmental risk analysis because it is 
obvious from the Fukushima nuclear power disaster that an accident can go beyond the 
imaginations of risk analysts. Also in specific context such as nuclear power, it has come 
to the fore that we can never rule out every possible human error, natural accident or 
unpredictable events.22 Nonetheless, we may continue to develop preventative safety 
measures in the society. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
in response to Fukushima disaster has suggested that technology designers and operators 
should appropriately evaluate and provide protection against the risks of all natural 
hazards; they should update assessments and assessment methodologies o f new 
information, experience and understanding o f the environment; and also, that severe 
long time combinations of external events should be adequately covered in design, 
operations, resourcing and other emergency arrangements.23 The IAEA response is at the 
same time a recognition that human activity is o f great importance and must be dealt 
with adequately in the society because it may exacerbate, avoid or even mitigate 
accidents.
22 M. Venables, ‘Nuclear power after Fukushima’, Engineering & Science, vol. 6, issue 4, April 2011.
23 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA International Fact Finding Expert Mission o f  the 
Nuclear Accident Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, Tokyo, Fukushima Dai-ichi 
NPP, Fukushima Dai-ni NPP and Tokai NPP, Japan, 24 May -  1 June 2011, Preliminary Summary.
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2.3. DEALING WITH RISK IN THE SOCIETY
According to Strydom,24 the extended discussions that followed in the wake of the 
development o f an atomic weapon at Los Alamos, the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and Soviet and American atomic tests in 1949 and 1954 respectively, 
provided a pervasive background for environmental risk discourse. In brief, he explains 
that the contemporary risk discourse dates back to the 1950s in the era o f nuclear power 
development which featured related questions about the safety o f nuclear technology and 
its destructive potential which was largely conducted by experts. He adds that the 
increasing concern about the environment from the 1960’s onwards however, saw a shift 
in environmental risk discourse from experts to include other social actors.
Strydom’s analysis o f risk discourse offers an overview of the shift in the 
approach o f environmental risk discourse to include political engagement and the public 
rather than solely for the experts to instinctively decide. However, it should be noted that 
this development did not change the orthodox role o f science in environmental risk 
analysis, but rather it complements the role o f science and defies any understanding of 
risk as purely a domain for science or experts.
Indeed, a general conclusion which can be drawn from both past and recent 
debates in the European Union (EU) is that risk analysis is based upon the practice of 
scientific evaluation in the form of Risk Assessment (RA), and by political Risk 
Management (RM). These two processes feature a distinction between the role of 
science in informing decisions on the acceptability o f an activity, and the political
• 25process to determine the necessary acceptability and regulatory action to be taken. 
There are however ongoing debates as to the roles of both RA and RM processes. In 
arguing for an overhaul o f this approach, commentators tend to align themselves into 
two groups. There are those who argue that science and expertise should be the primary 
basis for environmental risk decision-making and those who argue that democracy and
24 P. Strydom, Risk, Environment and Society (Open University Press, Buckingham 2002) 13
25 M. Douglas, Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences (Routlegde & Kegan Paul, London 
1985)
18
ethical values should be the primary basis.26 Below are some o f the underlying issues o f  
debates.
2.3.1. Risk Assessment
RA plays a vital role in the regulation of activities that can cause harm to the 
environment. Many environmental problems cannot be perceived, let alone understood 
or addressed without sophisticated scientific expertise. For example, this could be in 
addressing the consequences of global warming on the environment and also the 
identification o f acceptable levels o f environmental pollution.
In an illustrative manner, Ruckelshaus27 defines RA as the scientific device that: 
society has adopted to indicate the possible effects o f risk, and an attempt to quantify the 
degree o f hazard that might occur from human activities. Examples are the risks to 
human health and the environment from industrial chemicals. Going by this definition,, 
the way in which scientific RA is approached means that it must form the starting point 
in considering responses to questions o f risk. This scientific method indicates whether 
the risk o f an activity is o f a relatively well-understood type; and if  it is unfamiliar, an 
attempt should be made to identify the most nearly analogous threats and the aspects 
which are not understood before considering whether to reject, accept, reduce the risk, or 
to mitigate the effects.28 As it pertains to nuclear energy, the UK Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate (Nil) uses RA to determine acceptable levels o f radiation in setting 
environmental and safety standards. In practice those who control the plant are 
compelled by regulation to carry out an assessment o f the threats it poses before
90additional precautions are drawn upon.
26 E. Fisher, n 21 above 12. See also: S. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk 
Regulation (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1993). See also: K.S. Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear 
Power and Public Policy: The Social and Ethical Problems o f  Fission Technology (D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, Holland 1980) 153
27 W. Ruckelshaus, ‘Risk, Science, and Democracy’, Science and Technology, (1985) Vol. 1, 19-38
28 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, (DEFRA), The Government’s Response to the 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s 21st Report (November 2000) Para. 9.44
29 Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Safety Assessment Principles fo r  Nuclear Reactors (HMSO, 1982); 
and HSE, Safety Assessment Principles fo r  Nuclear Facilities (HMSO, 2006). See also: Regulation 7(1) o f  
the Ionising Radiations Regulations (IRR) 1999. IRR SI 1999 No. 3232
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Having said this, the process o f RA has been a subject o f severe scrutiny most 
especially as the focus of environmental risk shifts from visible hazards to more 
uncertain and invisible ones. As an outcome, the uncertainty that is characteristic of 
science raise series of questions in regard to the role o f science in identifying 
environmental risks, its accuracy and validity in environmental risk decision-making. 
Also as discussed in the next segment and in Chapter 3 below, such uncertainty may as 
well raise further political questions and the issue of the risk that the future generations 
are left with.
In RA, a prevailing feature is that analysis and some form o f prediction is 
important to assess what the adverse effect o f an activity may be and what measures will
• I f )successfully reduce it. In doing so, RA relies upon methodology such as experiments 
and sampling to predict, and also relies on modelling tools in collection o f data. There is 
a continuous argument that relying on modelling tools makes it difficult to assess 
whether a model is a constructive simplification or a misunderstanding o f the reality it is 
attempting to present. This creates a legitimate concern about the estimates or 
quantifications o f RA in environmental risk decision-making.31 Moreover, it is also 
believed that using experiments and samplings to assess risks may create methodological 
problems that are related to health. The concern is on whether animal studies or 
experiments fully represent an accurate analysis of the risk caused by exposure to 
radiation.32 Arguably, this is true o f past events that have demonstrated the flaws of 
science. O f particular resonance was the huge mistake made by UK scientists in 1986 in 
predicting the behaviour of radio-caesium in the environment after the Chernobyl 
disaster.33
Also, the methodology used in RA is a concern for prominent feminist 
environmental justice movements and NGOs who have begun to play an increasingly 
visible and influential role in environmental risk decision-making. Their involvement
30 E. Fisher, Drowning by Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk Regulation and the Pursuit o f Accountable 
Public Administration, Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies, Vol. 20, N o .l (2000), pp. 109-130, 115
31 E. Fisher, n 21 above 7
32 National Research Council, Science and Judgement in Risk Assessment, (National Academies Press, 
Washington 1994) 26
33 N. Hawkes and Others, The worst Accident in the World (Pan Books Ltd, London 1986) 155
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has however not gone unnoticed. Jasanoff and Wynne,34 argue that the contributions 
made by these groupings have not only created new facts to display methodology used 
in RA, but has exposed the manoeuvrability o f the boundary between nature and culture 
or science and society. They contend that in such cases there are many reasons to doubt 
the efficacy o f RA. According to Verchick35 for example, feminist environmental justice 
advocates challenge the model used in RA on three levels. Issues raised by this group 
are: whether scientific assessments are value-neutral, i.e., free o f societal bias or 
prejudice, or even in extreme cases that it does not presuppose the acceptance o f a 
particular value. In this regard, they argue that western science may be infused with its 
own ideology in its assessment process. Also, they argue that even if such inquiry by 
itself were value-neutral, environmental decisions that are based on such scientific 
inquiry would still contain subjective elements such as bias, concessions, and self- 
interest. They further add that scientific inquiries involving the risk o f death and disease 
should not even aspire to value neutrality. This is based on the perception that decisions 
which affect not only today’s generations but future generations should be made with all 
related political and moral considerations. In addition to the above, they also argue that 
the obsession with scientific concepts and technical methods are not to be relied upon at 
all because the practice represents a male bias process, and as a result they contend that 
the process o f identifying and evaluating environmental risk does not sufficiently 
represent a social inclusive process. Also, that the health studies currently used for RA 
fail to consider the variation in vulnerability to environmental threats, such as 
sociological and geographical factors among different groups.36 Although it may be 
difficult to adhere to these arguments because there is hardly any environmental group 
without a specific mandate or purpose o f establishment, be it negative or positive 
attributions. However, it is definitely the case that the translation of scientific 
information into environmental rules and standards o f conduct reinforce the concern 
over the natural environment and its inhabitants, and thus allow for scientific findings to 
be contested at different stages o f assessment.
34 S. Jasanoff and B. Wynne, Science and Decision-making in S. Rayner and E. L. Malone, Human Choice 
and Climate Change: The Social Framework, Vol. 1, (Battelle Press, Ohio 1998) 46
35 R. R. R. Verchick, ‘In Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice’, (1996) Harvard  
Women’s Law Journal, Vol. 19, 23-88, 76
36 Ibid 40
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In addition to the above, the dichotomy that exists in risk analysis has also been a 
subject of intense debate. It has been argued that the division between RA and RM has 
the tendency to distance the public, and in some cases even elected or appointed policy 
makers from major environment decisions.37 This is a considerable concern and indeed 
possible in situations where the complexities o f scientific inquiries are conducted in 
isolated scientific realm. For some, it is assumed that such division may help scientific 
inquiries to escape public and political scrutiny, thereby allowing the values and 
uncertainties o f RA to ultimately go uncontested, or even assume primacy in decision­
making rather than acting as an important element o f the process of risk analysis.38 This 
is a major concern when viewing the role o f science in both the formation o f energy 
policy and in risk decision-making. It is also an issue that continues to gain extreme 
publicity in environmental management. A practical example is from documents of the 
Inspector General of the United Sates (US) department of the Interior, a Report of
TOInvestigation. This report indicates that scientific environmental inquiries on which 
decisions are based upon can be manipulated by individual interests in applying the 
“Best Available Science”. An insight of the document reveals that Julie MacDonald, the 
former deputy assistant secretary of interior for fish, wildlife, and parks regularly 
intervened at the earliest stages o f scientific review and bullying the staff to reach her 
desired result.40 It was concluded that her actions in part led to the overturning o f the 
Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision on Greater Sage-Grouse in the USA. The USA’s 
federal court however held that the service had not applied the “Best Available Science” 
in reaching the decision.41 The decision o f the Court is convincing that scientific 
inquiries can be manipulated by individual interests, and this is of concern because
37 W.E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 7, 
1613-1723, 1673
38 K. Morrow, Genetically Modified Organisms and Risk, in L. Bodiguel and M. Cardwell, The 
Regulation o f Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford) 56
39 Office o f Inspector General, Department o f  the Interior, Report o f  Investigation, Julie MacDonald, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Fish, Wildlife and Parks 2 (2007). See:
<http://www.lb9.uscourts.gov/webcites/10documents/HomeBuilders conflict.pdf> accessed 15 September 
2011
40 Ibid
41 W. Watersheds Project v U.S. Forest Service, 535 F. Supp. 1173, 1183-85 (D. Idaho 2007). See also: H. 
Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1601-1653, (2007- 
2008) for a critical analysis o f the report
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scientific inquiries have the possibility o f shaping environmental risk regulations. As a 
result, there is little doubt that there may be negative consequences on the environment 
when false or misleading scientific information is submitted; the outcome o f which 
cannot be overstated in extreme cases.
Furthermore, personal values are not the only thing that affects scientific 
evaluations. Houck’s42 article on scientific inquiry raises the awareness o f yet further 
concern. In his analysis, he explains that there is a significant difference between the 
opinions o f scientists who receive corporate funding and those who do not during 
assessments. Quite simply, an understanding of this reveals that the process of scientific 
RA may also be overridden by financial interest. Regarding this, many commentators 
believe that this can literally be found in various subsidiary scientific institutions. An 
example is Mark Simmonds, a scientist and an employee o f NGO Greenpeace who once 
expressed concerns and gave precise indication as to how such interest develops. He 
explained that universities become more dependent on building external earnings and 
reckons that such an act put pressures on scientists to produce data that favours their 
sponsors. He emphasised specifically that because it is usually big companies who can 
afford such financial obligations, there is a danger that their vested interests will 
prevail.43 In respect to this, one may begin to doubt the recent recommendations o f the 
House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology. The report recommended 
that the Board o f Business Innovations and Skills on nuclear research should have the 
right to attract financial support from the nuclear industry and elsewhere.44 As to this, it 
may as well be the case that the outcome of such nuclear research may be to favour 
research sponsors rather than the nation as a whole.
In view o f these criticisms, it is strongly emphasised that there is the need to 
ensure that scientific inquiry does not go uncontested. One way of achieving this may be 
to ensure openness and transparency in scientific processes,45 or peer review which in
42 O. Houck, ‘Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy’, 12 December 
2003, Vol. 302, 1928, Science Magazine. See also: H.T. Stelfox et al., ‘Conflict o f  Interest in the Debate 
over Calcium-Channel Antagonists’, N. Engl. J. Med. 338, 101-6, (1998)
43 S. Yearley, The Environmental Challenge to Science Studies, in S. Jasanoff et all, Handboook o f  
Science and Technology Studies (SAGE Publications, London 1995) 477
44 House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology: Nuclear Research and Development 
Capabilities: 3rd Report o f  Session 2010-2012 (TSO, London. November 2011) Para. 143
45 E. Fisher, n 30 above 126
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turn has been argued to increase scientific integrity.46 Of course, there are many ways in 
which either of the above could be done. For example, it may be by creating an 
independent scientific body to compulsorily oversee scientific inquiries by requesting 
for the submission o f all findings to it. The UK Research Integrity Office for example 
squarely falls within this ambit. Its effectiveness in a variety o f scientific processes may 
however be limited because its concentrates more on the medical health industry.47
To this point, it is therefore not hard to imagine that the faith in science to define 
and solve complex environmental problems leaves many sceptical. For example, the 
uncertainty, which is the various problems involved (e.g. methodological problem) in 
determining the level of danger o f the risk of nuclear energy points to the direction that 
science, may not be able to cope effectively with a large-scale nuclear disaster. If so, 
could this then be the case of us doing without scientific RA in environmental risk 
decision-making? In answering this question, it should be noted that the role o f science 
cannot be separated from the decision-making process; rather, they co-evolve in 
response to each other because the existence o f scientific methods is what helps trace the 
causes of environmental problems. In this regard, Ruckelshaus48 adds that there appears 
to be no substitute for RA, in that some sort of risk finding is what tells us that there is 
any basis for regulatory action in the first place. He adds that the alternative to not 
performing RA is to adopt a policy o f either reducing all potential toxic emissions to the 
greatest degree technology allows or banning all substances for which there is any 
evidence of harmful effect. In response to this, it is arguable that the continuous 
adoption o f policy for reducing the agents o f risk appears more realistic than banning 
because environmental law is much more o f regulation. Banning these agents through 
the introduction of novel environmental laws will completely eliminate the agents o f the 
risk and may also suppress important benefits o f nuclear power. Although in some cases, 
the risks associated with these agents will still be a cause for concern. For example, a 
decision to ban the use o f nuclear power in existing nuclear states would still leave 
concerns o f risk unresolved. This is because half a century o f nuclear activities has left 
considerable waste for disposal and these wastes are still prone to sabotage, theft or
45 H. Doremus, n 41 above 1646
47 UK Research Integrity Office (UKRIO) at < http://www.ukrio.org/> accessed last 17 September 2011
48 W. Ruckelshaus, n 27 above
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accidental radiation release.49 Also for present purposes, a decision to terminate the use 
o f nuclear power or stop its development may have implications in addressing the 
carbon concerns.
2.3.2. Risk management
RM is the next stage in the decision-making process on risk and it concerns the potential 
use o f findings based on RA to make decisions about risk. It supports the statute and 
regulatory arrangements and it has been defined as a process of decision-making that 
integrates scientific findings within the broader structure o f policy and law.50 In this 
stage, the primary function is to reduce risk, particularly those that are associated with 
the cutting edge of science. Surely, the major reason for this is to decide how risk is to 
be controlled and to what extent if any based on the estimate o f RA.
RM seems to be carried out across a wide division o f authority amongst decision­
makers. For example, legislators determine the range and statutory basis o f applicable 
regimes; policy makers provide guidance on their operation; while regulators administer 
permits and the day to day running of regulatory systems.51 In the UK as an example, the 
starting point in the management o f industrial risk is to consider whether a given risk is 
so great or the outcome so unacceptable that it must be refused altogether; or whether 
the risk is, or has been made, so small that no further precaution is necessary; or if a risk 
falls between these two states, that it has been reduced to the lowest level practicable, 
bearing in mind the benefits flowing from its acceptance and taking into account the 
costs of any further reduction.52
49 D. Zillman, ‘The Role o f Law in the Future o f  Nuclear Power’ in D. Zillman and Others, (eds) Beyond 
the Carbon Economy, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 322. See also the Twenty-second o f The 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution on Energy-The Changing Climate 2000 (Cm 4749) at 
Para. 7.13. Without looking too far, there are also indications that radiation contaminated areas in Scotland 
will remain polluted even though attempts are made to ban the development o f  nuclear power; and 
Committee o f  Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM), 'managing our radioactive waste safely: 
CoRWM’s recommendations to the government', Doc 700, July 2006. As at the time o f  writing, the 
estimated tonnes o f  nuclear wastes stored on various nuclear sites across the UK was over 100,000 tonnes
50 L.D Guruswamy, ‘Sustainable Agriculture: Do GMOs Imperil Biosafety?’ (2001 -  2002) 9 Ind. J. 
Global Legal Stud. 461, 480
51 K. Morrow, n 38 above 55
52 HSE, The Tolerability o f Risk from  Nuclear Power Stations (Rev. 1992) 5
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Even though these tests are based upon the estimates o f science, the decision to 
proceed with an activity remains within the political sphere which at the end o f the day 
may also shape political agenda.53 Thus, it is possible for a country to make 
environmental risk decisions for political reasons. If so, then it is arguable that the 
government has an interwoven role o f minimising risk and also creating risk. For 
example where nuclear power is the subject, the driving force behind the government 
thinking of RM is the pressing issue of climate change and energy security. Here, the 
nuclear new build decision54 may be seen as an aspect o f the fundamental duty o f the 
state to protect the state by minimising as far as it is able, the risks to which the state is 
exposed from other fossil sources o f energy.55 It is also the case that the production of 
risk goes hand-in-hand with the effort to protect the environment from the effects of 
energy supply from fossil sources. Hence, the government’s role in the creation of risk is 
equally evident when viewed alongside the nuclear option. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that there is the “do nothing” option in governance for any given environmental 
problem. That is, to leave matters as they stand or perhaps to choose from review 
developments at some point in the future. However where new nuclear power decision is 
concerned, “doing nothing” may not be a welcome option as it may be seen as the 
creation o f risk or rather, the acceptance o f risk o f fossil sources o f energy.56 Besides in 
this political sphere, “doing nothing” may as well be a consequence of political misuse 
o f science. For example as seen in the US report above at 2.3.1, scientific inquiries may 
also be misinterpreted politically to give effect or to prevent certain environmental 
decisions. And in this case, it is usually the members o f the public who do not get their
cn
preferred environmental policy outcome that often raises such concern.
53 L.D Guruswamy, n 50 above 481
54 DTI (2006), Energy Review. The Energy Challenge, (Cm 6887) July, HSMO
55 J. Ash, Another Man’s Poison: ‘Risk Management and Nuclear Power Generation’, Electrical Policy 
Research Group, Judge Business School. Available at
<http://www.cessa.eu.com/sd papers/wp/wp2/0209 Ash.pdf> assessed 10 September 2010
56 Ibid. This is argued based on the speech o f - Alan Johnson, former Secretary o f  State for Trade and 
Industry (GNN, 2008) -  “we need to look at the risks to security o f  supply, our climate change 
commitments and, to long term, to make sure we take the necessary action. There is not a do nothing 
option”.
57 H. Doremus, n 41 above 1639
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Having said this, there are also various criticisms relating to RM. For example, 
there is the argument that decision-makers should no longer rely on science as the basis 
for environmental risk decisions because of the uncertainty inherent in RA as discussed 
above.58 As a result, this has over the years led to public distrust in RM. The Bovine 
Spongioform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreaks when the government announced that 
they have been linked to health effects in humans after initially rejecting such claims is 
an example o f situations where public distrust had grown in RM.59 Besides, BSE 
scenario also represents circumstances where not only the legitimacy o f risk regulation 
but the whole administrative process has been called into question by the public.60 Also, 
there is the concern that making decisions based on science may forcefully impose 
specific assertions on people. For example, the latest piece o f work by Ben Goldacre 
titled - Bad Science,61 which discusses “Brain Gym” as a string o f complicated and 
proprietary exercise for children and which enhance the experience o f whole brain 
learning is a classic example o f scientific evolution that has been imposed on members 
o f the society.
In relation to the above, nuclear power raises further concern. The concern here 
relates to the secrecy that engulfs the industry o f which events in the nuclear industry 
has done little to dispel.62 It is arguable that where there is secrecy, there is very real 
difficulty in testing levied criticisms against the government or perhaps contesting 
questions o f risk that is o f increasing concern to the public. In the UK as an example, 
secrecy had long existed in the nuclear power industry since the creation o f an ad hoc 
committee o f certain cabinet ministers called the GEN 16363 and also provisions o f the 
Atomic Energy Act 1964. The Atomic Energy Act for example states that “any person
58 E. Fisher, n 30 above 110
59 The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), 21st Report 1998 (Cm 4053); The BSE 
Inquiry: The Report -  Vol. 1, Findings and Conclusions: Executive Summary o f  the Report o f  the Inquiry, 
3. The Cause o f BSE at
<http://collections.europarchive.Org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquirv.gov.uk/pdf/volumel/Cover.pdf 
> last accessed 10 June 2011
60 E. Fisher, n 30 above 109. See also: Cabinet Office, Modernizing Government, Cm 4310 (1999) 16
61 Ben Goldacre, Bad Science (HarperCollins, London 2009) 13
62 See also: J.G. Palfrey, The Problem o f  Secrecy, Annals o f  the American Academy o f  Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 290, The Impact o f Atomic Energy (Nov. 1953), pp. 90-99; W.C. Patterson, Nuclear 
Power, 2nd edition (Pengiun Books, England 1986) 12, for a better understanding o f the secrecy issue in 
the nuclear industry
63 T. Hall, Nuclear Politics (Penguin Books Ltd, Middlesex 1996) 26
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who without the consent of the Minister communicates to any other person except an 
authorised person any document, drawing, photograph, plan, model or other information 
whatsoever which to his knowledge describes, represents or illustrates any existing or 
proposed plant used or proposed to be used for the purpose o f producing or using atomic 
energy; the purpose or method o f operation o f any such existing or proposed plant; and 
any process operated or proposed to be operated in any such existing or proposed plant, 
shall be guilty o f an offence under the Act”.64 It is towards this that Hill and Vielvoye65 
argue that secrecy in the nuclear industry is by all means essential so as to be cautious in 
releasing information because the nuclear technology developed as an extension of 
nuclear weapons. Even though one may accept that such precaution is deemed necessary 
in the modem day society where the variety of terrorist attacks over the last decade have 
centred attention on the international misuse o f the nuclear process,66 making decisions 
in esoteric ways is however, confronted with a variety o f international Conventions. 
These Conventions allow for the dissemination of information and the participation of 
the public in environmental risk decision-making.
64 Art. 11(1) o f the Atomic Energy Act 1964
65 P. Hill and R. Vielvoye, Energy Crisis (Robert Yeatman Ltd, London 1974) 186
66 D. Zillman, n 49 above 323
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I2.4. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK DECISION­
MAKING
Public participation means different things to many people. In the past, the term was 
often used to refer to opportunities for providing comments at public hearings, voting in 
referenda, or being a member o f a social movement. More recently, the meaning of 
public participation is far more ambiguous and it refers to a variety o f procedures for 
enabling diverse members o f the public to be participants on issues about preferred 
policy options, and in some cases decision-making processes.67 This development, that 
is, a move to more participatory procedure is now almost an instinctive response to 
concerns about the legitimacy o f environmental risk decisions.68 Such procedures are 
reflected in the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- 
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 1998,69 various EU 
environmental directives,70 and also national initiatives such as the UK Government’s 
Cabinet Office Code of Practice on Consultation.71
In principle, these procedural laws should allow members o f the public to partake 
in and influence environmental decisions. However in practice, there are still concerns 
that public participation gains little capacity in environmental decision-making process 
for it to influence decisions that are made. One way o f examining this concern is to 
consider public participation through the lens of Arnstein’s ladder of citizen 
participation72 which categorizes participation processes according to the degree to 
which decision-making involves the public.
67 T. Webler and S. Tuler, ‘Public Participation in Watershed Management Planning: Views on Process 
from People in the Field’, Human Ecology Review, (2001) Vol. 8, No. 2, 29
68 M. Lee, EU  Environmental Law: Challenges, Changes and Decision-Making (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2005) 113
69 The Convention was signed at Aarhus, in Denmark, in 1998. The EU has been a party to the Convention 
since 2005 (following Decision 2005/370/EC). The UK ratified it in 2005. Hereinafter referred to as the 
Aarhus Convention
70 Dir. 96/61/EC concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, [1996] OJ L257/26; Dir. 
85/337/EEC on the Assessment o f the Effects o f  Certain Private and Public Projects on the Environment, 
[1985] OJ L I75/40, as amended by Dir. 97 /11/EC amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the Assessment o f  
the Effects o f  Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, [1997] OJ L73/5
71 Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Code o f  Practice on Consultation, (July 
2004). Available at <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file47158.pdft> accessed on 24 June 2011
72 S. Arnstein, ‘A Ladder o f Citizen Participation’ (1969) 36 Journal o f American Planning Association 
216
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According to Amstein, the bottom rungs o f a ladder in citizen participation are: 
(1) Manipulation and (2) Therapy; these two rungs describe levels o f non-participation 
that have been falsely substituted by some to be a form of genuine participation. Their 
real objective is not to enable people to participate in programs, but to enable power 
holders to educate or cure participants. Rungs (3) Informing and (4) Consultation, 
progress to level o f tokenism that allow the have-nots to have a say, but they lack the 
power to ensure that their views will be heeded by the powerful. Rung (5) Placation is 
simply a higher level tokenism because the ground rules allow have-nots to advice, but 
retain for the power holders the continued right to decide. She added that further up the 
ladder are levels o f citizens’ power with increasing degrees o f decision-making clout. 
Citizens can enter into a (6) Partnership, which enables citizens to negotiate and engage 
in trade-offs with traditional power holders; (7) Delegated Power and (8) Citizen 
Control, where it is possible for the have-nots citizens to obtain the majority o f decision­
making seats, or full managerial power.
Although, Amstein’s ladder of citizen participation may be argued to be outdated 
because it focused on 1960s America’s society, for current purposes, it shows the extent 
to which the public has the ability to influence environmental risk decisions. In her 
analysis, the upper rungs o f the ladder such as delegated power and citizen control 
provide an opportunity for public participation with greater influence on decisions that 
are made, and it is possible for them to improve the quality o f decisions by contributing 
a wide range o f expertise and values upon which decisions are based. In contrast, those 
processes near the lower rungs of the ladder such as informing and consulting face the 
problem of not having their opinions taken into consideration when decisions are made. 
Under these processes, decision-makers are likely to overlook a range of knowledge and 
values presented to it, and participation may not necessarily be seen as improving the 
quality o f decisions that are made. Further, these processes are also likely to have a trend 
o f consistency in decisions when they often reflect the continuous opinion o f the 
decision-makers. In the language o f Kirk and Blackstock, the process of participation 
near the bottom rungs are best regarded as a way o f improving the range of the quality of
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information the regulator has before it, which may not be quite the same thing as 
improving the range o f information and values upon which decision is actually based.73
As discussed in this part, there is a growing consensus about the significance of 
public participation in environmental risk decision-making because the way in which 
risk is presented in the decision-making process assumes particular importance in terms 
of its acceptability. Against this background, one area that will be specifically looked at 
is the decision-making process for the development o f nuclear power in the UK. In so 
doing, I will discuss the attractions of public participation so as to contextualize its effect 
on the acceptability o f the risk o f nuclear power and its development.
2.4.1. Identifying the Public
Notwithstanding its wide use so far, it is necessary to determine the identity o f the public 
as there are different people who care, positively or negatively, about environmental 
decisions. Who they are may also depend on their ethical, moral, interest, and welfare 
viewpoints.74 To aid this process the following questions may be asked: who will 
potentially be affected by the risk and the consequences o f any management decision?; 
which parties or individuals have knowledge and expertise which may be useful to 
inform any discussion or decision?; which parties or individuals have expressed an 
interest in this particular, or similar type of, risk management problem?: and, who will
• 75be prepared to listen, respect diverse viewpoints and be prepared to negotiate? For 
present purposes, the identity of the public is: industry bodies, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and also the wider public.
2.4.2. Arguments for Public Participation
The arguments for public participation in environmental risk decision-making where 
nuclear power is concerned are not surprising. They include the following:
73 E. Kirk and K. Blackstock, ‘Enhanced Decision Making: Balancing Public Participation against ‘Better 
Regulation’ in British Environmental Permitting Regimes’ JEL (2011) 23 (1): 97-116
74 M.K. Ewing, Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making, (2003). Available at 
<http://www.gdrc.org/deci si on/001 -Th esis .pdf> accessed 4th July 2011
75 DEFRA, ‘Guidelines for Environmental Risk Assessment and Management’ (1995) Para. 3.8. available 
at <http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/qualitv/risk/eramguide/index.htm> last accessed 10 August 
2011
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First, public participation is often driven by the complex and dynamic nature of 
science. This is particularly important on the basis that scientific discourse is often 
highly technical and esoteric. As such, it may cause problems in the context of 
participatory approaches. For example, scientific evidence can prove difficult for the 
public to comprehend, let alone engage with critically. This is further complicated by the 
fact that in risk analysis, science plays an undeniable role in decision-making. Thus, it is 
arguable that if  the public is to understand the complexity that surrounds science, the 
pervasiveness o f these problems demands transparent decision-making that is flexible to 
changing circumstances and embraces a diversity of knowledge and values o f the
• 76  •public. This however, bears some resemblance with the EU principle which reiterates 
that scientific RA alone cannot in some cases provide all the information on which 
environmental decisions should be based. The EU principles acknowledges that other 
factors such as societal, economic, traditional, ethical and environmental factors and the 
feasibility o f controls should be considered to ensure that decisions made are clearly 
made.77
Second, it is also arguable that participation o f the public in environmental 
decision-making is highly welcome so as to understand environmental complexities as 
known to science in situations where the media play a role in marketing fear and in 
shaping the public perception o f risk. For example, this may be by portraying 
environmental risks probably more serious than estimated by scientist,78and it is usually 
the case that the media put fear in the minds o f the public as regards the impacts of 
technological risks when threats are oversimplified by the media itself.79 We are all 
familiar with this. An example o f past events in which the media have played a huge part 
in amplifying people’s perception o f a particular risk with considerable practical 
consequences includes the reporting o f the malfunctioning in the nuclear power station 
at Three Mile Island in the US,80 and more recently the Fukushima disaster.81 The
76 M.S. Reed, ‘Stakeholder Participation for Environmental Management: A Literature Review’, 
Biological Conservation 141 (2008) 2417-2431
77 European Communities, White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final
78 DEFRA, n 73 above at Para. 3.6
79 See: AgBio View Special, ‘Waiter...There is a Gene in My Soup!’... Communicating with the Public, 
Media and Policymakers on AgBiotech Issues’, available at <http://www. agbioworld.org/biotech- 
info/articl es/biotech-art/communicating.htm 1 #working> accessed 4 August 2011
80 RCEP, n 59 above.
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Fukushima disaster may as well be the opportunity for the media to re-assert itself in 
environmental risk issues. As to this, the marketing o f fear by the media may be of 
disadvantage in situations where there is increased public anxiety about the use of 
nuclear power. While this remains an issue, it would also be wrong to say that it is only 
towards the nuclear industry that environmental fear is being marketed. Examples 
extend to other areas such as Genetic Modified Organisms (GMOs) where the media 
also raises awareness o f issues relating to GMO products.82 However, in response to the 
role of the media as it relates to environmental disaster, Cutter83 argues that the problem 
o f media influence on the public lies in the inability o f scientists and journalists to 
communicate with one another and understand the pressures and constraints under which 
they both operate. Indeed, science and journalism are two distinct disciplines and 
significant steps will need to be undertaken on both sides to facilitate communication 
between the two disciplines. Such steps if undertaken could perhaps have reduced the 
fear of the government in releasing BSE information to the media. For example, the fear 
was that releasing information about BSE to the media would have caused 
disproportionate alarm, would be seized on by the media and dissident scientists as 
demonstrating that BSE was a danger to humans, and would lead to a food scare or, even 
more serious, a vaccine scare.84 At the same time care must be taken because any 
improved relationship between scientist and journalist might also lead to further 
consequence.
Third, another factor that engages the public in environmental risk decision­
making process is the scepticism at the marriage between the government and industrial 
scientists; yet it is the government and industry scientist who have prominent roles in 
environmental risk decision-making.85 For example, a survey o f public opinion on 
environmental issues in the UK found that the public have less confidence in
81 BBC, ‘Japan’s Fukushima Nuclear Plant Opened to Reporters’, available at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15705303> last accessed 6 December 2011
82 L. Bodiguel and M. Cardwell, Genetically Modified Organisms and the Public: Participation, 
Preferences, and Protest in L. Bodiguel and M. Cardwell, The Regulation o f  Genetically Modified 
Organisms: Comparative Approaches, (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 11
83 S.L. Cutter, Living with Risk: Geography o f  Technological Hazards, (Edward Arnold, London 1992) 48
84 BSE n 59 above at Para. 1197
85 L. Bodiguel and M. Cardwell, n 57 above 12
86 Department for Business Innovations and Skills (BIS), Market and Opinion Research International 
(MORI): Public Attitudes to Science 2011 -  Summary Report
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government and science itself due to series o f events relating to the hazards o f nuclear 
waste, ozone depletion, and even global warming.87 As such, public faith in the ability of 
science in particular to deliver solutions to risks has been reduced, and science is now 
viewed as not so much as a solution to the problems of risk but also the cause o f risk.88 
Thus from this stand point, it is arguable that such scepticism necessitates the need for a 
transparent decision-making process and a way o f ensuring transparency may be to 
allow the public to participate in the decision-making process.89
2.4.3. Benefits o f Public Participation
For present purposes, there are many claimed benefits for public participation. These 
include the following:
It is often asserted from a substantive point o f view90 that involving diverse 
groups o f the public as well as technical expertise in environmental decision-making 
will provide essential information and insight into environmental risk. It is believed that 
the public can contribute ideas, concerns, and even information that will make 
environmental decisions richer and more realistic. Such an input has been argued by 
Lee91 to create alternative, less technocratic expertise that is thought to be necessary in 
environmental decision-making. One way in which this can be achieved may be by
87 E. Hiruo, Exploding waste Theory Part o f  effort to Derail Repository, NUCLEAR FUEL, (March 1995) 
9
88 N de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2002) 152
89 Additionally, the focus o f  the government on sustainable development as the basis o f environmental 
standards also suggests the need to engage the public in environmental related issues. This is reflected in 
the UK government development strategy (Department o f the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(DETR), Building A Better Quality o f  Live: A Strategy fo r  more Sustainable Construction, (HMSO, 
London 2000) Chapter 3 where the Government identified the benefits o f  the input and influence of public 
in the development o f  environmental activities. Similarly, the emphasis on public participation in 
sustainable development is also a core concern o f  the Rio Declaration which acknowledges that only if  
ordinary members o f  the community, particular those in disadvantaged groups, take part in decision­
making processes can the outcomes o f  those processes be regarded as good. (Agenda 21 Rio Declaration. 
Available at
<http:/Avww.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=l 163> last 
accessed 4 August 2011)
90 Substantive rationale for public participation focuses on the quality o f  the outcome o f  decision-making, 
on substance. It rests on arguments that public participation improves the outcome o f  decision-making 
processes. See: J. Holder and M. Lee, Environmental Protection: Law and Policy, 2nd eds, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2007) 87
91 M. Lee, Public Participation, Procedure, and Democratic Deficit in EC Environmental Law, (2003) 3 
Year Book o f European Environmental Law, 193-226, 204
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raising important questions of fact that scientists have not addressed, and by offering 
knowledge about specific conditions that can contribute more realistic assumptions to 
risk analysis.92 In this way, the public could have their values integrated in decisions that 
affect them and it seems likely that this may promote public trust in environmental 
decisions that are made.
Consequently, it has been argued that public input in environmental risk 
decision-making should increase the quality o f decisions that are made as decisions are 
based on more complete environmental information.93 This can also be linked to the 
preamble to the Aarhus Convention which clearly identifies that improved access and 
public participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the implementation of 
decision. In this regard, Beierle’s94 research on the input o f stakeholders participation in 
environmental decision-making suggests that citizen participation may improve the 
quality o f decisions that are made in majority of the cases studied. This research was 
conducted over 239 cases by examining for example, whether the stakeholders introduce 
a more holistic perspective in the decision-making process; or perhaps whether there 
was adequate access to information and expertise. Likewise, Sultana and Abeyasekera95 
analysed thirty-six cases o f community management o f fisheries facilitated by NGOs 
and found evidence that public participation led to collective action in the decision­
making process. Although these studies suggest that public participation may improve 
the quality o f decisions that are made, nevertheless, even if it does not, such an input 
may clear up misunderstandings about some technological controversies that exist in the 
nuclear power sphere.
Also, it is continuously being argued that public participation in environmental 
risk decision-making will promote the acceptability o f risk when decision-makers 
understand public attitudes and concerns and are capable o f responding to them 
effectively.96 For a risk to be acceptable in the present context, it means the willingness
92 C. Stem and V. Fineberg, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (National 
Research Council, 1996) 23
93 Ibid
94 T.C. Beierle, The Quality o f  Stakeholder-Based Decisions, (2002) Risk Analysis 22, 739-749, 747
95 P. Sultan and S. Abeyasekera, Effectiveness o f Participatory Planning for Community Management of  
Fisheries in Bangladesh, Journal o f Environmental Management (2007) 86, 201-213, 204
95 M.S. Reed, Participatory Technology Development For Agroforestry Extension: An Innovation- 
Decision Approach, African Journal o f  Agricultural Research 2, (2007) 334-341
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to take a risk well as it is.97 Such willingness may however depend on the attitude of 
decision-makers and the attitude o f the public towards the risk in question. In relation to 
this, there is a coherent body of academic literature that examines various procedures of 
participatory processes. Stem and Fineberg,98 for example, favour a deliberative 
approach to public participation for building understanding, public trust and values, and 
acceptance o f environmental risks. They explain that because deliberation involves 
scientist, technical specialist, and the wider public, people are able to confer, ponder, 
exchange views, consider evidence, reflect on matters o f mutual interest and concern, 
and negotiate; and also there is an attempt to persuade each other in decision-making 
processes. In essence, the public is not simply called on to inform those with greater 
expertise but rather becomes deliberators in their nature, with the view that their 
opinions are heeded to.99 The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) in 
its 21st report also called for more deliberative techniques in recognizing public values. 
This report however goes further by giving a precise indication as to when the public 
should be involved in the decision-making process. It states that “public values should 
be articulated at the earliest stage possible in setting standards and developing policies; 
that the public should be involved in the formation o f strategy rather than mere being 
consulted on already drafted proposals. The report concluded that openness at this 
framing stage allows people to question assumptions about the characteristics of 
environmental issues and the scientific understanding upon which analysis is based”.100
2.4.3.I. Deliberative Participation
It is arguable that deliberative participation is an appealing approach in environmental 
risk decision-making to promote the acceptability of risk o f nuclear power where there is 
public anxiety towards government agencies and the nuclear industry itself. Indeed such 
an approach may produce a number of advantages. These include: promoting public 
institutional trust; familiarity with the issues o f the industry; and also diverse 
perspectives and opinions on related issues. All of which could be achieved if perhaps
97 HSE, n 52 above at Para. 10
98 C. Stem and V. Fineberg, n 92 above 74
99 J. Steele, ‘Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-Solving 
Approach’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 415, 427-8, 428
100 RCEP, n 59 above at Para. 7.22
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the public have confidence in regulatory controls to safeguard them against the various 
risks which they fear. In this regard, there are already indications that the government 
aims to adopt deliberative approaches in nuclear energy matters. An example is the issue 
o f radioactive waste management where the Committee on Radioactive Waste 
Management (CoRWM) hopes to involve the public at the policy formation level in 
order in gather their views and thus inform on policy formation.101 The method of their 
involvement gives a precise practical explanation o f how a deliberative process could be 
conducted to achieve the above advantages. This includes holding a number of its 
meetings in public, providing opportunities for people to challenge information, for 
example by making clear the sources o f information and points o f view on which the 
Committee advice is based, and also encouraging people to ask questions or make their 
views known and listening to their concerns.102 I contend that these processes are 
essential for a sustained commitment to development o f nuclear energy, most especially 
as the acceptability o f risk is a political question which is likely to be disputed at a 
number o f levels among participants.103 An example is the management o f nuclear waste 
where past events at both international and domestic level ended with the hint that any 
approach to providing nuclear disposal facility will have to include public opinion and 
values in the policy, and decision-making process for it to be successful.104 These can be 
seen in the Yucca Mountain project in Nevada; the attempt by the UK Atomic Energy 
Authority (UKAEA) proposal to find suitable sites for disposing o f high level waste in 
Scotland, Cornwall, Wales and Northumberland; and the proposal to assess the 
suitability o f sites at Billingham on Teeside, and Elstow, for low level waste repositories 
by the Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Management Executive (NIREX). In 
particular, the two cases of UKAEA and NIREX were described as the gulf that existed 
between the views of those attempting to take forward the technocratic policy
101 CoWRN is an independent body appointed by the UK Government to scrutinise plans for managing 
UK higher activity radioactive waste now and in the future. CoWRN, Managing our Radioactive Waste 
Safely: CoWRN’s Recommendations to the Government, Doc. 700, July 2006, Chapter 7
102 See: CoWRN, Proposed Programme o f Work 2010-2013, CoRWN doc. 2800 final (31 March 2008), 
Annex A, Para. 17
103 M. Lee, n 91 above 205
104 P. Simmons and K. Bickerstaff, (2006) The Participatory Turn in UK Radioactive Waste Management 
Policy. In Proceedings o f  VALDOR-2006. Congrex- Sweden AB, Stocklholm, pp. 529-536. Available at 
<http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/ Public/37/101/37101543.pdf> accessed 10 
July 2011. Note: NIREX is now Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA)
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programme, and those o f the host communities which stood to be affected by the 
implementation o f the programme because o f its lack o f public involvement in the policy 
formation and transparency in the decision-making process.105 Against this backdrop, 
both proposals were however abandoned in 1981 and 1987 respectively.106
2A.3.2. Risk Communication
However, the extent at which a deliberative approach will be helpful in creating a better 
informed public may prove challenging as it also involves the communication of risk. As 
to this, the cases of UKAEA and NIREX above also indicate the significance o f risk 
communication. It reaffirms that if people are going to accept and have trust in 
environmental risk decisions, they need information on risk issues and the different 
choices available.107 NIREX for example, was criticized for its exclusive focus on 
communication from experts and government officials to the affected public.108 Reports 
are that during consultation, attempts at site investigation were presented to communities 
and local planning authorities as being “research” activity and quite distinct from any 
consultation for respiratory construction. And as a consequence, the proposal 
encountered sustained and co-ordinated local opposition, while its neglect of relations 
with local authorities resulted into distrust and a tendency towards non-cooperation.109 
Thus with some confidence, one can say that competently prepared and delivered 
communications can change the public’s beliefs about how a technology operates and 
what risk it produces.110
105 Ibid, 532. See also: R. Kemp, The Politics o f Radioactive Waste Disposal (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester 1992) for the a lengthy discussion on the public inquiry in relation to the UKAEA 
proposal and the consultation exercise o f NIREX
106 P. Simmons and K. Bickerstaff, n 104 above
107 See: DEFRA, n 75 above at Para. 3.7. for a list o f  general importance o f  risk communication. See also: 
BSE, n 57 above for the consequences o f lack o f  risk communication
108 R. Kemp, n 105 above 66-77
109 Ibid
110 M. Maharik and B. Fischhoff, Risk Knowledge and Risk Attitudes Toward Regarding Nuclear Energy 
Source in Space, Risk Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1993, 345-353, 534
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2.4.4. Improvements in Participatory Strategies
In view of the above, Atherton and Dalton111 argue that lessons have been learnt in areas 
o f participatory strategies. They grouped these lessons under three themes namely: 
structure, the organisational arrangements and institutional framework must be designed 
to give issues visibility and place public interest at the heart o f long-term management; 
process, the way policy is developed and implemented must be open and accountable 
(there must be a stepwise approach, with clear decision points and wide stakeholder 
consultation and involvement); and also behaviour, the different organisations involved 
must interact with each other and stakeholders in an informed, open and responsive 
manner.
Some elements o f these strategies can be seen in the European Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive112 and the Environmental Impact 
11  ^ •Assessment (EIA), which has to some extent been amended to comply with the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention to enable early and continuous public involvement 
and clarifying the role o f environmental interest groups in decision-making process. The 
SEA Directive states that “authorities with environmental responsibility and the public 
shall be given an early and effective opportunity within appropriate time frames to 
express their opinion on the draft plan or programme and the accompanying 
environmental report before the adoption of the plan or programme”. The EIA provision 
is quite similar to this but relates to the project level rather the strategic level.114 Case 
law and the critical understanding o f the duty of the licence applicant115 as it pertains to
111 E. Atherton and J. Dalton, Moving Forward with Lessons Learned About Long-term Radioactive 
Waste Management. In Proceedings o f  VALDOR-2006. Congrex- Sweden AB, Stocklholm. Page 2-10. 
Available at <http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/ Public/37/101/37101543.pdf> 
accessed 10 July 2011
112 Directive 2001/42/EC on the Assessment o f  the Effects o f  Certain Plans and Programmes on the 
Environment; implemented into the UK law by: HSMO, The Environmental Assessment o f Plans and 
Programmes Regulations 2004, Statutory Instrument 2004 No. 1633
113 Directive 85/337/EEC on the Assessment o f the Effects o f Certain Public and Private Projects on the 
Environment, amended by Council Directive 97/ll/E C . See also Chapter 4 for requirements under the 
planning regime
1,4 See: Art. 6(1) o f  the SEA and Art. 3 o f the EIA respectively
115 See: UK NIREX Limited, NIREX Report: Environmental Report 2001-2003, NIREX Report No. 
N/102, October 2003. Para. 4 available at <http://www.corporateregister.com/al0723/NirexQ3-env- 
uk.pdf>: NIREX believes that these Directives may be used to structure the decision-making process 
relating to long-term radioactive waste management in the UK. Also in Sweden, it is the case that the 
working out o f an EIA should include consultations with authorities, organisations, and the public 
(Chapter 6 o f the Swedish Environmental Code). The House o f Lords also held in Berkeley v Secretary o f
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new nuclear build and as discussed in Chapter 5 below, shows that these Directives are 
also used to engage the public in dialogue. This may be on issues o f radioactive waste, 
and integrating scientific and social research on radioactive waste management into the 
decision-making process. Nonetheless, there are still concerns as practices in nuclear 
waste management also reveal that public involvement in the decision-making process 
as required under these directives is not a compulsory act for the industrial promoters by 
law.116 For example, the German legal system does not foresee extensive legally 
binding direct participation at local levels. Even if at all such provision exists, they may 
be limited when it comes to projects that require a formal planning approval procedure 
as it is the case with a radioactive disposal repository.117
Having said this, the UK’s voluntarism approach for nuclear waste
1 1 0
management also indicates further commitment by the government to improve 
participatory strategies on matters o f nuclear energy. The approach signifies that the 
problem o f nuclear waste management is more o f a social one than a technical one. In so 
doing, it involves the authorities o f the local government o f the host community (i.e. the 
community in which nuclear waste disposal facility will be built and it include the 
population of that area and the owners of the land) to signify interest in having a deep 
disposal waste facility built in their community. The aim is however to target early 
public participation through their community representatives in the decision-making 
process of site selection.119
However, while it is possible to argue that the voluntarism approach is one 
solution to issues of public participation as regards to nuclear energy, only time will tell
State fo r  the Environment [2001] 2 AC 603, Para. 15 “that EIA requires the inclusive and democratic 
procedure...in which the public is given an opportunity to express its opinion on the environmental 
issues”.
116 Note: the UK SEA legislation does recommend that consultation bodies and the public are informed 
and given the opportunity to forward their opinion within a reasonable time. (Section 15, Para. 3 o f  The 
Environmental Assessment o f  Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004, Statutory Instrument 2004 
No. 1633). Although this may not necessary be required as explained in Chapter 5 at para. 5.3.4.1.1.
117 R. Barth and G. Arens, Further Development o f Public Participation in the Site-Selection and Approval 
Process o f a Final Repository in Germany; In Proceedings o f VALDOR-2006. Congrex- Sweden AB, 
Stockholm. Page 107-114.
<http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/ Public/37/101/37101543.pdf> accessed 10 
July 2011
118 BERR and DEFRA, Managing Radioactive Waste Safely: A Framework fo r  Implementing Geological 
Disposal, Cm 7386 (TSO, June 2008)
119 Ibid, at Para. 6.8 and Chapter 6 respectively
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whether such far recent procedural development which aims to enable key stakeholders 
including nuclear operators, local government representatives, regulators and non­
governmental organisations to observe and provide input to the programme,120 will be 
sufficient to address particular issues o f public participation in matters of environmental 
risk. So far, only three communities have shown interest in the approach to site 
selection,121 and this suggests that such an approach may not be effective after all.
Besides, the literature on voluntarism in siting methods reinforces further concerns.
122Hunold for example, argues that the voluntarism approach is diminished by the 
excessively local conception o f public participation that typically informs voluntary 
siting attempts. He explained using Canada’s development of deep and geological 
disposal facility for low and intermediate radioactive waste as example. He argues that 
the approach limits democratic legitimacy because only the consent o f a subject of 
citizens who will share the proposed facility’s risks is being sought, rather than those 
who live beyond the city limits. Thus, there is a sense o f understanding here that the 
voluntarism approach limits participation to only those within particular geographic 
vicinity o f the proposed waste disposal activity that signifies interest in the process. 
Conversely these groups may also be the most vulnerable to immediate risks. However, 
it is arguable that this goes against the idea of a wider public inclusiveness in 
environmental risk decision-making; that is, the basic idea that a range o f public should 
be involved on an ongoing basis. This includes those who do not support the project or 
proposal in question, so as to ensure that all viewpoints are considered in making 
decisions.123 In this regard and for a voluntarism approach to be effective in the manner 
in which it is hoped for, it may become necessary to involve a wide range o f public in 
pursue of its objectives. After all the uncertain nature o f the risk o f nuclear power 
suggests that the whole environment and its inhabitants are potentially vulnerable to any 
adverse consequence that may occur.
120 DECC, Managing Radioactive Waste Safely,: Implementing Geological Disposal Annual Report April 
2010-March 2011, (DECC, June 2011) Para. 9
121 Department o f Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Managing Radioactive Waste Safely: 
Implementing Geological Disposal Annual Report, April 2010 -  March 2011 (June 2011) Para. 20
122 C. Hunold, Canada’s Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Problem: Voluntarism Reconsidered, 
Environmental Politics, Vol.l 1, No.2, (2002) 49-72
123 Siting Task Force (STF, 1994), Public Involvement and Communications in the Cooperative Siting 
Process, Prepared by the STF Secretariat for the STF Canada
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Elsewhere in Europe, there are examples of governments facing similar public 
participatory challenges. In the background, these countries, like the UK, have signed up 
to the Aarhus Convention which is strongly supported by the EU and it may exert some 
influence on national approaches to public participation.124
2.4.5. Public Participation and the Aarhus Convention
The promotion o f public participation in environmental risk decision-making has also 
been enhanced in recent years by the Aarhus Convention. The Convention deals with 
environmental participation in decision-making at three stages, namely: decisions on 
specific activities; plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment; and the 
preparation of executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally binding
* • 125normative instruments. It sets out requirements for public participation in various 
categories of environmental decision-making. Article 6 o f the Convention establishes 
certain public participation requirements for decision-making on whether to license or 
permit activities which may have a significant effect on the environment.126 It includes 
participatory requirements such as timely and effective notification of the public 
concerned, reasonable timeframes for participation, including provision for participation 
at an early stage, a right for the public concern to inspect information which is relevant 
to the decision-making free of charge, an obligation on the decision-making body to take 
due account o f the outcome o f the public participation, and prompt public notification of 
the decision, with the text o f the decision and the reasons and considerations on which it 
is based being made publicly accessible. The public concerned is however, defined as 
the public affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in the environmental 
decision-making, and explicitly includes NGOs promoting environmental protection and 
meeting any requirements under national law.127 Article 7 requires Parties to make 
appropriate practical and/or other provisions for the public to participate during the 
preparation of plans and programmes relating to the environment. Although the 
convention does not specify the environmental programmes in question, however, there
124 P. Cameron, ‘The Revival o f  Nuclear Power: An Analysis o f  the Legal Implication’, J. Environmental 
Law (2007) 19(1): 71-87, 82
125 Art. 6, 7, and 8 o f the Aarhus Convention respectively
126 See: Annex I o f the Aarhus Convention for list o f prescribed activities
127 Art. 6(2) o f  the Aarhus Convention and Art. 2(5) o f  the Aarhus Convention respectively
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is every reason to believe that such programmes includes nuclear energy projects and 
other areas such as transportation. Article 8 also applies to public participation during 
the preparation by public authorities of executive regulations and other generally 
applicable legally binding rules that may have a significant effect on the environment.
The EU and its Member States have signed the Aarhus Convention and it is part 
o f the EU law through Council Decision 2005/370/EC.128 Also, the Convention has been 
implemented in the EU through Instruments such as Directive 2003/4/EC on access to 
information and Directive 2003/35/EC on public participation.129 As a signatory, the 
Convention obliges the EU to ensure that there is compliance not only within its 
Member States, but also within the EU institutions as provided for under article 2(2)(d) 
o f the Convention.130
Having said this, implementing the Aarhus Convention’s public participation 
requirements on decisions on specified activities theoretically represents challenges in 
fulfilling the requirements o f the Convention.131 For example, this is because decisions 
permitting activities covered by article 6(1 )(a) and Annex I o f the Convention, where 
public participation is mandatory, such as granting consent for the construction of 
nuclear power stations, are not made at the EU level, rather at Member State level. 
Furthermore, it is also because the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty 
(EURATOM) 1957 is not a signatory to the Aarhus Convention. Nonetheless, it should 
be noted that the EU law implementing the Aarhus Convention relates to nuclear 
activities as stated in Annex I o f the Convention.
Considering the above and given the importance o f consultation in this area in 
the UK, the provisions o f the Aarhus Convention are increasingly being relied upon by 
NGOs to challenge environmental policies and decisions. This is usually sought for
128 Council Decision o f 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf o f the European Community, o f the 
Convention on access to information, public participation in environmental decision-making and access to 
justice in environmental matters
129 Directive 2003/4/EC o f the European Parliament and o f the Council o f 28 January 2003 on public 
access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC, and Directive 
2003/35/EC o f the European Parliament and o f the Council o f  26 May 2003 providing for public 
participation in respect o f  the drawing up o f certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and 
amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 
96/61/EC respectively
130 The EU institutions are by definition public authorities for the purpose o f  the convention
131 V. Rodenhoff, The Aarhus Convention and its Implications for the ‘Institution’ o f the European 
Community, RECIEL 11 (3) 2002, 343-357, 352
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when there is disillusionment in decisions that are made or perhaps when participation is 
viewed as amounting to tokenism. Even when considerable efforts are made to foster 
effective public participation, there may still be considerable dissatisfaction with the 
performance o f regulatory arrangements and opponents will use such means as are 
available to them to call the decisions into question in the courts.132 To what effect this is 
can be seen in the case of R. (on the application o f  Greenpeace Ltd) v Secretary o f  State 
fo r  Trade and Industry133 where Greenpeace initiated a claim for judicial review in 
respect o f the government’s decision to support nuclear new build as part o f UK’s future 
energy mix.
2.4.5.I. R. (on the application o f  Greenpeace Ltd) v Secretary o f  State for Trade and 
Industry
It all started in the 2003 Energy White Paper134 when the government stated clearly that 
before any decision to proceed with the building o f nuclear power stations, there would 
need to be the fullest public consultation on policy formation and the publication of a 
White paper setting out the government’s proposals.135 Consequently, because o f the 
challenges facing the UK energy sector, the government initiated a review of the 2003 
document. It was announced that a policy statement would be issued in 2006 in effect of 
the 2003 review with the Secretary of State promising that it would feature an “extensive 
public and stakeholder consultation”.136 The government began with the publication of a
1 27consultation document in 2006. Greenpeace took part in the consultation exercise as a 
NGO against the use o f nuclear energy and sought for a quashing order on the argument 
that the fairly cursory nature o f the content o f the 2006 document could not be regarded 
as a true consultation paper but rather it amounted to an issues paper. This claim was 
founded on the breach o f legitimate expectation by the Government to oblige its promise
132 K. Morrow, n 38 above 60. See also: The complaint by Greenpeace to the Market Standards Research 
Board (MSRB) in respect o f consultancy in the events following the Greenpeace case [2007] EWHC 311 
at <http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/files/pdfs/nuclear/MRSfindings.pdf> accessed 20th June 2011
133 [2007] EWHC 311
134 DTI and DEFRA (2003), The Energy White Paper. Our Energy Future -  creating a low carbon 
economy, (Cm. 5761) Feb. HMSO
135 [2007] EWHC 311, Para. 4.68
136 Answer to Parliamentary Question, 2 December 2005
137 Cm 6887
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of the fullest public consultation on a change o f policy on nuclear new build. It was 
alleged that the document was vague and unclear as to what the consultees were being 
asked to respond to; that it lacked adequate information to enable consultees to respond 
intelligently; and that it was an incomplete document on the basis that a great deal o f the 
information upon which the Government's decision would ultimately be based was not 
actually available during the duration o f the consultation exercise, but after the period.138
However, before the Greenpeace claim could be addressed in the judicial review 
proceedings the issue o f justiciability was considered. In this regard, the Government 
argued that the issue was one of high level policy and was not suitable for judicial 
review. The case came before Sullivan J who agreed that the matter was indeed a high 
level policy document; but nonetheless, he took the view that the fact that high level 
policy was involved did not preclude judicial intervention. He made reference to the 
relevance o f the Aarhus Convention and took the view that, given the huge importance 
o f the nuclear new build issue, only the promised ‘fullest public consultation’ would 
have been adequate. He added that “whatever the position may be in other policy areas, 
in the development o f policy in the environmental field consultation is no longer a 
privilege to be granted or withheld at will by the executive because the UK government 
is a signatory to the Aarhus Convention. The Preamble o f the Convention records the 
parties to the Convention by recognizing that adequate protection o f the environment is 
essential to human well-being and the enjoyment of basic human rights. “This includes 
the right to life itself; that is recognizing that every person has the right to live in an 
environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, and the duty, both individually 
and in association with others, to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of 
present and future generations, considering that, to be able to assert this right and 
observe this duty, citizens must have access to information, be entitled to participate in 
decision-making and have access to justice in environmental matters, and 
acknowledging in this regard that citizens may need assistance in order to exercise their 
rights; recognizing that, in the field o f the environment, improved access to information 
and public participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the implementation 
o f decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give the public the
138 [2007] EWHC 311, Para. 67
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opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due account of 
such concerns; and aiming, thereby to further the accountability o f and transparency in 
decision-making and to strengthen public support for decisions on the environment.”139 
As to this, he mentioned that even if  the government had made no such promise, it was 
difficult to see how anything less could have been consistent with the obligations of the 
Aarhus Convention to provide opportunities for public participation.140 Sullivan J. 
agreed with Greenpeace that the document constituted an ‘issues paper’ which lacked 
clarity and was not therefore adequate for purpose.141 However, he granted a declaration 
to the effect that there had been a breach o f the claimants' legitimate expectation of the 
“fullest public consultation” but refused to grant the claimants the quashing order that 
they sought.142
Although the decision is this case clearly indicates the willingness of the court to 
interfere in matters o f “high level” environmental decisions, more importantly, it shows 
that the decision-making process must involve the wider public and not just NGOs.143 
This is significant in the present context because it appears different from the intention 
o f the drafters o f the Aarhus Convention which place too much emphasis on 
participation by organized interest groups rather than the general public.144 Surely, one 
may argue that the domination o f NGOs is to some extent an inevitable and appealing 
approach because they enjoy considerable expertise which allows them to participate 
meaningfully in the decision-making process which may not necessarily be said for the 
public at large. Even if individual members could bring a claim, they are likely to be less 
well-informed and resourced than NGOs. Care must however be taken that it does not 
displace the broader notion of public participation including individual contributions to 
environmental matters.145
139 Ibid, Para. 49
140 Para. 51
141 Para. 74 and 79
142 Para. 120
143 Para. 113
144 M. Lee and C. Abbot, The Usual Suspects? Public participation under the Aarhus Convention, The 
M odem  Law Review , Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 80-108
145 K. Morrow, ‘On Winning the Battle but Losing the War....’, Env. Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1, 65-71, 
70. See: R v Secretary o f State fo r  Foreign Affairs, ex p  World Development Movement [1995] 1 ALL ER 
611 at Para. 620as it relates to sufficient interests in decisions that are made
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2A.5.2. The A irport Cases
In similar vein, the joint case o f R. (on the application o f  Medway Council) v Secretary 
o f  State fo r  Transport, Local Government and Regions; R. (on the application o f  Essex 
CC) v Secretary o f  State fo r  Transport, Local Government and Regions; and also R. (on 
the application o f  Mead) v Secretary o f  State fo r  Transport, Local Government and 
Regions,146 in which the future development o f air transport in the UK consultation 
document White Paper147 excluded the options for Gatwick airport development. This 
cases also point towards the acceptance of an inclusive public decision-making process 
by the Court. In these cases, M and two other local authorities and two individuals 
challenged the Secretary o f State’s decision to exclude any option relating to the 
expansion o f Gatwick airport. This was based on the fact that an agreement not to 
construct a second runway at Gatwick before the year 2019 had been concluded between 
the relevant local authority and the British Airports Authority. Without going into much 
detail, the claimants challenged the decision o f the Secretary o f State on grounds of 
judicial review. This includes: irrationality, that the Secretary o f State had a “closed 
mind” or fettered his discretion; unfairness; obligation; human rights; proportionality; 
and also legitimate expectation.148 The cases were brought before Maurice Kay, J., who 
granted the application and quashing order that it was procedurally unfair to operate the 
consultation process in such a way so as to effectively prevent the applicants from 
advocating Gatwick as an alternative solution at an early stage in the decision making
149process.
Overall, the above cases show that environmental policies are predominantly set 
by the government with less public involvement. Indeed as one commentator puts it, 
“public participation is recognised at the management stage, it is yet to be accepted at 
the knowledge-creation phase”.150 This quotation is perhaps the best way to summarise 
the above cases and to describe public participation in the UK environmental decision­
making process, at least where the development o f major infrastructures are concerned.
146 [2002] EWHC 2516 (Admin); [2003] J.P.L. 583; [2002] 49 E.G. (C.S.); [2002] N.P.C. 152
147 Department for Transport, The Future Development o f  Air Transport in the United Kingdom: South 
East (2002)
148 [2002] EWHC 2516 (Admin); [2003] J.P.L. 583; [2002] 49 E.G. (C.S.); [2002] N.P.C. 152, Para. 4-48
149 Ibid, Para. 52
150 B. De Marchi, Public Participation and Risk Governance, Science and Public Policy, Vol. 30, No. 3, 
June 2003, pp 171-176
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This is because it clearly indicates that the public are not usually involved in the policy 
formation stage, but only after the policy has been made. Thus, one may say that such 
policy is more likely to reflect the concerns o f the government rather than the values of 
the public; and this has so far proved to be a catalyst for public disapproval of nuclear 
energy.
2.4.6. Consequences of Public Participation
As to the above, it is clear that public participation may affect environmental decisions 
that are made. These effects will now be evaluated not from a single viewpoint but from 
the various groups o f the public as categorised earlier at paragraph 2.4.1.
In general, NGOs play a major role in the policy formation o f the vast 
encompassing energy industry. With their observer status, they contribute to the 
decision-making processes by bringing new additional voices to the fore and shaping 
energy policy.151 For example, apart from Greenpeace active involvement in nuclear 
power decision-making process in the UK as discussed so far, other trans-boundary 
regional groups such as the Australian Biomass Association and Small Hydropower 
Association, also play an important role in actor mobilization, coordination and lobbying 
for Renewable Energy Electricity Source.152 It is also the case that NGOs have a great 
deal to contribute to decision-making processes by providing alternatives to the 
dominant official version o f public interest. In addition, they add considerable and 
varied expertise to the decision-making process through their ability to exploit 
established decision-making processes which is increased by their ability to exploit 
established networks to add breadth and depth to their input.153 However, Morrow154 
makes it clear that the participation of NGOs also introduces new challenges. She points 
out that there is the danger of the role played by NGOs as it moves gradually from being 
participative democracy to an alternative form o f representative democracy. She
151 W. Lafferty and A. Ruud, Promoting Sustainable Electricity in Europe: Challenging the Path 
Dependence o f Dominant Energy Systems, (Edwards Elgar Publishing Limited, UK 2008) 196
152 Ibid
153 K. Morrow, ‘Public Participation in the Assessment o f  the Effects o f Certain Plans and Programmes on 
the Environment: Directive 2001/42/EC, the UNECE Espoo Convention and the Kiev Protocol’ (2004) 4, 
Yearbook o f  the European Environmental Law 49, pp. 54-57
154 H. Cullen and K. Morrow, ‘international Civil Society in International Law: The Growth o f NGO 
Participation’ (2001) 1 Non-State Actors and International Law 7
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explains that once NGOs reach a certain critical mass, they cease to become an organ of 
participative democracy but rather a representative in their function without an electoral 
mandate. This suggests that NGOs are likely to press forward their innermost ethics and 
values rather than a collective effort o f the public which may be o f detriment to the 
decision-making process.
On the other hand, there are also a number o f ways that public participation can 
affect environmental risk decision-making. The public could either seek for regulations 
o f certain issues to be made in the environment or be against certain environmental 
decisions.155 In Austria for example, energy planners in the mid-sixties proposed to 
construct up to five Nuclear Power Plants by end o f the century in order to meet the 
country’s electricity demand. However, in 1976 a very intensive public and political 
debate about the use o f nuclear energy for electricity production began and the 
Government held a referendum on the use o f nuclear power.156 Although the outcome of 
the referendum only showed a marginal difference157 between those in support of 
nuclear energy and those against its development, it was however enough for the 
government to stop the development.
Considering the above, the Fukushima fiasco is arguably one event that may 
hinder the public appetite for the use of nuclear power. Even though the immediate 
danger o f the disaster may have passed, its occurrence however, reminds the public of 
the Chernobyl disaster, where inhabitants felt the psychological effects of a nuclear 
disaster, and the consequences which are thought to have affects on the public for 
years.158 In this regard, there is no denying that the evidence o f what I refer to as 
“Contemporary Pressure” -  meaning that the manifestation o f newer forms risks have 
the power to alter and dictate the level o f acceptability o f technological risk in the 
society, is far more obvious in the present day society. In so far, this has led to global 
criticism as to the use o f nuclear power on one hand, and on the other, it facilitates the 
review o f energy policies amongst countries; with questions over the promotion of
,ss J. Steele, n 99 above
156 European Commission, EUROBAROMETER 234: A Report on Europeans and Nuclear Safety, March 
2010. Also refer to W. Lafferty and A. Ruud, n 151 above
157 In the referendum 50.5% o f  the population voted against the use o f  nuclear energy in Austria
158 European Communities, Consequences o f  the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: Opinion and Report 
(Economics and Social Committee, Brussels 1987)
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nuclear power dominating political affairs among EU Member States. Arguably, 
decision-makers now face uneasiness about the use of nuclear energy while the public 
are demanding for greater safety measures to complement existing ones or perhaps 
completely phase out its use. For example, in Germany, the Fukushima was linked to the 
outcome o f some state election results and the government through the legitimate 
expectation o f its energy policy review has agreed to stick to the planned moratorium on 
nuclear power and the country is on the road to shut down all its nuclear plants by the 
year 2022.159 In contrast to this and as mentioned in Chapter one above, the UK 
government has decided to continue with its proposed nuclear power programme. Even 
though the country is not prone to extreme natural hazards like Japan, the government 
has not ruled out the possible consequences o f natural disaster in severe climate 
conditions. For example, the government is making plans to ensure that improved 
arrangements are in place to ensure the safety o f its nuclear industry. This includes 
initiating a review o f flooding studies, including from Tsunamis and whether there is the 
need to improve further site-specific flood risk assessments as part o f its periodic safety 
review programme because existing nuclear stations are on the coast, many at low 
elevations which are vulnerable to sea level changes.160 At this point, the question is 
whether these efforts will allay the fears o f the risk o f nuclear power and gain public 
support for its development in the UK.
CONCLUSION
From the above discussions, it is often the case that in making environmental risk 
decisions, the decision-making process is characterised by political and scientific 
knowledge, with the political aspect relying or based on science. As a result, it is clear 
that the dependence on the role and activity o f science and greater awareness o f the 
discipline reveals the indeterminacy o f scientific knowledge; much to the dissatisfaction 
of the public in terms o f the uncertain effects of environmental risks. At the same time, it 
is also clear that the uncertain effects o f environmental risks and the denial o f public role
159 Guardian Newspaper, Germany Votes to End Nuclear Power by 2022, available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 l/iun/30/germanv-end-nuclear-power-2022> assessed 19 July 2011
160 Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: Implications fo r  the UK Nuclear 
Industry: Final Report, September 2011. Available at <http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/fukushima/final- 
report.pdf> lasted accessed on 4 November 2011.Para. 343, 355, and 375
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in procedural processes o f environmental risk decision-making (at least as it pertain 
nuclear power) remains a fundamental factor likely to shape the acceptability of the risk 
o f nuclear power.
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CHAPTER 3
LEGAL REPONSES TO THE RISK OF NUCLEAR POWER
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Having discussed above the societal responses to the risk o f nuclear power, I now 
examine the legal responses to these risks in this chapter and across the next.
From its beginnings, legal response to the risk o f nuclear power has been the 
introduction o f various laws and policies to address the risks that are associated with its 
use. These laws and policies cover in general the need to control radioactive materials, 
licensing of nuclear facilities, the protection o f workers and the general public from 
harmful effects o f radiation, and also the safeguarding o f materials and the means of 
manufacturing materials for nuclear weapons.1 At the same time, the introduction of 
these laws and policies demonstrate evidence o f the consistent care with which the 
nuclear process is used. As a result, it is probably accurate to refer to nuclear power as 
the most legally controlled energy source in the world.2
Having said this, addressing the risk of nuclear power also appears problematic 
as it presents some legal and practical challenges. This is because these risks often have 
uncertain effects which sometimes appear too great to comprehend. Thus in an era 
where nuclear power has grown to be a topical issue, one cannot avoid thinking about 
the gravity o f risk and the possible impact on future generations.
In light o f these uncertainties, this chapter examines the general principles of 
environmental risk regulation as it relates to nuclear power. In doing so, it starts by 
looking at the various risks that are associated with the use o f  nuclear power, with 
particular focus on the threats, concerns and challenges o f nuclear waste as an example, 
in order to put into context the principles o f the UK regulatory regime. These principles 
include: the principles o f the International Commission on Radiological Protection
1 P. Riley, Nuclear Waste Law, Policy and Pragmatism  (Ashgate publishing Ltd, Aldershot 2004) 151
2 D. Zillman, ‘The Role o f Law in the Future o f Nuclear Power’ in D. Zillman and Others, (eds) Beyond 
the Carbon Economy, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 16 and 326
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(ICRP), other fiscal policies such as Cost Benefits Analysis (CBA), Risk-based 
Approaches, and the Precautionary Principle as applied to unknown risks.
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3.2. RISK IN THE CONTEXT OF NUCLEAR POWER
The various risks that are associated with the use o f nuclear power continue to generate 
controversy in environmental risk regulation. While some commentators argue that these 
risks are over emphasised,3 others disagree4 and the Fukushima disaster seems to have 
confirmed their fears.
According to Ping,5 the various risks that are associated with the use o f nuclear 
power includes: First, there is the risk of the occurrence of a catastrophic meltdown. 
Although it has been argued that the likelihood o f the release o f radiation from a nuclear 
plant may be remote, it does happen as illustrated by the Windscale disaster, TMI 
disaster, the Chernobyl disaster, and the Fukushima disaster.
Second, there exists the possibility o f the release o f radioactive materials during 
transportation o f nuclear materials. The key concern here is the numerous control 
mechanism and health and safety controls which ought to be followed in the nuclear fuel 
cycle. For example, this is from mining to milling to conversion, to enrichment, to fuel 
fabrication, to plant operation, and finally, to waste processing and storage. The concern 
here is that these processes involve separate facilities that necessitates many miles of 
materials movement, exposure, and accident potential, which exposes humans to the 
harmful effects of radiation.
Third, nuclear power also raises very substantial national security issues. It is 
widely accepted that there is the risk of diversion of uranium materials and reactor waste 
products by terrorists to make higher grade weapons. This risk is further magnified when 
one thinks about the porous security systems in many countries that are now seeking 
nuclear energy, and also the situation in countries such as Iran where it is believed that 
the development and use o f nuclear power might be diverted for other purposes other
3 J. Gray, Choosing the Nuclear Option: The Case for a Strong Regulatory Response to Encourage Nuclear 
Energy Development, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 315-348, 2009. See also the n 148 above
4 Parliamentary Office o f  Science and Technology, Public Opinion on Electricity Options, October 2007, 
Number 294
5 G Pring, A. Hass and B. Drinkwine, ‘The Impact o f  Energy on Health, Environment, and Sustainable 
Development: The TANSAAFL Problem’ in D Zillman, and Others, (Eds) Beyond the Carbon Economy, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 25
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than civil use.6 Also, the variety o f terrorist attacks in countries such as the USA over 
the last decade has now centred attention on the possible international misuse o f the 
nuclear process. For example, it is believed that terrorists may directly attack the nuclear 
generating plant or fuel fabrication facility, expecting to release large quantities of 
radiation in populated areas, and which is thought to involve potential damages far 
worse than the nuclear industry’s disaster at Chernobyl. Some commentators however 
dispute this threat. Cohen7 for example, once argued that there is no credible terrorist 
threat. He argued that terrorists have not killed on a mass scale through the use of 
nuclear weapon, something they could do by means such as simple introduction of 
poison gas into the environment. However, Cohen’s claim stands to be challenged as it 
is based more on statistical evidence; that is, the occurrences o f  events over time in 
predicting the occurrence o f a disaster.8 In this regard, recent studies continue to contest 
that nuclear risk from plane crashes is higher than estimated. For example, studies 
submitted to the inquiry to expand Lydd airport in Kent late last year concluded that the 
risk that planes will crash into nuclear plants and release potentially lethal clouds of 
radioactivity is significantly higher than official estimates.9
There is also the risk of the release o f radioactive materials from nuclear waste. 
This is a major issue in countries such as the UK because o f the lack o f a final disposal 
facility for managing nuclear wastes that are produced. Currently, nuclear wastes are 
temporarily stored on sites pending the time that a suitable permanent disposal site will 
be found. As a result, it is believed that as stored nuclear wastes grow larger the threat 
grows too. As the disposal o f nuclear waste remains a practical issue to be solved, it is 
certainly the case that waste produced will continue to be radioactive for years. The 
wastes stored on site may even be vulnerable to sabotage, theft, or even in the event of 
accidental release of radiation through the combination o f human error and the
6 Guardian, ‘Iranian Nuclear Power Station Begins Generating Electricity’, available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 l/sep/04/iran-nuclear-power-bushehr-plant> last accessed 2 
December 2011
7 B.L. Cohen, The health Risks o f Nuclear Power, in K.S. Shrader-Frechete, ed., Environmental Ethics 
(Pacific Grve, CA: Boxwood Press, 1981) 329-337
8 J. Beattie, ‘The Assessment o f  Environmental Consequences o f Nuclear Reactor Accidents’ in B. Wade 
et al, The Environmental Impact o f Nuclear Power (British Nuclear Energy Society, London 1981) 4
9 R. Edwards, “Nuclear Risk from Plane Crashes is Higher than Estimated, Inquiry Shows”, available at < 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/201 l/feb/21/nuclear-risk-plane-crashes> last accessed 18 
December 2011
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occurrence o f natural disaster as in the case o f the Fukushima disaster which have effect 
on wastes stored in ponds on sites. Although, it should be remembered that there are 
some other man-made and natural sources such as medical x-ray equipments and 
materials in soils and rocks that also emit radiation.10 The concern is however the spatial 
dimension o f the effects o f the release o f radioactive materials from both legacy and 
future wastes.11
In view o f the above, the next part will focus more on the various risks that are 
associated with nuclear waste; and it is considered in this chapter as the most 
challenging issue facing the UK nuclear industry.12
10 HSE, The Toler ability o f Risk from  Nuclear Power Stations (Rev. 1992)
11 P. Riley, n 1 above 96
12 See also: British Government Panel on Sustainable Development, Second Report (1996) p.8 -  how to 
dispose o f radioactive waste safely has also been considered to be one o f  the most intractable problems 
currently facing other nuclear power nations
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3.3. THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WASTE IN THE UK
The history o f managing the risk o f nuclear waste in the UK is not a particularly happy 
one. Prior to 1970, very little thought had been given to the question o f how to deal with 
the nuclear waste produced. It was in 1976 that the Sixth Report o f the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) pointed out that “it would be wrong to 
commit future generations to the consequences o f fission power on a massive scale 
unless it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that at least one method exists 
for the safe isolation o f these wastes for the indefinite future”.13 The government’s 
response to the RCEP report was six main objectives.
These are: to minimise the creation o f waste from nuclear activity; to deal with 
waste management problems in principle before any large scale programme o f nuclear 
power was undertaken; to carry out handling and treatment o f waste with due 
environmental considerations; to dispose of wastes at nuclear sites in accordance with a 
programme; to provide adequate research and development on methods of disposal; and 
to dispose o f wastes in appropriate ways, at appropriate times and at appropriate 
places.14 Arguably, the government’s response meant a lackadaisical approach towards 
the management o f nuclear waste because it added little to finding a solution to the 
waste problem that besieges the industry. At the same time, it would be fair to say the 
concerns expressed in the Flowers report led to the creation o f the Radioactive Waste 
Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) in 1978 to offer independent advice to 
Ministers on radioactive waste issues15 and the search for waste disposal sites for high 
level radioactive wastes in the following years. However, such plans were abandoned 
partly because o f the reason stated earlier.16 Yet, almost thirty five years on, the issue of 
radioactive waste disposal is still as it was. As a result, the government has been accused
13 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Sixth Report, Nuclear Power and the Environment, 
(Cmnd. 6618) (1976) at Para. 181
14 Radioactive Waste Management, Cmnd. 8607 (1982), Para. 13
15 RWMAC <http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/2008072710133Q/defra.gov.uk/rwmac/> last accessed 
12 August 2011. See also: See: S. Tromans and J. Fitzgerald, The Law o f Nuclear Installations and 
Radioactive Substances, (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1997) 204
16 See Part three o f  Chapter 2 above at 2.4.3.1. An alternative view was because o f  the general election 
just a month away and so the programme was dropped for political reasons.
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o f showing a mixture o f procrastination, indecision and more importantly, a failure to 
grasp the nature of the problem associated with nuclear waste disposal.17
Having said this, it is important to note that the government’s decision to support 
nuclear new build on one hand, and the lack of any real market for spent nuclear fuel 
disposal in the UK on the other, is a step further in creating new wastes. As such, this 
decision is also likely to fuel public anxiety over nuclear waste as there are already 
concerns over what to do with the tonnes of wastes stored at nuclear plant sites around 
the UK, needless to mention the consequences of the creation o f new ones. As to this, it 
becomes paramount to establish the most appropriate and acceptable waste disposal 
method in which the public will have confidence. Moreover, the need for a suitable 
disposal method is clear in terms o f the impact o f the occurrence o f  a nuclear disaster as 
in the case o f the Fukushima disaster where nuclear waste was stored on site.
In regards to the issue of a nuclear waste disposal facility in the UK, the 
conclusion o f the CoRWM has been to follow other international standards and practices 
by identifying geological disposal as the way nuclear waste will be managed in the long 
term. However, a safe and secure interim storage will continue to be used until a 
geological disposal facility is built.18 In theory, this initiative may be described as a huge 
step forward towards finding a solution to the issue of nuclear waste disposal that has 
plagued the UK nuclear industry for years now. Nonetheless in practice, there is more to 
a geological disposal repository as seen in other nuclear power countries than the mere 
identification o f such method.
3.3.1. Concerns and Challenges of Nuclear Waste Management
To start with, it is worth mentioning that the disposal o f nuclear waste continues to 
generate considerable concerns and challenges on future generation at both international 
and EU level. Under article 11 o f the Joint Convention on the Safety o f Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety o f Radioactive Waste Management for example, 
contracting states are to take necessary steps to avoid actions that impose reasonably
17 2006 (4th report, HL paper 109) Hansard
18 CoRWN, Managing our Radioactive Waste Safely: CoRWN’s Recommendations to the Government, 
(July 2006) doc. 700
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predictable/undue burden impacts on future generations which are greater than those 
permitted for the current generation. According to Tromans,19 this implies an exercise of 
judgement rather than an attempt to avoid any risk at whatever cost. He argues that no 
one knows what may represent an “undue burden” over the timescales concerned, and 
any more than what may be the “needs and aspirations” o f the future generation. With 
little doubt and as explained at paragraph 3.4.3.1. below, this is perhaps one reason why 
the interests of future generations are always heavily discounted. Further, the term undue 
influence sounds rather vague. It may be argued to extend to the cost o f storage of 
nuclear waste (the cost o f supporting and ensuring safe storage facilities for example, 
may be enormous as it may take decades for the completion o f a disposal facility), or 
even the cost incurred by operators of nuclear installations to run an installation. As to 
this, it may as well be the case that the UK policy on radioactive waste disposal to store 
radioactive wastes pending the construction o f a geological disposal respiratory facility 
may nevertheless also create a cost burden for future generations who will have to deal 
with the long-term waste stored considering the time-scale that may be involved in the 
construction of such facilities.20
Likewise at the EU level, the genesis of the concerns and challenges of 
radioactive waste disposal can be traced to the provisions of the European Atomic 
Energy Community Treaty (EURATOM) which looks rather vague for such an 
important issue. For example, as discussed in Chapter Four as part o f the limitations of 
the EURATOM, Member States are only required to provide the European Commission 
with such general data relating to any plan for the disposal o f nuclear waste in whatever 
form. The aim is to make it possible to determine whether the implementation o f such a 
plan is liable to result in the radioactive contamination o f water, soil or air space of 
another Member State. Upon providing the Commission with the required information, 
the Commission shall deliver its opinion after consulting the group o f experts stated in
19 S. Tromans, Nuclear Law: The Law Applying to Nuclear Installations and Radioactive Substances in its 
Historic Context, 2nd Eds, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) 375
20 See also: The Joint Convention on the Safety o f Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management as discussed in the next Chapter for an analysis o f  further issue o f  
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel
59
the Treaty.21 Undoubtedly, this provision represents a way by which the Commission 
can obtain information about radiological protection within the EU and also to assess 
whether any planned nuclear waste disposal activity is liable to cause significant damage 
to the environment. Although at the same time, this provision looks stronger than the 
requirements o f international law as it suggests that an action may otherwise be unlawful 
without informing the Commission, the decision in the case o f Landde Sarre and Others 
v Ministre de I ’Industrie,22 which deals with the interpretation o f the provision o f article 
37, nevertheless provides the opportunity to argue that the EURATOM fall short on 
nuclear waste related issues. The decision of the Court o f Justice in this case was that 
although the Commission has to be provided with general data before a disposal of 
radioactive waste is authorised by competent Member State and it opinion brought to the 
notice o f that State before the issue o f any such authorisation, the State is however, not 
obliged to conform with the opinion.23 Thus, Member State to whom the opinion has 
been addressed is not legally bound by it and may disagree with any opinion that is been 
made. In this regard, it is only logical to be concerned about the management o f nuclear 
waste in the EU most especially as Member States have competence over disposal 
methods. The question now is, what happens if  something does go wrong either in the 
event o f non-compliance or over compliance with the Commission opinion? Neither this 
nor the many other questions o f nuclear waste have easy answers anyway.
In addition to the above, NGO Greenpeace has launched a broadside against 
European repository plans. This attack is directed to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) four general criteria of an appropriate deep geological disposal site. 
These criteria are: long-term (millions o f years) geologic stability in terms of major earth 
movements and deformation, faulting, seismicity and heat flow; low groundwater 
content and flow at repository depths, which can be shown to have been stable for 
periods o f at least tens of thousands of years; stable geochemical or hydro-chemical
21 Article 37 o f  the EURATOM Treaty. Note: Subsequent attempts by the Community to impose some 
sort o f European wide framework for radioactive waste have not been forthcoming. These includes- 
Council Decision 75/406/EURATOM o f 9 July 1975 on the management and storage o f  radioactive waste; 
and also Council Resolution [1980] OJ C51/1 implementing a Community plan o f  action in the field o f  
radioactive waste, and [1980] OJ C51/4 relating to the reprocessing o f  irradiated nuclear fuels
22 Case 187/87, 22 September 1988, ECR, 5013
23 Ibid, Para. 14-16. See also: 92/269/Euratom: Commission Opinion o f  30 April 1992 concerning the 
nuclear fuel reprocessing plant Thorp o f the Sellafield establishment (United Kingdom). [1992] O J. L138.
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conditions at depth, mainly described by a reducing environment and a composition 
controlled by equilibrium between water and rock forming minerals; and good 
engineering properties that readily allow construction o f a repository, as well as 
operation for periods that may be measured in decade.24 It is to these that Greenpeace 
argues that there are safety issues, particularly those relating to groundwater 
contamination which makes a geological repository less favourable as a permanent 
disposal option of nuclear waste.25
Also, the concern over nuclear waste in jurisdictions such as the UK is further 
apparent within the parameters of the management o f nuclear waste and the construction 
o f a geological disposal facility. As to this, we cannot ascertain yet whether the 
government policy on geological repository will succeed or fail as numerous factors 
must be put into consideration. However, what we know is that regardless o f whether or 
not it succeeds, it is surely the case that high level waste will remain radioactive for 
years or even much longer than expected by the government. The reason for this is the 
time-scales involved in the construction o f a geological repository. Drawing on overseas 
geological repository programmes as example, the processes to be analysed and 
evaluated in site selection, demonstrating the suitability o f a site, obtaining the necessary 
planning and regulatory approvals, constructing the repository to the point at which it 
can accept waste may be complex, and also scientific understanding o f geological 
processes and engineering design, may take as long as forty years.26 Also because of the 
lack of predictability in the disposal o f nuclear waste and the consequences o f the risk of 
an accident or failure o f the system, any proposed solution deserves serious 
consideration from the technical and policy community on one hand, and on the other,
• 27  *the science studies community in terms o f the stability o f any proposed region. This 
may also take time. In addition, the time taken to complete a geological facility may
24 International Atomic Energy Agency (2003), Scientific and Technical Basis fo r  the Geological Disposal 
o f  Radioactive Waste, Technical Report Series No. 413 (Vienna, IAEA)
25 The Telegraph, ‘President Barack Obama’s Yucca Mountain Decision is a Blow to US Nuclear Power’, 
available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbvsector/energy/8012171/President-Barack- 
Obamas-Yucca-Mountain-decision-is-a-blow-to-US-nuclear-power.html> last accessed 15 November 
2011
26 CoRWN, n 18 above at Chapter 16, Para. 12
27 A. Macfarlane, Underlying Yucca Mountain: The Interplay o f Geology and Policy in Nuclear Waste 
Disposal, Social Studies, Vol. 33, No. 5, Earth Sciences in the Cold War (2003) 783-807
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even be longer than expected depending on the outcome o f serious intermingling of 
technological and political factors as demonstrated by the Yucca Mountain Project in the 
United States (USA) where scientific knowledge, politics, and policy have co-evolved, 
with each affecting the other in the developing process.28 Or even in cases where the 
construction o f a repository has already been completed as seen in Finland, a core of 
nuclear wastes may still not necessarily be disposed immediately as they are allowed to 
be cooled for some years before the final disposal process can proceed.29
However in the event that a geological disposal is being constructed, some 
commentators are on the opinion that there are still threats attached to it. Grossman and
30  • •Cassedy argue using historical illicit retrieval such as recovery o f buried Pharaohs 
treasures to explain that it would be an act o f hubris in the extreme for any nation to 
expect that it will be able to maintain a geological disposal facility for thousands of 
years, that even the most extreme vigilance maintenance methods are vulnerable to a 
single lapse. It is to this that they argue in favour o f burying nuclear waste in deep rock 
in deep ocean trenches. As such, they believe that this will pose far fewer technological 
problems and would have such significant natural barriers in which the foreseeable 
future wastes could be buried and left with minimal reliance on guardianship. 
Grossman and Cassedy’s argument against a geological repository facility also creates 
room for an exercise o f objective judgements on whether there are adequate protective 
measures against the risk of nuclear waste from nuclear energy producing states. For 
example, the threat here may be the risk o f a terrorist attack against disposal repositories, 
thereby causing severe damage such as the catastrophic release of radiation. This is of 
great concern as there are indications that nuclear installations in many countries o f the 
world such as the USA are not adequately protected.32 However where the UK is
28 Ibid, above 802
29 Finnish Energy Industries, Nuclear Waste Management in Finland, page 10. Available at 
<http://www.energia.fi/en/publications/nuclear%20waste.pdf> last accessed 10 August 2011
30 P.Z. Grossman and E.S. Cassedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis o f  Nuclear Waste Disposal: Accounting for 
Safeguards, Science and Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1995) 49
31 Ibid 50
32 Starr, ‘NRC Memo Warns o f Attacks on Nuclear Plants’, CNN, 31 January 2002. Available at 
<http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/01/31/ret.terror.threats> accessed last 12 September 2011
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concerned, such protective measures may specifically query the role, functions and 
effectiveness o f the Civil Nuclear Constabulary in safeguarding nuclear materials.33
Having said this, it is to the concerns and challenges discussed above that some 
commentators have termed the UK government’s policy to adopt a geological disposal 
method for the permanent disposal of nuclear waste as a “quick fix” for the development 
o f nuclear power.34 They consider the government’s decision as haste to approve a new 
generation o f reactors before solving the existing nuclear waste problems as advised by 
the RCEP. This is not surprising. After all, the government’s position is that the current 
lack o f a final disposal should not be a barrier to the development o f nuclear power.35 
Besides, the recommendations o f the CoRWM’s also add further scepticism. It is 
because these recommendations are directed to existing and committed waste arising 
only and not from nuclear new build. In its view, should a new build programme be 
introduced, it would require a quite separate procedure to test and validate proposals for 
the management o f the wastes arising from such a programme.36 In view o f this, it 
therefore appears to be the case that the government is concerned more with legacy 
wastes than those that will be produced. Arguably, this may not only have implications 
for future generations as discussed so far but also appear to be yet another partial 
solution to the issue o f nuclear waste in the UK. Hence, it is considered necessary at this 
point to examine the role o f law in addressing the concerns and challenges o f nuclear 
power that are imposed on the society as a whole.
33 Civil Nuclear Constabulary, available at <http://wwAv.cnc.police.uky> last accessed 17 September 2011
34 D. Lowry and others, ‘No Quick Fixes on Nuclear Waste’, available at 
<www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/aug/07/greenpolitics.nuclear> accessed 15 July 2011
35 DECC, Revised Draft National Policy Statement fo r  Nuclear Power Generation: Vol. II (HSMO, 2010)
36 CoRWN doc. 2749, CoRWN Statement o f its Position on New Build Wastes, Final (2 March 2010)
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3.4. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE UK RISK REGULATORY REGIME
Having highlighted the nature o f the risks, and also the concerns and challenges of 
nuclear power by using nuclear waste as an example, attention is now drawn to the 
principles o f environmental risk regulation that minimises and set the level o f risk we 
can live with. As we will see below, these approaches appear problematic as they pose 
further environmental concerns in terms o f the unknown/uncertain effects o f the risks of 
nuclear power.
3.4.1. International Commission on Radiological Protection
The radiological protection principles underpinning the government’s policy take 
account o f the ICRP.37 According to the ICRP protection system, any practise involving 
the exposure to radiation should be based on three major practices. The first is a practise 
o f justification, that is, no practise involving exposure to radiation should be adopted 
unless it produces sufficient benefit to the exposed individuals or to society to offset the 
radiation detriment it causes. The second is the optimisation o f protection. That is in 
relation to any particular source within a practice, the magnitude o f individual doses, 
number o f people exposed, and the likelihood o f incurring exposures should all be kept 
“As Low As Reasonably Achievable” (ALARA)38 taking account o f economic and 
social practices. The third is the individual dose risk limits, that is, the exposure of 
individuals resulting from a combination o f all relevant processes should be subject to 
dose limits, and ensuring that no individual is exposed to radiation risks which are 
judged to be unacceptable in any normal circumstances.39 These aspects are considered 
to be of paramount importance in radiological protection because o f the complexity of
37 ICRP Publication 60 (1990), Para. 112
38 Note: In the UK the term “As Low As Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP) is commonly referred to. The 
ALARP approach grew out o f the safety case concept developed formally in the UK (The public inquiry 
into the Piper Alpha disaster: London, HSMO 1990). It requires operators and intending operators o f a 
potentially hazardous facility to demonstrate that the facility is for its intended purposes; the risks 
associated with its functioning are sufficiently low; and that sufficient safety and emergency measures 
have been instituted.
39 See also: S. Tromans and J. Fitzgerald, n 19 above 211
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the dose distributions in both time and space, and the presence of natural sources o f 
radiation.40
These requirements are indentified in the EU provisions o f the Basic Safety 
Standard Directive 96/29/EURATOM laying down basic safety standards for the 
protection of the health o f workers and the general public against the dangers o f ionising 
radiation41 The main provisions o f the Directive are the same as those of the ICRP 
mentioned above. In any case these are: the justification principle, whereby the relevant 
activity resulting in exposure must be justified in advance by the advantages that would 
be achieved from the activity; the optimisation principle, that all exposure is to kept as 
low as reasonably achievable; and the setting o f dose limits for exposure to individuals.
3.4.1.1. The Justification Principle
Out o f the three principles stated above, the justification principle has so far been the 
most controversial aspect o f the ICRP recommendations in the UK and has given rise to 
litigation.42 An example is the case o f R v Inspectorate o f  Pollution, ex p  Greenpeace 
Ltd (No 2)43 which was a challenge to variations granted by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
o f Pollution (HMIP) and Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) to allow 
the temporary testing o f new thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP) operated by 
British National Fuel Limited (BNFL) at Sellafield. Greenpeace who opposed the 
variations were asked whether they wished to request a hearing in the inquiry process, 
but declined to respond. Following the granting of the variations, Greenpeace sort for 
judicial review to quash the decision and to grant an injunction to stay the
40 ICRP, n 37 above, “The Biological Basis o f Commission’s Policy”.
41 Note: The protection o f  workers and the general public from hazards o f  ionising radiation in the UK 
also relies on the general duties applying to employers under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 
and overlaid by the Justification o f  Practices Involving Ionising Radiations Regulations 2004. Besides, the 
requirement is also o f importance in the licensing o f  nuclear installations
42 Note: the question o f  failure to follow the principle o f  optimisation has also been tested in the USA. In 
James v Southern California Edison Co. District Court for the Southern District o f  California. D.C. No 
CV-94-01085-NAJ. and 94F3d651 US App. LEXIS 37542, the Court ruled that the principle was the 
standard by which the duty o f  care should be determined, and that the defendant must demonstrate that the 
release/exposure was as low as reasonably achievable and it is for the jury to decide if  it had been 
achieved. Also, the ALARA principle has also been scrutinised in terms o f  the definition o f  what is 
reasonable; see: B. Ale, Risk: An Introduction -  The Concepts o f  Risk, Danger and Damage (Routledge, 
London 2009) 110
43 [1994] 4 A l l  E R 329.
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implementation of variations so as to prevent testing. The case came before Brooke J. 
who granted judicial review but refused to impose a stay on implementation. The 
decision was upheld by the Court o f Appeal.44
On the ground o f challenge by Greenpeace was the absence o f justification. The 
substantive application to quash the variations was heard by Otton J. on two grounds. 
The first relates to the lawfulness o f the way in which the variation procedure was used, 
and the second relates to the alleged absence o f justification o f the process from which 
the waste discharges would arise. In respect o f these two grounds, Greenpeace relied 
upon the Radioactive Substances Act 1960: A Guide to the Administration o f the Act, 
which states that “all practices giving rise to radioactive waste must be justified, that is, 
the need that such practice must be established in terms o f its overall benefits”.45 In 
addition, Greenpeace also referred to article 6(a) of the Basic Safety Standards Directive 
80/836/EURATOM46 which states that “every activity resulting in an exposure to 
ionising radiation shall be justified by the advantages which it produces” . Otton J. held 
that “there was a general obligation on the authorising bodies in considering when to 
permit the discharges necessary for testing to consider the health and safety aspect and 
in particular whether the amount o f radioactive waste to be discharged would pose a 
significant risk to the health or safety o f the public. He added that there was no 
obligation upon the authorising bodies to consider the wider issues which were already 
under consideration through the consultation process as extended relating to the main 
operation”.47 In support, the evidence o f HMIP and MAFF also indicated the low levels 
o f discharges involved, and that the discharges were below existing and authorised 
limits.48 Otton J. however concluded that the justification requirements o f the Guide to 
Radioactive Substance Act 1960 and Directive 80/836/EURATOM had been satisfied 
and that it was not necessary to go into social and economic issues arising out o f the
44 R v Inspectorate o f Pollution, ex p. Greenpeace [1994] 4 A l l  E.R. 321, C.A. See also: Tromans n 21 
above 246
45 The Department o f  Energy’s 1982 Publication, The Radioactive Substances Act 1960: A Guide to the 
Administration o f  the Act, Para. 46(a)
46 Council Directive 15 July 1980 amending the Directives and laying down the basic safety standards for 
the health protection o f  the general public and workers against the dangers o f  ionising radiation, as 
amended by 84/467/EURATOM
47 [1994] 4 A 11 ER 329, Para. 56
48 Ibid, Para. 57
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main authorisation. This he based on the fact that the justification issues had been 
considered by Ministers on the main application and there was a distinct possibility 
would be authorised; that the need for testing was established in terms o f its overall 
benefit and the regulating bodies having taken note o f the benefit such temporary testing 
would produce; and that it was relevant to bear in mind that the need for THORP had 
been considered at the planning stage and do not require re-evaluation.49
The main authorisation process to permit radioactive discharges was strongly 
challenged in R v Inspectorate o f  Pollution, ex p  Greenpeace Ltd50 in which Greenpeace 
and Lancashire County Council sought to quash the decision to grant authorisations for 
the disposal o f radioactive waste from THORP. In this case, the hearing was before Potts 
J. who identified two main issues for the justification process. These are: whether there 
was a legal requirement to consider justification, and whether the finding that the 
activities giving rise to the discharges permitted by the authorisation were justified was 
irrational. Also, other issues that were raised included: issues relating to environmental 
impact assessment (that is, whether Directive 85/337 applied and whether the essential 
requirements o f the provisions of the Directive were complied within any event); the 
issue o f consultation; and local inquiry (that is, whether the decision not to hold an 
inquiry was flawed or irrational).51
In relation to the first issue, Greenpeace referred to R v Inspectorate o f  Pollution, 
ex p  Greenpeace Ltd (No 2) and the reference o f challenge made in the case. It however 
also made reference to the place of justification in the system o f radiological protection 
recommended by the ICPR above, and to Re-Ionising Radiation Protection in E.C. 
Commission v Belgium52 where Advocate General Jacobs stated in his opinion that the 
general principles upon which the system o f radiological protection recommended by the 
ICRP are based in ICRP publication 60 and reflected in article 6 o f the Basic Safety 
Standards Directive 80/836/EURATOM. The question for Potts J. was whether 
justification must be considered in exercising powers of authorisation and variation
49 Ibid, Para. 59-61
50 R v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Environment, ex p. Greenpeace L td  [1994] 4 A 11 ER 352
51 Ibid, Para. 32. on the Assessment o f the Effects o f  Certain Public and Private Projects on the 
Environment, amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC
52 [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 513 at 524
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under section 13 and 16 of the Radioactive Substance Act 1993 which was silent on the 
issue. This raised difficulties as to the relationship between article 6 and 13 o f Directive 
80/836/EURATOM, and Potts J. held that the principle set out in article 6(a) of 
Directive 80/836/EURATOM must be applied. For instance, a justification exercise of 
this type must be applied to every consideration o f an authorisation o f radioactive waste 
discharge under s 13 and 16 o f RSA 1993.53 On the other hand, Greenpeace argued in 
relation to the second question that the Ministers had failed to consider all relevant 
information in that they had not checked BNFL’s assertions as to future contracts and 
viability; that they did not insist on seeing a report made for BNFL by Touche Ross 
(Accountants) on the future viability o f THORP and disclose it; and that they did not 
properly consider possible alternatives to THORP, for example dry storage.54 Potts J. 
held that the Ministers were entitled to reach this conclusion on the material available to 
them; that they were entitled to reach this conclusion without seeing the Touche Ross 
report.55
Furthermore, the issue o f justification was also challenged in R v Secretary o f  
State fo r  Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; ex p  Friends o f  the Earth Ltd and 
Greenpeace L td 56 In this case, the Court o f Appeal considered the application o f the 
principle that the proposed practice by BFNL of manufacturing mixed oxide fuel (MOX) 
at Sellafield was justified. Importantly, the case gives an indication as to how major 
projects in the UK are subject to economic and environmental appraisal and the 
problems arising from the lack o f specific legislation on justification.57 In this regard, the 
government had concluded that the manufacture o f MOX fuel had only very minor 
radiological detriments and that it would provide economic benefits that were capable of 
justifying it as a class or type o f practice.58 As such, the claimants argued that the 
government had disregarded the sunk costs o f building the fuel plant. They submitted 
that in determining the economic benefits o f the new type o f practice, it was necessary to 
include the costs o f enabling it to come about. In dismissing the application, the Court
53 Ibid, Para. 35
54 Ibid, Para. 49
55 Ibid, Para. 58-59
56 [2001] EWCA Civ 1847; [2002] Env LR 24
57 S. Tromans, n 21 above 249
58 [2001] EWCA Civ 1847; [2002] Env LR 24, Para. 13
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held that the costs incurred in setting up a plant so as to enable the type o f practice to be 
carried out were not to be set against the economic benefits. The Court acknowledged 
that although it was important to have regard to the process being undertaken, namely 
the determination of the economic benefit on the basis of economic benefits, however, 
the capital costs incurred in the construction o f the MOX plant were not costs that could 
be said to be included in the practice itself and should therefore be ignored.59
The fact that the Court in this case acknowledged that justification could be best 
considered when applicants are encouraged to apply for an authorisation at an early 
stage in a project,60 raises further concern in the process o f justifying the construction of 
new nuclear reactors. In this regard, it has been argued that there are likely problems 
because information on how radiation waste, radiation spent fuel, and health impact of 
radiation discharges, will not be fully assessed until after the justification decision is 
taken.61 This may present enormous legal challenges given that justification once 
concluded may foreclose on any future discussion on issues that are relevant to the 
development o f nuclear power. For example, such challenges may arise under the 
planning system where the government has taken away safety issues from the public 
inquiry process. It has however been suggested62 in relation to this, that the government 
should hold an independent inquiry as permitted under the regulations governing 
justification, in order to allow room for further risk considerations by public.
3.4.2. Limits of Risk-Based A pproaches
In addition to the above, it is arguable that the outcome o f higher level o f concern to 
protect the environment in terms o f radioactive discharges has been the move towards 
newer approaches. These approaches to environmental risk regulation do not however 
provide a solution to the concern over the nature o f the risks o f nuclear power.
59 Ibid, Para. 17
60 Ibid, Para. 15
61 P. Dorfman, ‘Justification o f  N ew  Nuclear Power in the UK’, available at
<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate-uk/2009/Q5/26/iustification-of-new-nuclear-power-in-the-uk/> 
accessed 15 November 2011
62 Ibid
63 The Justification o f  Practices Involving Ionising Radiation Regulations 2004 (No. 1769), Regulation 17
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An example o f risk-based approach, that is, the method o f radioactive discharge 
screening levels employed to ensure that discharge levels are not exceeded64 can be 
found in the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive 96/61/EC65 
which mirrors the UK Integrated Pollution Control system (IPC), although to a broader 
scope. The provisions of the IPPC Directive are specific systems of control that oblige 
the Member States to take an integrated approach to the protection o f the environment 
by limiting environmental impacts o f certain industrial operations. The primary aim is to 
address pollution problems in an integrated manner that takes account o f all three 
environmental media, i.e., air, water, and land; based on the recognition that substances 
can move among environmental media as they travel along pathways from sources to 
receptors, and that controls over releases o f a substance to one environmental medium 
can result in shifting the substance to another medium.66 At the same time, these 
objectives reflect the principles of the EU’s environmental policy namely, the principle 
o f prevention; the polluter pays principle; and precaution principle. In the nuclear 
context, the preventive principle can be used to identify known risks and may be seen in 
operation in decisions to contain a nuclear reactor, to create a pressure boundary and to 
provide containment to guard against the possibility o f accidental escape o f radioactive 
materials; where that is not possible (where risk is unknown), the precautionary principle 
comes into play as the law must intervene in cases o f uncertainty; and where the
f s lenvironment is damaged, the polluter is strictly liable to pay.
The source based control of the IPPC Directive is the “Best Available 
Technique” (BAT). The BAT is described in the Directive as an “advanced stage in the 
development o f activities and their methods of operation which indicate the practical 
suitability of particular techniques for providing in principle the basis for emission limit 
values designed to prevent, and where that is not practicable, generally to reduce
64 European Commission, Radiation Protection: Effluent and Dose Control from  European Union NORM  
Industries -  Assessment o f Current Situation and proposal fo r  a harmonised Community Approach. Vol. 
1: Main Report, Iss. No. 135, page xii
65 Amended by Directive 2008/1/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and control. It is 
implemented in England and Wales by the Pollution Prevention and Control Act 1999, and the Pollution 
Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000 SI 2000/1973 (PPC Regs) as amended
66 Ibid, Preamble o f  the IPPC Directive
67 P. Riley, n 1 above 16. Note that this principles also provide guidance for UK Environmental Agency in 
pursuit o f  radioactive discharge strategy; see DECC, UK Strategy fo r  Radioactive Discharges, July 2009
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emissions and the impact on the environment as a whole”.68 “Techniques” includes both 
the technology used and the way in which the installation is designed, built, maintained, 
operated and decommissioned; “Best” is the most effective in technique in achieving a 
high level o f environmental protection; o f which “Available” means the techniques 
which have been developed on a scale which allows implementation in the relevant 
industrial sector, under economically and technically viable conditions, taking into 
consideration the cost and advantages, whether or not the techniques are used or 
produced in the Member State in question, as long as they are reasonably accessible to
i 69the operator.
Indeed, the mechanism o f BAT signifies the establishment of a legally 
enforceable standard to which methods o f pollution control must be adhered to in the 
EU. For example, it makes provision that all permits issued in pursuant to the regime 
must be underpinned by the requirement to use BAT in respect of the technology and 
methods used to reduce risk and pollution by taking into consideration the costs and 
advantages. It however looks likely that a technique may be rejected as BAT if its 
costs would far outweigh the environmental benefits. Besides, the fact that the Directive 
also requires permits to contain suitable release monitoring requirements, specifying 
measurement methodology and frequency, evaluation procedure and an obligation to 
supply the competent authority with data required for checking compliance with the 
permit,71 also indicates that nuclear power72 operators are obliged to achieve the set 
standards during the operation o f nuclear installations, so also are regulators who are 
guided by it when granting permit for industrial installations. In the event o f non 
compliance with the standards by operators, the BAT could have drastic results and 
potentially requiring elimination o f activities.73
In this regard, it is the duty o f the UK Environmental Agency (EA) to ensure that 
BAT is applied accordingly. The EA is to ensure that: the holders o f authorisations
68 Art.2( 12) o f Directive 2008/1/EC
69 Art. 2(12)(a-c) o f Directive 2008/1/EC
70 Art. 2 (12) & 9 (l)-(4) Directive 2008/1/EC respectively
71 Art. 9(5)-(6) Directive 2008/1/EC
72 Annex I (1.1), and listed in the PPC Regs as a Part A (1) activity subject to regulation by the EA
73 A. Babich, ‘Too Much Science in Environmental Law’ 28 Columbia Journal o f  Environmental Law 
(2003)119 ,127
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under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 adopt these where appropriate; that limits 
should be set at the minimum levels necessary to permit “normal” operation or 
decommissioning of a facility; and that in regulating the normal operation or 
decommissioning of a facility, the EA should take into account the relevant operational 
fluctuations, trends and events that are expected to occur over the likely lifetime o f the 
facility. Also, the EA is to ensure that waste management decisions by such holders are 
based on BAT in order to prevent the unnecessary creation o f waste or discharges, to 
minimise waste generation; and to minimise the impact o f discharges on people and the 
environment, and where a legally binding obligation requires stricter conditions and 
limits than those which would be required by the application o f BAT, the EA is to 
ensure that those stricter conditions and limits are applied.74
As it stands, the application of BAT looks relatively developed to integrate and 
include further measures aimed at facilitating environmental protection (at least beyond 
the UK IPC systems even though they achieve similar objectives). Nevertheless, it is 
arguable that over development in regulation may be damaging to the environment. A 
good example to explain this is the theory that by imposing significant compliance costs, 
regulation may indirectly cause damage in the environment, such as deaths. In this 
regard, it has been argued that individuals with more disposable income are less likely to 
die, to become ill, or to suffer accidental injury. That is, a regulation that imposes 
significant costs on people could produce a negative health effect that more than 
counteracts the positive health effect from reduced exposure to harmful substances. 
Arguably, akin to this is the flexibility approach developed in the BAT which may also 
compromise its effectiveness. For example, costs and advantages are clearly to be taken 
into account, but there is no further detail on either which costs and advantages might be
H£\relevant or the appropriate response to those costs and advantages. How the costs and
74 DECC, Statutory Guidance to the Environmental Agency Concerning the Regulation o f Radioactive 
Discharges into the Environment, 2009. Available at
<http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/uk%20energv%20supplv/energy%20mix/nuclea 
r/radioactivitv/dischargesofradioactivitv/1 20091202160019 e @@ guidanceearadioactivedischarges.pd 
f > last accessed 25 December 2011
75 Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role o f  Health/Health Analysis, 22 
ECOLOGYL.Q. 729, 730-31 (1995)
76 M. Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Changes and Decision-Making (Hart Publishing, Oxford
2005) 167
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benefits are to be weighed remains open and indeed a major concern in relation to 
environmental risk matters. However, the European Commission has also made it clear 
that where authorities o f Member States systematically set emission limit values that are 
too lenient and not based on BAT, the Commission may be forced to introduce 
Community emission limit values.77 While this remains an issue yet to be seen, the 
flexibility given to Member States may also help to justify setting low emissions limit 
values in that it is necessary in cases where other key government objectives need to be 
met. For example, this may be in terms o f safe and timely decommissioning o f  existing 
facilities, securing energy supply through new build, and maintaining defence 
capabilities.78
Having said this, the application o f BAT in setting emissions value raises further 
concern in terms o f privatisation o f the nuclear industry in the UK. To simply put, 
private investors may ignore the small probability o f serious consequences just because 
they have their interest devoted to other areas such as profit making. For example, such 
interest may be connected to waste issues or even the cost o f decommissioning in 
extreme cases. As such, any unnecessary cost may be damaging to the company. My 
point here is that these companies may have little incentive to design the reactor or even 
to operate the plant with a view to minimizing risks.79
3.4.3. Cost Benefit Analysis
In addition to the issues discussed above relating to the regulation o f radioactive 
discharge into the environment from nuclear installations, further weakness are apparent 
in the move towards the integration of economic analysis in environment risk regulation. 
Questions however remain on whether it is appropriate to adopt an economic approach 
in light of uncertainty. For example, how can the CBA help to improve the protection of
77 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee o f  the Regions - On the Road to Sustainable Production - 
Progress in implementing Council Directive 96/61/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and 
control COM/2003/0354 final
78 S. Tromans, n 19 above 451
79 D. Helm, Nuclear Power, Climate Change, and Energy Policy, in D. Helm and C. Hepburn, The 
Economics and Politics o f  Climate Change, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) 252
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the environment? Or perhaps, would the CBA impose unnecessary environmental cost 
or burden?
In brief, CBA is an appraisal tool for assessing the relative costs and benefits o f a 
project, including non-financial costs and benefits to society and the environment.80 
Under CBA, cost is anything that sacrifices some want or incurs some loss o f welfare 
and which would not have occurred had the project in question not been undertaken. 
Benefit on the other hand, is any gain in welfare brought about by the project and which 
would not have occurred in its absence.81 These are usually measured in the environment 
as individuals’ willingness to pay for a gain or willingness to pay to avoid a loss 
(revealed preference). For example, it may be by reference to relative property values or 
individuals’ willingness to accept compensation to tolerate a loss, or to go without a 
benefit (hypothetical preference).82 In turn, a decision is then justifiable when the net 
benefit is positive or a benefit to cost ratio is greater than one; and in theory, only 
measures that are demonstrated to be efficient and create more benefit than cost are to be 
pursued. The basic rule is however not to sanction anything where the costs exceed the 
benefits, but rather to choose the option that maximises the difference between benefits 
and costs.
It is often the case in environmental risk decision-making to employ CBA so as 
to ensure that better decisions are made and perhaps avoid inefficiency in government, 
such as making unfavourable environment decisions. For example, the Environmental 
Act 1995 provides that the EA in considering whether or not to exercise any power 
conferred upon it by or under any enactment, must take into account the likely costs and 
benefits o f the exercise or non-exercise o f the power or its exercise in the manner in 
question.84 There are also findings that the practice o f CBA long precedes the 
Environmental Act. An example is the Environmental Protection Act 1990 which
80 P. Stookes, A Practical Approach to Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005) 619
81 D.W. Pearce, Social Cost-Benefit Analysis and Nuclear Futures, Energy Economics (1979), Vol. 1, Iss. 
2, 66-71,66
82 D. W. Pearce, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Policy, Oxford Review o f  Economic Policy 14, 
No. 4 (1998), 84-100, 84. See also: M. Lee, n 76 above 5
83 M.S. Baram, Cost Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental 
Regulatory Decision-making, 8 Ecology L.Q. (1979-1980) 478
84 S.39 Environmental Act 1995
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provides that in any authorization, there should be specific conditions as the regulator 
considers appropriate for ensuring that the best available techniques not entailing 
excessive costs will be used in carrying on a prescribed process.85 Also in the nuclear 
industry, the CBA is been used for setting environmental safety standards. For example, 
the justification principle o f the ICRP involves weighing the benefits arising from an 
activity against the radiation detriment it produces. Thus, it is right to say that CBA aims 
to set out for government (in this case the nuclear regulators) what the market does for 
business.86
In principle, in order for CBA to be performed in the manner in which it is 
expected, all costs and benefits must be articulated in a monetary measure, usually in 
dollars, including things not normally bought and sold on markets, and to which dollar 
prices are therefore not attached.87 As examined below, it is not as simple as this 
description might suggest.
3.4.3.1 Issues Generated by Nuclear Power
The use o f the CBA in environmental risk regulation raises many important policy 
concerns. This includes: first, the concern over the decision-making process itself. It 
questions whether the full complexity o f the value o f the environment such as ecological 
change, and that whether human life and health, that are not goods are capable of 
expression in monetary terms. Surely, CBA thrives best when market pricing is available 
to measure the costs and benefits, and when the measurement can be expressed in dollars 
or some commensurate unit. For example, the direct and indirect financial costs of 
externalities such as failed crops, ill health or dirty water, can in theory be calculated, 
but their physical effects and regulation are complex and unpredictable, as well as hard 
to price.88 Without the knowledge o f environmental physical effects to adequately 
measure these factors, the CBA may lead to conclusions that are ethically unacceptable.
85 S.7 Environmental Protection Act 1990
86 F. Ackerman and L. Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost- Benefit Analysis o f Environmental 
Protection, University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 150 (2002)
87 S. Kelman, Cot-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Crittique, AEI Journal on Government and Society, (1981 
Issue) 36
88 M. Lee n 76 above 6
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The UK Natural Environment White Paper acknowledges this complexity by stating that 
most of the benefits that are derived from nature are not properly valued, and that when 
nature is undervalued, bad choices can be made.89 The government’s response however, 
is to establish an independent Natural Capital Committee to educate and inform it on the 
state of the environment by providing advice on when, where and how environmental 
assets are being used unsustainably; on how the government should prioritise action to 
protect and improve the environment so that there is focus where it will have greatest 
impact on improving wellbeing in our society; and also to advise the government on 
research priorities to improve future advice and decisions on protecting and enhancing
i • 90the environment.
Arguably, one way in which the Committee may carry out its duties in the 
absence o f environmental measurement certainty is to follow contingent economic 
practices such as individual willingness to pay. For some environmental economists, 
these practices point towards a solution in finding an economic value for environmental 
assets. Pearce and Barbier91 for example, argue that if we know what the economic value 
o f an environmental asset is, we can work towards the capture o f that value by creating a 
market for the asset; and also knowing how people value an asset for example, can help 
find the price that will be charged to those people for using the asset, and that price 
translates to a revenue which, in turn, can be used for finance conservation. However, 
the methods for such contingent economic practices that are usually employed to 
determine such economic valuations have been criticised. For example, critics argue 
against the use of economic valuation methods in that the results of contingent 
valuations are inconsistent with economic theory.92 It is towards this that Hanemann93 
adds that how a contingent valuation is conducted is definitely crucial to its conclusions. 
At the same time he raised objections that contingent valuations such as surveys are 
vulnerable to response effects in the way in which respondents interpret the meaning o f
89 DEFRA, The Natural Choice: Securing the Value o f  Nature, Cm. 8082, (June 2011) Para. 3.11
90 Ibid
91 D. Pearce and E.B. Barbier, Blueprint fo r  a Sustainable Economy (Earthscan, London, 2000) 2
92 P. A. Diamond, et al, "Does Contingent Valuation Measure Preferences? Experimental Evidence." In 
Hausman, J. A., ed., Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment. (New York: North-Holland, 1993) 41- 
89.
93 W. M. Hanemann , Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation, The Journal o f  Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 19-43
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questions; and that because the survey process creates the values, the issue is whether 
preferences through surveys are a construct or whether they are a stable construct; and 
also that such survey responses cannot be verified.94 To this point, it is clear that using 
contingent economic valuations may create a market for non-market environmental 
goods. Yet, this remains an area in which decision-makers must tread carefully because 
the individual involved in contingent valuations may refuse to give any figure or put 
figure on environmental resources.95 In such cases, the survey process may appear 
problematic for the purposes made for.
Second, the CBA even becomes less attractive if one correlates it with the future 
impact of uncertainty. For example, the distant future costs and benefits may appear as 
insignificant present values when the CBA is practised.96 In view o f the provision of 
article 1 (ii) o f the IAEA Joint Convention on the Safety o f Spent Fuel Management and 
on the Safety o f Radioactive Waste Management which provides that individuals, 
society and the environment should be protected from harmful effects o f ionising 
radiation “now and in the future” in such a way that the needs and aspirations o f the 
present generation are met without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their needs and aspirations, and also article 4(vii) which goes further by requiring 
appropriate steps to be taken to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations, the 
question is whether the CBA as currently practised, prevents an undue burden to future 
generations where nuclear waste for example is concerned. The answer will probably be 
“no”. This is because it seems unlikely that it does not represent an attempt to prevent 
risk to future generations. To adopt the use o f CBA in this regard raises explicit 
questions about nuclear waste that will be produced and that o f the management of 
legacy wastes. As to this, whether nuclear wastes are stored for some period or 
reprocessed for further use, or perhaps disposed of permanently, there still exist 
unknown risks relating to it and which needs to be settled. To have a CBA that provides 
reasonable judgements, advocates need precise data on risks and benefits. O f course,
94 Ibid, 21-29
95 Ibid
96 D. Pearce et al, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment: Recent Developments, (OECD Publishing,
2006) 23
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producing such information is a difficult task considering the uncertain nature o f the risk 
posed by the storage and disposal o f nuclear waste.
Third, discounting is another controversial issue o f the CBA. A good example to 
explain this is to consider it in light o f Stern’s formidable report.97 This report makes an 
economic case for climate change by attributing future values to contextualise the effects 
o f climate change. The report sets out the economics o f moving to a low-carbon global 
economy, focusing on the medium to long-term perspective, and drawing implications 
for the timescales for action, and the choice o f policies and institutions; the potential of 
different approaches for adaptation to changes in the climate; and also specific lessons 
for the UK, in the context o f its existing climate change goals. The report which used an 
economic technique to assess the impacts o f climate change has been extensively 
criticised among economists. For example, some have argued that the discount rate 
adopted for the treatment of risk and uncertainty is inappropriate, and that the 
calculation and comparison o f costs and benefits is done incorrectly.98 Others also 
contend that because the attributed values are likely to change, estimates of 
environmental costs and benefits are likely to be variable and lead to conclusions that 
are ethically unacceptable.99
Indeed, these criticisms suggest that discounting procedures for the costs and 
effects o f the environment understates the possible future impacts and may give rise to 
unfavourable assumptions over environmental effects and their impacts. For example in 
the present context where there is increasing concern over the impact o f climate change, 
the use of CBA may make the society even more vulnerable to its adverse effects. Also 
in nuclear power context, even if  the principle of discounting is applied, the rate of 
discount applied to the appraisal o f a nuclear power plant may at the same time not be
97 N. Stem, The Economics o f Climate Change, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007)
98 See Frank Ackerman, “Debating Climate Economics: The Stem Review vs. Its Critics,” report to 
Friends o f the Earth, July 2007, <http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/StemDebateReport.pdf> accessed 
7 August 2011
99 P.Z. Grossman and E.S. Cassedy, n 30 above 47
78
the most appropriate rate for the assessment o f additional safety measures for 
example.100
In addition, the CBA also raises distributional concerns as to the manner in 
which environmental valuables should be distributed.101 For example, it is arguable that 
a decision to allow the disposal of nuclear waste in a Community may result in 
economic benefits to the industrial promoters and the government. On the other hand, it 
may result in severe health concerns for those living in the vicinity in the event o f a 
catastrophic disaster. With regard to this, Stokey and Zeckhauser102 noted that a program 
should only be adopted if it would yield benefits to one group greater than the losses that 
would be occasioned to another group; or provided that the two groups are in roughly 
equivalent circumstances and the changes in welfare are not o f great magnitude; or if it 
redresses the discriminatory effects o f earlier policy choices, that policy should be 
undertaken. However, Baram103 believes that such an approach has the tendency to 
ignore constitutional precepts underlying the decision-making process. He argues that 
constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, property rights, and 
representative government should carry greater weight in solving distributional problems 
than any other assumptions on fairness developed by economists. In light o f this 
arguments, one may draw the conclusion that society already accepts some distributional 
disparities possibly in terms of scare economic needs and individual wants. However, 
making environmental decisions based on economic efficiency as argued by Babich may 
nonetheless qualify as environmental betrayal.104
From the above, it is clear that the CBA appears not to attach any significance to 
environmental risk and this makes it less suitable in environmental risk decision-making. 
Nonetheless, economists may still find it easy to contend that the CBA has a distinct use 
in drawing up a list o f the pros and cons o f an investment without that much analysis
100 HSE, n 10 above 51
101 A. Liberatore, The Management o f  Uncertainty: Learning From Chernobyl, (Gordon and Breach 
Publishers, Amsterdam 1999) 4
102 E. Stokey and R. Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis (W.W. Norton, 1978) 281
103 M.S. Baram, n 83 above 488
104 A. Babich, n 73 above 137
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taking place.105 How far it can go remains controversial once we start to consider the 
risks o f nuclear power and its uncertain nature. It is however in dealing with uncertainty 
that the precautionary principle appears to be an appealing solution.
3.4.4. The Precautionary principle
Over the past decades, the precautionary principle has been integrated into a number o f 
international agreements and domestic laws. The way in which it has been incorporated 
into these laws create the path for critiques to voice their concerns as to the varying 
definitions o f the principle. While such criticisms are beyond the parameters of this 
section, it is indeed vital to highlight some o f these definitions. For example, the Rio 
Declaration states that, ‘in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach 
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats 
o f serious or irreversible damage, the lack o f full scientific certainty shall not be used as 
a reason for postponing cost effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation’.106
The precautionary principle has also received considerable attention in the EU. 
The European Commission highlights the fact that the principle should be considered 
within a structured approach to the analysis o f risk and that it is particularly relevant to 
the management o f the risk.107 The Treaty on the Functioning o f the European Union 
(TFEU) also provides that environmental policies shall aim at a high level o f protection 
taking into account the diversity o f situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall 
be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventative action 
should be taken, that environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified and that 
the polluter shall pay’.108 This provision has been applied by the Court, notably in Pfizer 
animal health SA v Council109 where it was held that ‘it is appropriate to bear in mind
105 D.W. Pearce, n 81 above 71
106 Principle 15 o f  Rio Declaration available at
<http://www.environmentandhumanrights.org/resources/Rio%20Declaration.pdP> last accessed 15 July 
2011
107 Commission o f  the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the 
Precautionary Principle, Brussels, 02/02/2000, COM (2000) 1, Summary Para. 4
108 Article 191 o f  TFEU (ex Article 174 TEC)
109 Case T -13/99 [2002] E C R 11-3305
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that, as the court o f justice and the court of first instance have held, where there is 
scientific uncertainty as to the existence or extent o f risks to human health, the 
community institutions may, by reason o f the precautionary principle, take protective 
measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness o f those risks become 
fully apparent’.110
The precautionary principle also features in the UK Government policy going by 
the UK Government’s 1994 confirmation that it would comply with the suspension of 
dumping radioactive waste at sea.111 This is a form o f precaution against environmental 
hazards. Besides, it was a subject o f the report o f the Inter-Departmental Liaison Group 
on Risk Assessment (ILGRA) and they recommended that it should be invoked when 
there is good reason to believe that harmful effects may occur to human, animal or plant 
health or to the environment; and the level o f scientific uncertainty about the 
consequences or likelihood of the risk is such that the best available scientific advice 
cannot assess the risk with sufficient confidence to inform decision-making.112
According to O ’Riordan113 the precautionary principle has six core elements 
namely: preventative anticipation, a willingness to take action in the absence of 
scientific proof o f evidence o f the need for the proposed action because precaution does 
not mean preventing manifest or predicted risks that have been scientifically proven; 
safeguarding o f ecological space, that margins o f tolerance should not even be 
approached, let alone be breached; proportionality o f response or cost effectiveness of 
margins or error, to show that the selected degree o f restraint is not unduly costly; duty 
o f care on those who propose change, this raises profound questions over the degree of 
freedom to take calculated risks and to compensate for possible losses by building in 
ameliorative measures; promoting the cause o f intrinsic natural rights, the notion of 
ecological harm is widened to include the need to allow natural processes to function in 
such a manner as to maintain the essential support for life on earth; and paying for past 
ecological debt, that is precaution is essentially forward looking but there are those who
110 Ibid, paragraph 139
111 Review o f  Radioactive Waste Management Policy -  Final Conclusions, Cm. 2919 (1995), Para. 16
112 HSE, ‘The Precautionary Principle: Policy and Application’ available at 
<http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/committees/ilgra/pppa.htm> assessed 19 April 2011
113 O’Riordan et al, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle, (Earthscan Publications, London 1994) 17
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recognise that in the application of care, burden sharing, ecologically buffered cost 
effectiveness and shifting the burden of proof, there ought to be a penalty for not being 
cautious or caring in the past.
The application of the precautionary principle however seems quite sensible in 
the nuclear power industry, possibly as a form o f regulatory insurance.114 For example, 
Riley115 points out that the nuclear experience has probably been the paradigm for the 
development of the precautionary principle. In his analysis, he explained that the core 
elements o f the principle mentioned above, for instance, the preventative anticipation 
and the safeguarding o f ecological space can be seen in operation in the decisions to 
contain the nuclear reaction, and to create a pressure boundary to provide secondary 
containment to guard against the possibility o f accidental escape of radioactive materials 
beyond the primary boundaries. That the provision o f shielding in anticipation of future 
activities, the storage o f irradiated fuel in shielded and accessible facilities which 
preserve options without harming the environment are actions in the absence of 
definitive knowledge o f the way ahead. For example, we may say that the precautionary 
principle was to be in operation when the BNFL were penalised for not responding to 
the need to provide improved protection for a pipeline transporting potentially 
radioactive liquid.116 On the other hand, Mossman and Marchant117 argue that the 
application o f the precautionary principle is not required in the context o f radiation. 
They make a case that the ALARP principle is already in place to minimize radiation 
dosage in environmental settings; and as such the principle becomes irrelevant. This is 
based on the argument that radiation is one o f the most thoroughly studied subjects of 
human health effects and that environmental doses are well-known. They also add that 
the risk o f exposure to radiation does not meet the criteria identified in the EU
114 C.R. Sunstein, The Paralyzing Principle, Regulation, Winter 2002-2003, 32-37, 32
115 P. Riley, n 1 above 134
1,6 Ibid, 137. Also, ENDS Report 276, April 1997, page 44
117 K. Mossman and G. Marchant, The Precautionary Principle and Radiation Protection, 13 Risk: Health, 
Safety & Environment (2002) 137-149, 142
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Communication, and that its existing scientific data lack the requirements identified to 
trigger the application of the principle.118
Although Mossaman and Marchant’s argument may not necessarily apply to all 
nuclear related processes, there is however no doubt that much research has been done 
on radiation and the nuclear technology, even at times when there are gaps and 
inconsistencies in the evidence produced.119 However going back to the definition o f the 
precautionary principle -  “in order to protect the environment the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States where there is lack o f full scientific 
certainty”, it may as well be said that the phrase “lack of full scientific certainty’ could 
refer to the “gaps and inconsistencies in any evidence produced”, which should trigger 
the application o f the precautionary principle. It may also be that in situations where 
there is minimum knowledge to the extent o f the threat in question, or if  we suspect that 
they could be catastrophic, we have every reason to use precautionary measures. Thus as 
regards to the issue o f carbon concern, the decision to stop the use o f nuclear power by 
some nations because of the risks attached to its use may well be against the 
precautionary principle.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the precautionary principle if  applied 
may paralyse the development o f new technologies, as nothing can ever be proved to be 
totally safe;120 the only safe level o f exposure is no exposure at all.121 While also, there 
are arguments that the application o f the principle serves to encourage the development 
o f activities that may be ignored or completely neglected on the basis that the true nature
118 Ibid 142. European Commission, n 77 above at Para. 5 o f Summary. Note: there are also arguments the 
Communication o f  the European Commission on the precautionary principle that the principle itself is 
ambiguous as to what level o f acceptable risk, what role costs should play in risk decisions, what quantum 
o f  scientific evidence is sufficient for making decisions, and how potential risk-risk tradeoffs should be 
addressed. Nevertheless, the Communication still gives the most detailed guidance on the principle. See: 
L.D Guruswamy, ‘Sustainable Agriculture: Do GMOs Imperil Biosafety?’ (2001 -  2002) 9 Ind. J. Global 
Legal Stud. 461, 483
119 K.R. Foster et al, Science and the Precautionary Principle, Science, Vol. 288, No. 5468 (2000) Page 
979-981
120 K. Morrow, Genetically Modified Organisms and Risk, in L. Bodiguel and M. Cardwell, The 
Regulation o f Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford) 72. See also Sunstein n 114 above
121 A. Babich, n 73 above 123
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of risk is not known.122 However where the principle is invoked, it should be understood 
that it is not the elimination o f risk that is sought, rather it is a question o f identifying the 
risk and taking a decision as to what constitutes an acceptable level o f risk.123 Thus, one 
can conveniently say that in the application of the precautionary principle at policy 
levels in the field o f nuclear power risk such as radiation operations, the principle can 
also be seen as part o f RA and RM. However, the relationship between risk and the 
precautionary principle may also present some difficult challenges. For example, one 
may argue that the impossible burden of the continuing attempt to demonstrate that a 
particular activity is safe destroys scientific credibility; yet it is the ease of identification 
through science (that is, the reliance on the principle of sound science) that allows for 
limits to be set and monitored and for preventive measures to successfully operate.124 
Besides, the reliance on science may yet again raise public concern over environmental 
risk analysis and it should not be forgotten as discussed in Chapter Two above that the 
role o f the public is quite significant in environmental risk decision-making.
CONCLUSION
Many will agree that the inherent risks that lie alongside the use o f nuclear energy are 
major factors that affect its development in the UK and other parts o f the world. This is 
because there are instances where the public (including the government) are sceptical 
about its use on the ground that it raises various uncertain health and safety problems, 
including the possibility of a catastrophic disaster; of which the principles discussed 
above offers little or no help in dismissing uncertainties.
122 N de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2002)
123 K. Morrow, n 120 above 72
124 P. Riley, n 1 above 137
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CHAPTER 4 
NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY REGULATIONS
4.1. INTRODUCTION
“We will experience big nuclear accidents from time to time, but we can and we will
live with them”.1
When James Lovelock made this statement, many pro-nuclear states would have argued 
that the management of nuclear safety and developments in nuclear engineering provides 
adequate protection against any nuclear power accident that may occur. This is true of 
the UK government who once acknowledged in its Energy Review that modem reactor 
designs are expected to increase nuclear power safety.2 In spite o f this regulatory 
assurance, it is by all means arguable that a way o f assessing national nuclear power 
safety measures would be in the event of the occurrence o f a nuclear disaster. This 
sounds rather extreme but there is little doubt that it will put into test, the nuclear power 
safety regime and installation facilities in operation. This is true o f the recent Fukushima 
nuclear power disaster which provides the platform for the re-examination o f nuclear 
safety regulations and reactor designs in the twenty-first century. In actual fact, such 
assessments should also lead way in assessing both the regional and international safety 
standards. For example, it should help assess the level o f compliance with international 
conventions and treaties such as those o f the IAEA, most especially as the provisions are 
not legally binding on contracting Parties. Such assessment may be on issues o f nuclear 
waste for example, were large quantities o f highly radioactive wastes were stored in 
pools on site when the disaster occurred.
Based on the foregoing, this chapter is based on the second half o f the 
introductory quote - “but we can and we will live with them”. I consider this important 
for present discussion because it raises questions in the subject o f nuclear power safety 
measures and standards that are currently employed, to include disaster response 
management. For present purposes, how “we can live with nuclear power disaster” will 
be an analysis of nuclear safety regulations. Within this context, there is an array of
1 J. Lovelock, The Revenge o f  Gaia: Why the Earth is Fighting Back -  and How We Can Still Save 
Humanity (Penguin Books, London 2006) 91
2 DTI (2006), Energy Review. The Energy Challenge, (Cm 6887) July, HSMO
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international, EU, and national legal instruments that address nuclear industrial 
activities, ranging from the siting and licensing o f nuclear installations to the 
decommissioning o f reactors. Thus, the question now is whether the Fukushima disaster 
reveals anything about nuclear safety regulatory framework; or perhaps whether the 
safety measures put in place can cope with any highly dangerous situation that may 
arise.
In answering these questions, this chapter is divided into four parts, and this 
introduction comes first. Part Two focuses on nuclear power safety measures. It looks at 
international, EU, and also UK regulations. Part Three follows the same procedure but 
this time it focuses on disaster preparedness. Both parts however examine the 
jurisdictional issues involved. Part Four looks at the way ahead. As such it examines 
whether there is need to review the safety provisions discussed in part two and part 
three. If so, it questions whether there are constraints.
8 6
4.2. DISASTER PREVENTION
The Fukushima nuclear disaster just like the Chernobyl disaster has so far not only been 
a catalyst for assessing nuclear power safety measures, but it also reminds us that the use 
o f nuclear energy creates unavoidable risks for all states. Generally speaking, the 
problem for nuclear States is that the effects o f the risk o f a nuclear disaster may be felt 
in places separated by distance from the place where the incidence occurred. For 
example, every state and the environment is potentially affected by the possibility of 
radioactive contamination, the spread o f toxic substances derived from the use o f nuclear 
energy, and the long term health hazards consequent o f exposure to radiation.3
In this regard, there are varieties of international and bilateral legal agreements, 
EU, and national instruments addressing nuclear safety; all with a common relationship 
to prevent a nuclear power disaster. With respect to this, the culture is usually through a 
licensing procedure that tends to shift the burden of proof o f safety to an early point in 
time. This is the moment before operations have started. Such an approach directly shifts 
preventive measures to the operators of the nuclear installations, and the regulators 
enforcing all necessary requirements whether in the design o f the reactor or in the 
operation of installations. As discussed in what follows, the question remains whether 
this approach to safety is effective in light o f the Fukushima nuclear power disaster?; or 
does the Fukushima disaster reveal any doubt as to the role o f the regulators or operators 
o f nuclear installations?
4.2.1. International Regime On the Safe use of Nuclear Power
Art.III.A.6 o f the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) statute authorizes the 
IAEA to “establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in collaboration 
with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies 
concerned, standards o f safety for protection o f health and minimization of danger to life 
and property, and to provide for the application o f these standards to its own operations 
as well as to the operations making use o f materials, services, equipment, facilities, and 
information made available by the IAEA or at its request or under its control or 
supervision; and to provide for the application o f these standards, at the request o f the
3 P. Birnie et at, International Law & the Environment, 3rd eds (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) 
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parties, to operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or, at the request 
o f a State, to any of that State's activities in the field o f atomic energy” .
Having said that, the concern to ensure the safe use o f nuclear energy generation 
and the use o f radioactive substances under the IAEA statute is the enabling statute for 
the establishment o f the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), and the Joint Convention 
on the Safety o f Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management (the Joint Convention). However, the non-binding nature o f these 
Conventions and their substantive provisions appear to create some concerns in ensuring 
the safe use of nuclear power among contracting Parties. Below are some of these 
concerns as contextualised by the obligations o f these Conventions.
4.2.1.1. The Convention on Nuclear Safety
The Chernobyl disaster led to the adoption o f the IAEA CNS in 1994 to prevent the 
occurrence o f such accidents in the future. It has since become the key instrument at the 
international level on nuclear power safety and it is based on the technical standards 
contained in the Safety Fundamentals o f the IAEA.4 Although in some countries such as 
the UK as discussed below, the requirements provided for in the CNS have been in 
effect for years before its adoption. This is in the form o f Nuclear Installations Act 
(NIA) 1965 which provides a regime o f control and liability in relation to the installation 
and operation o f nuclear reactors and other installations designed or adapted for the 
production or use o f nuclear energy, including the storage, processing, and disposal of 
nuclear fuel. The CNS nevertheless remains the start point on discussions relating to 
international nuclear safety.
The objectives o f the CNS on nuclear power safety management are: to achieve 
and maintain a high level o f nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of 
national measures and international co-operation including, where appropriate, safety 
related technical co-operation; to establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear 
installations against potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society 
and the environment from the harmful effects o f ionising radiation from such
4 The Safety o f Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Series N o.l 10, 1993
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installations; and also to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to 
mitigate such consequences should they occur.5
A major part o f the CNS requires contracting parties to take appropriate steps to 
ensure that safety at nuclear installations are given due priority; that the level o f trained 
staff are adequate, that quality assurance programmes are established; that 
comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out periodically; that 
radiation exposure is as low as reasonably achievable; and that emergency plans are 
prepared.6 Also, the convention specifies appropriate steps with regard to the siting, 
design, construction, and the operation o f civil nuclear power installations,7 including an 
attempt to deal with the problem of unsafe reactors such as updating existing nuclear 
installations to modem safety standards.8 Furthermore, the Convention provides for the 
parties to meet periodically to review reports on measures they have taken to implement 
these international safety obligations. It also makes provision for each party to discuss 
the reports submitted by other contracting parties with the aim o f allowing experts to 
identify the problems, concerns, uncertainties, or omissions in national reports, focusing 
on the most significant problems or concerns.9
Looking at the provisions o f the CNS, it is obvious that the Convention tries to 
promote its objectives of seeking a high level o f nuclear power safety by strengthening 
national measures and international cooperation. As a party, the UK remains bound by 
its obligations in relation to how it acts with respect to the safety o f its nuclear industry. 
Thus, this research now examines the implications o f the obligations o f the Convention 
in light of recent developments and events in the nuclear industry.
However before going into much detail, this section starts to examine the CNS 
by looking at its non-binding nature which appears to be the architect of some o f the 
concerns over the safe use o f nuclear power in contracting States. In this regard, it 
should be noted that there is nothing in the IAEA statute on health and safety standards 
that bind contracting Parties with the provisions of the CNS. Safety obligations are only 
based on fundamentals rather than specific safety requirements. It is only when the
5 Art.l o f  the CNS
6 Art. 10-16 o f the CNS
7 Art. 17-19 o f the CNS
8 Art.6 o f  the CNS
9 Art.20(3) o f  the CNS. See also: 1st Review Meeting o f the Parties (1999) Annex II, para.4
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IAEA supplies materials or services to contracting parties in terms o f the safety of 
nuclear installations that the statute gives it the power to make sure that acceptable 
health, safety, and design standards are adopted,10 or to examine the design of 
equipments and facilities to ensure compatibility with its standards.11 For example as to 
the effects of the occurrence of natural disaster on nuclear installations, the arrangements 
in place are the IAEA established safety standards and requirements. These 
arrangements provide that hazards due to induced ground motion shall be assessed for 
the site with account taken o f the seismic-tectonic characteristics o f the region and 
specific site conditions, and that a thorough uncertainty analysis shall be performed as 
part o f the evaluation o f seismic hazards.12 As to this, the IAEA has extended its 
objectives by establishing an initiative under the International Seismic Safety Centre 
(ISSC) within the IAEA's Department of Nuclear Safety and Security to serve as a focal 
point on seismic safety for nuclear installations worldwide. As such, the ISSC assists 
countries on the assessment of seismic hazards o f  nuclear facilities to mitigate the 
consequences o f strong earthquakes. It also helps to promote knowledge sharing among 
the international community in order to avoid or mitigate the consequences of extreme 
seismic events on nuclear installations; to support countries through advisory services 
and training courses; and also to enhance seismic safety by utilizing experience gained 
from previous seismic events in contracting parties.13
It is to the non-binding nature o f the CNS that this chapter argues that the 
implementation of its obligations sometimes become problematic at the national level. 
Take for instance, if the argument that modern nuclear reactors are safer than those of 
the early or middle twentieth century reactors is judged to be right, o f which the answer 
would probably be “yes” by those promoting the nuclear option because of 
developments in the nuclear industry, it is then right to say that the reactors o f the latter 
may need to be reviewed to modem safety standards. However as far as the CNS is 
concerned, such an update may prove difficult to enforce where the provisions o f the 
Convention are not legally binding on contracting parties, or the IAEA having limited
10 Art. 111(6) XI o f  the IAEA Statute
11 Art. XII o f  the IAEA Statute
12 IAEA, Nuclear Safety Standards Series: Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations. No. NS-R-3 (2003). 
Chapter 3
13 IAEA, <http://vyww-ns.iaea.org> last accessed 20 March 2011
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powers because it cannot ensure the full compliance with its safety standards. For 
example in ensuring the safety o f installations, the IAEA acts as an International 
inspectorate and review body. In so doing, it provides a means for assessing the 
suitability o f nuclear installations. Such was the case when the IAEA inspected 
Bulgaria’s nuclear reactors in 1991 and found it in a very poor condition with various 
safety related deficiencies. It could only advise the Bulgarian government to take 
immediate measures but it could not compel any closure whatsoever.14 Similarly, an 
IAEA inspection o f the Chernobyl plant in 1994 disclosed continuing serious 
deficiencies and a failure to meet international safety standards.15
Thus, it is perhaps right to say that many o f the provisions o f the CNS are 
regarded as obligations to adopt a particular course o f action rather than as obligations to 
achieve a specified result.16 Article 6 which deals with the safety of existing installations 
also underline this argument. It provides that “each contracting party shall take the 
appropriate steps to ensure that the safety o f nuclear installations existing at the time the 
Convention enters into force is reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary, the 
contracting Party are to ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as 
a matter o f urgency to upgrade the safety o f the nuclear installation. If such upgrading 
cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation 
as soon as practically possible. The timing o f the shut down may take into account the 
whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environment and 
economic impact” . It is clear from the provision of article 6 that substandard nuclear 
installations must be shut down. However, it is also clear that the timing o f the shutdown 
is left to the State concerned to make decisions. As such, it is obvious that States are not 
immediately obliged to comply with the obligations o f the Convention. Thus, one may 
conclude that the early or middle twentieth century reactors such as the Chernobyl and
14 P.W. Bimie, n 3 above 498. Also, note that concerns over safety standards led Bulgaria to reluctantly 
close four o f  its six reactors plant before joining the EU in 2007. Available at BBC, Nuclear Europe: 
Country and Guide, <http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/4713398.stm> last accessed 2 June 2011
15 Ibid
16 M.T. Kamminga, The IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety, The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, (1995) Vol.44, No.4, pp.872-882, 877. Although, it should be noted that recent developments 
in international law have focused on how attention to procedure can be used to secure compliance. See for 
example: S. Bell and D. McGillivray, Environmental law, 7th Eds., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2008) Chapter 6
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Fukushima style reactors will remain in operation until economic alternatives are 
found.17 As to this, Kamminga18 argues that the thinking behind the provision o f article 
6 is that rather than having non-complying States outside the scope of the Convention, it 
is better to have them on board as parties, so that they can be subjected to the pressures 
o f the peer review process. Accordingly, the impact of the CNS will therefore depend 
almost entirely on the interpretations given to its provisions in the context o f the peer 
review process.
Even so, the peer review process raises concerns over the obligations o f the 
Convention. This is worrying because the CNS does not provide for the enforcement or 
sanction in case o f  non-compliance by contracting parties. Instead it depends solely on 
peer review for effectiveness and to supervise the implementation o f the provisions of 
the Convention as seen in articles 5, 20 and 21 which require contracting parties to hold 
meetings and discuss reports submitted by other parties to the Convention. The concern 
here is that review system as provided for appears to be basic for the purpose made for. 
For example, it does not provide for technical experts in the review process.19 Although 
the Convention stresses the role of reporting and peer pressure in that it is designed to 
ensure fulfilment o f obligations by Parties through control and sanction which is based 
on their common interest to achieve higher levels o f safety with the aim of developing 
and promoting regular meetings o f parties.20 It however does nothing to enhance the 
commitment o f contracting Parties to the review process or even to incorporate technical 
experts into the process. This concern is coupled with the fact that the IAEA has no 
general power o f compulsory review o f the nuclear installations in contracting States or
91even provide for independence verification of review compliance. The reviews of 
nuclear installations only take place at request by contracting parties and the IAEA’s
17 P.W. Bimie, n 3 above 502. Also, note that the Ukrainian government announced that it supports the 
shutdown o f the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as proposed the IAEA, but however it made mention that 
the closure schedule should respect the technological realities o f reactor decommissioning as well as the 
financial capabilities o f  Ukraine. See: A. MacLachlin and A. Brail, Ukraine Accepts Chernobyl Close but 
Doesn ’t Commit to Schedule, NUCLEONICS WEEK, November 10, 1994 at page 14
18 M.T. Kamminga, n 16 above 874
19 For example, the peer reviews carried out under the auspices o f  the World Association o f  Nuclear 
Operators (WANO) were reported to have achieved good results. See: W.T. Subalusky, The Value o f  Peer 
Reviews to Nuclear Plant Safety (1994), Trans. O f the American Nuclear Society, Supp.70(l), 701-702
20 Chapter 3 o f  the CNS
21 M.T. Kamminga, n 16 above 879
92
procedures by themselves cannot ensure the assessment o f the safety o f installations. 
Even though when a review has been conducted, States parties decide which information 
they regard as confidential and therefore may not make available such information to be 
scrutinised by peers.22 On the other hand, the peer review process itself may even raise 
issues such as transparency. For example, the issue of transparency may arise as in 
practice, where it is only governmental representatives, but not NGOs that may be 
invited to send observers to participate in review meetings o f the parties as provided for 
by the Convention.23 Thus, one thing for sure is that it appears that it will be difficult for 
the public to have confidence in the review processes. For example, there is likely to be 
issues such as increased public anxiety of the safety o f nuclear installations. After all, 
the Fukushima nuclear power disaster is only a reminder to the public of the possibility 
o f a nuclear disaster and its possible consequences.
It is also o f increasing concern at the national level that the CNS just like the 
EURATOM as discussed below seeks to achieve its objectives by strengthening national 
safety measures, in that the responsibility o f nuclear safety is a domestic affair. Article 
7-9 does reaffirm this. It states that “the responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the 
State having jurisdiction over a nuclear installation and requires each party to establish 
and maintain a national legislative and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear 
installations, including a system o f licensing, independent inspection, and enforcement 
o f applicable regulations”. As an example, article 8 o f the CNS requires the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) as a safety regulatory body in the UK to be resourced and 
separated from other bodies or organisations concerned with the utilisation of nuclear 
power. Surely, the fact that the HSE is sponsored by the Department o f Work and 
Pensions which has no role in the utilisation of nuclear energy may help to ensure the 
independence o f the HSE. However for an industry that has so such trans-boundary 
risks, it is arguable that the Convention lacks the procedure that provides for trans­
boundary safety management. Such weakness appears more glaring because the
22 A rt.27(l) o f  the CNS
23 Art.24-5 & 27 o f  the CNS. See: IAEA <http://www-ns.iaea.org/conventions/nuclear-safetv.asp> for 
details o f  previous review meetings. It should be remembered that the exclusion o f  environmental groups 
in the review process can partly be blamed with the exception o f Greenpeace International, to take part in 
the drafting o f  the Convention. See: O. Jankowitsch and W. Tonhauser, “The Convention on 
Nuclear Safety” (1 9 9 7 ) A u stra lian  R eview  o f  In ternational & E uropean L aw  2: 319-340
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Convention lacks specific provisions to promote commitment to opinions of other 
Parties other than the state in question. For example, the Convention provides for “the 
establishment and implementation o f procedures for evaluating site-related factors that 
are likely to affect the safety o f an installation; the likely safety impact o f proposed 
installations; re-evaluating such factors as necessary; and for consulting other 
contracting parties in the vicinity which are likely to be affected by an installation”,24 but 
it does not provide that the state in question must take account o f the views o f another. 
My point o f course is that in practice, the Convention treats the possible effects o f trans­
boundary risks minimal and this does not represent the spatial dimensions o f risks of 
nuclear power.
In addition to the above, the concern over the obligations of contracting Parties is 
further compounded because the character o f most o f the obligations o f the CNS appears 
to be general, it contains no detailed technical annexes o f in-depth standards of 
obligations,26 and also does not provide for technological assistance. Although the 
generality o f the provisions o f the Convention and the lack o f technical annexes o f in- 
depth safety standards was however defended during the negotiation o f the Convention 
by the authorities of countries with large nuclear power programmes as an incentive that 
would encourage all countries to strengthen their safety programmes and safety 
culture.27 As a result, the Convention fails to envisage the possibility of adopting more 
specific safety standards when compared to other environmental treaties.28 Examples 
are: the UN Convention on Climate Change adopted in 1992 which sets an overall 
framework for intergovernmental efforts to tackle the challenge posed by climate 
change, and the UN Convention for the Ozone Layer adopted in 1985 which is a 
framework agreement in which States are to cooperate in relevant research and scientific 
assessments of the ozone problem, to exchange information, and to adopt appropriate
24 Art. 17 o f the CNS
25 Ibid 876
26 See also: O. Jankowitsch and W. Tonhauser, n 23 above
27 Ibid 327. Note that although the countries with few or no nuclear power plants argued in favour o f  a 
more detailed, prescriptive form o f  Convention on all nuclear related activities and others expressing the 
wish for some form o f  mandatory international safety controls implemented by the IAEA. This was 
however defeated and the Convention as we can see only applies to land based nuclear power plants which 
excludes military installations, reprocessing plants, research reactors, and facilities designed specifically 
for treatment and storage o f radioactive waste
28 M.T. Kamminga, n 16 above 876
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measures to prevent activities that harm the ozone layer. On the other hand, it is also
arguably that a major concern for the UK is that the CNS does not provide for
technological assistance in achieving the required safety standards among contracting
parties. This I consider, a big failure on the part o f those that drafted the Convention
because the main environmental disadvantage o f nuclear power is the technological risk
involved. In this regard, Sand29 argues that a clear trend in modern environmental
treaties as seen in the Convention on Climate Change as an example, is the incorporation
of technological assistance to encourage States to join a Convention and accept its
obligations. Besides during the negotiation of the Convention, China also stressed the
importance o f safety related technical assistance by some other technologically
advanced developing countries.30 With this in mind, it is arguable that the purpose the
CNS tries to address would appear well suited with the provision for technical 
•  ^1assistance. Such provision may be o f considerable importance in the UK where nuclear 
reactor designs are based on foreign design policy. For example, it may provide further 
technical support during safety assessment o f the design o f nuclear installations where 
there may be differences in the detail o f designs considered by foreign regulators.
4.2.I.2. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the 
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
As mentioned above, the concern over nuclear power safety also led to the adoption of 
the IAEA Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety 
of Radioactive Waste Management (the Joint Convention). The Joint Convention was 
opened for signature in 1997 and entered into force in 2001. The convention is “joint” 
simply because it applies to both radioactive waste disposal and spent fuel management. 
With little or no doubt, this is an effort to ensure that in safety terms spent fuel and 
radioactive waste must be subject to the same management requirements.
The main obligations under the Joint Convention are: to achieve and maintain a 
high level o f safety worldwide in spent fuel and radioactive waste management through 
the enhancement o f national measures and international co-operation including where
29 P.H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 213 
(1990-1991), 213-227
30 O. Jankowitsch and W. Tonhauser, n 23 above 328
31 M.T. Kamminga, n 16 above 878
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appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation. Also, to ensure that during all stages 
of spent fuel and radioactive waste management there are effective defences against 
potential hazards so that individuals, society, and the environment are protected from 
harmful effects o f ionising radiation now and in the future, in such a way that the needs 
and aspirations o f the present generation are met without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their needs and aspirations.32
The Joint Convention as an incentive Convention33 follows the model o f the 
CNS above with similar objectives in ensuring high standards and prevention of 
accidents.34 Under the Joint Convention, contracting parties are also to report on the 
implementation o f its obligations at review meetings,35 and as a result, the Convention 
contains no mechanism for the enforcement or sanction in case o f non-compliance or a 
breach o f its terms. Rather, it is also designed to obtain compliance through voluntary 
cooperation and “peer pressure” rather than by means o f control and sanction.36 
However, it is in slight contrast to the CNS because it makes further reference to 
protection o f the environment and the need for intergenerational protection in the 
context o f radioactive waste disposal.37
Nonetheless, it is also of concern that some o f the provisions o f the Joint 
Convention appear ineffective for the purpose that it is meant to address. In particular is 
the provision o f Article 3(1) which states that “the Convention shall apply to the safety
32 Art.l(i) and (ii) o f  the Joint Convention. In brief, there are a number o f articles which elaborate on the 
safety provisions o f  the Joint Conventions. These are covered under seven Chapters. Chapter 2 deals with 
spent fuel management, Chapter 3 contains provisions on the safety o f radioactive waste management, 
Chapter 4 provides for general safety measures such as the establishment o f  a legislative and regulatory 
framework, Chapter 5 deals with miscellaneous provisions, Chapter 6 deals with meetings o f contracting 
parties, and Chapter 7 deals with other provisions
33 Preamble V o f  the Joint Convention
34 There is an overlap between the Joint Convention and the CNS. The CNS applies to radioactive waste 
or spent fuel held on the same site and directly related to the operation o f  a nuclear power plant. Once a 
nuclear plant ceases to be a nuclear installation it moves out o f the CNS and into the Joint Convention
35 Art.30 o f  the Joint Convention. Note: according to art.3, the Joint Convention does not apply to the 
safety o f  management o f spent fuel or radioactive waste within military or defence programmes, unless 
declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste by the contracting party, however, the Convention shall apply 
to the safety o f  management o f  spent fuel and radioactive waste from military or defence programmes if  
and when such materials are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian 
programmes
36 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, Sixth Situation Report Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management in the 
European Union, COM, (2008)542 Final, SEC, (2008) 2416 final/2, 16 July 2010, (the ‘Commission Staff 
Working Document’) page 43
37 Chapter 1: Objectives o f the Convention, Art.l(ii)
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o f spent fuel management when the spent fuel results from the operation o f civilian 
nuclear reactors. Spent fuel held at reprocessing facilities as part o f a reprocessing 
activity is not covered in the scope o f this Convention unless the Contracting Party 
declares reprocessing to be part o f spent fuel management”. Thus, the implication of the 
application o f this provision is the exclusion o f spent fuel from the scope o f the 
Convention if in active reprocessing. Simply put, spent fuel held at reprocessing 
facilities as part o f a reprocessing activity is not covered by the Convention. Once it is 
sheared to be dissolved and reprocessed, it is outside the scope o f the Convention. It 
should also be understood that, although active reprocessing is excluded from the scope 
o f the convention, storage on the site of a reprocessing facility pending reprocessing is 
covered by the Convention. This is because in such a case we are dealing with spent 
non-reprocessed fuel. This interpretation o f Article 3(1) is not shared by all States which 
had participated in the negotiations. A minority of States considered that the words "as 
part o f a reprocessing activity” mean "intended for reprocessing more or less in the near 
future". These countries consider storage o f spent fuel on site of a reprocessing facility 
as intended for reprocessing outside the scope o f the Convention.38 At the same time, it 
is also the case that active reprocessing can be brought within the convention on a 
voluntary basis by a declaration o f a contracting party.39
As such, the Joint Convention has some implications on contracting parties. For 
example, one may say that parties are given total discretion in carrying out their 
obligations. This is exemplified in the actions of France, Japan, and the UK who have 
pool storage o f used fuel to support associated reprocessing plant operations and have 
made a common declaration stating that they shall on a voluntary basis, report on 
reprocessing as if  it were part of spent fuel management within the meaning o f the 
Convention and invite all other Countries which undertake reprocessing to do the same. 
However, report suggests that not all parties are likely to support such a move.40 As 
such, where a minority o f parties consider the active reprocessing as meaning
38 A. de Kageneck and C. Pinel, The Joint Convention on the Safety o f Spent Fuel Management and on the 
Safety o f  Radioactive Waste Management, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, 
No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 409-425, 413
39 Art.3(l) o f  the Joint Convention.
40 Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, Ministry o f  Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Ministry o f  
Economic Affairs, National report o f  the Netherlands to the Joint Convention, first review conference 
April 2003, Page 6, The Hague, April 2003,
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reprocessing more or less in the near future, it is surely going to be the case that used 
fuel sent to a reprocessing plant will also be stored for longer periods o f time before 
reprocessing.41 Thus, it is o f concern that IAEA standards do not fully resolve this issue. 
As such, it remains a doubt whether there is really any comprehensive international law 
governing the reprocessing o f nuclear waste on site other than the mere fact that the 
licence holder of a nuclear installation would be held liable for any environmental 
damage whatsoever that may occur.42 Surely, this is a major issue in view o f the impact 
o f the earthquake and tsunami that struck Fukushima nuclear power stations where a 
number o f radioactive activities including reprocessing o f  spent nuclear fuel were 
carried out on site. Although while focusing on the overall nuclear safety issues and 
emergency response o f the Fukushima nuclear disaster the IAEA did recognise the 
importance of spent fuel management under severe facility degradation.43 This however 
adds little to effective legal approaches for enhanced safety and security o f spent fuel 
management. As a consequence, one can conveniently say that spent fuel management 
remains an important subject for both the security and safety o f nuclear power.
It is also worth mentioning that spent fuel is not covered under the Joint 
Convention during transportation. According to the Convention, safety principles will 
apply if spent fuel is transported from one facility to another within a given site.44 
Nonetheless, it does contain rules applicable to trans-boundary movements. For 
example, article 27 provides that “each contracting party involved in trans-boundary 
movement shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such movement is undertaken in 
a manner consistent with the provisions o f this Convention and relevant binding 
international instruments”. At the same time, article 27 does not contain any transport
41 Nuclear Engineering International, ‘Used Nuclear Fuel - What Happens After Fukushima?’, available at 
<http://www.neimagazine.com/storv.asp?storvCode=2060462> accessed 1 December 2011
42 See for example, art.21 o f the Joint Convention and art.9 o f the CNS
43 IAEA, Mission Report: The Great East Japan Earthquake Expert mission, IAEA International Fact 
Finding Expert Mission o f  the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Accident Following the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami, Tokyo, Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP, and Tokai Dai-ni NPP, Japan (24 May-2 June 
2011) at Para. 1.3
44 Art.2(0) o f  the Joint Convention. Although, as regards to off-site transportation o f  spent fuel, the 
Convention refers to "International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionising Radiation and 
for the Safety o f Radiation Sources" (1996), in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals entitled "The Principles o f  
Radioactive Waste
Management" (1995), and in the existing international standards relating to the safety o f  the transport o f  
radioactive materials (Para. Xiv o f the Preamble)
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safety rules. Rather, it only sets out the principles with which countries must comply 
when undertaking a trans-boundary movement.45
Having said this, there are also implications of the Joint Convention on particular 
legal authorities such as the Nuclear Defence Authority (NDA) in the UK. For example 
it is in the case o f both spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilities, that the 
safety of existing facilities must be reviewed under article 12 to determine whether any 
intervention is needed for reasons o f radiation protection. This may however have 
challenging liability implications for the NDA because o f its control over past nuclear 
practices in the UK. The NDA will have to make provisions under article 13-16 o f the 
Joint Convention for the siting of new facilities, their design and construction, including 
assessment of safety, operational facilities, and for geological disposal facility when the 
need arises. So also, financial provisions will have to be made available under article 
22(iii) to enable appropriate institutional controls and monitoring arrangements to be 
continued for the period deemed necessary following the closure o f a disposal facility. 
Indeed, history suggests that one cannot overlook the liability implications on the NDA. 
For example, the issue o f liability of existing nuclear installations came up in the late 
1980s during the breakup of the Central Electric Generating Board (CEGB). The 
problem was lack o f any real grasp on the magnitude o f those liabilities which on the 
long run had an adverse impact on the UK privatisation process o f the nuclear industry 46 
In this regard, it is arguable that the NDA needs to be well resourced in other to carry 
out its obligations as provided for under the Joint Convention.
4.2.2. European Dimension for Nuclear Safety: The European Atomic Energy 
Treaty
“Every institution is the product of a series of historical events and at the same time 
reflects the convictions, hopes and concerns o f those who were instrumental in
establishing it.”47
45 A. de Kageneck and C. Pinel, n 38 above 412
46 S. Taylor, Privatisation and Financial Collapse in the Nuclear Industry (Routledge, Oxford 2007) 43-4
47 P.S.R.F. Mathijsen, A Guide to European Community law  (5th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, London 1990) 5
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In 1957, the EURATOM was created alongside the European Economic 
Community (EEC) Treaty and it was tipped to be a success in relation to the security of 
energy supply and to promote European market integration, in order to foster the means 
by which national differences in economic growth could be minimised. Unlike the 
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC)48 which expired in 2002 because of 
its validity period o f fifty years, the EURATOM Treaty is still very much in existence 
and remains largely unchanged fifty three years after it was drawn up.49
The lack o f validity period puts the EURATOM Treaty back into lime light as 
the starting point for present discussions on the safe use o f nuclear power in the EU. For 
example, this relates to the Treaty provisions dealing with health and safety which are of 
uttermost importance in the development o f EU laws on the safe use of nuclear power. 
These provisions have come under criticism within the EU mostly because the political 
and economic environment in which contemporary nuclear industry is operating is very 
different from the 1950s. Furthermore from the experience o f the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster, it may as well be the case that some provisions of the Treaty have no teeth to 
ensure safety standards in the present day society. A few of these criticisms will now be 
examined.
A major criticism relates to the safety provisions o f nuclear installations. The 
EURATOM Treaty provides that the safety o f nuclear installations was to remain within 
the ambit of nuclear States. The Treaty only provides for basic safety measures for
48 ECSC was signed in 1951 and it covered an energy policy for coal
49 Art.2 o f the EURATOM commits signatories to a plan o f  implementation. In order to perform its task, 
the community shall, as provided in this treaty:
(a) Develop research and ensure the dissemination o f technical knowledge,
(b) Establish, and ensure the application of, uniform safety standards to protect the health o f  workers 
and o f  the general public,
(c) Facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by encouraging business enterprise, the 
construction o f the basic facilities required for the development o f  nuclear energy within the 
community,
(d) Ensure a regular and equitable supply o f ores and nuclear fuels to all users in the community,
(e) Guarantee, by appropriate measures o f control, that nuclear materials are not diverted for 
purposes other than those for which they are intended,
(f) Exercise the property rights conferred upon it in respect o f special fissionable materials,
(g) Ensure extensive markets and access to the best technical means by the creation o f a common 
market for specialised materials and equipment, by the free movement o f capital for nuclear 
investment, and by freedom o f  employment for specialists within the community,
(h) Establish with other countries and with international organisations any contacts likely to promote 
progress in the peaceful uses o f  nuclear energy.
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workers and o f the general public against radioactive substances. It provides that basic 
safety standards shall be laid down within the EU for the protection o f the health of 
workers and the general public against the dangers o f radiation.50 Under article 33, 
Member States are required to lay down the appropriate provisions to ensure that they 
comply with the basic safety standards established under the Treaty. A general concern 
of the Treaty right from its establishment in terms of radiation protection from nuclear 
installations is that the Treaty makes no distinction between technological safety of 
nuclear installations and radiological protection.51 However looking beyond this, it is 
now of increasing concern that the safety provisions o f the Treaty do not appear to 
reflect an advanced nuclear industry in which it is no longer desirable to consider 
nuclear safety in a purely national perspective. Only a common approach is understood 
to guarantee the maintenance of a high level of nuclear safety in the EU.52 Thus this 
raises concern about the safety organisational structure o f Member States. For example, 
because nuclear power is a technology that hangs on support and skills o f both the 
scientists and engineers, the concern for present discussion is how these skills are 
transferred and organised effectively for most under developed or developing Countries 
to provide adequate safety measures. This concern becomes more problematic in 
developing countries primarily due to scarcity o f financial resources or perhaps the lack 
of management skills. For example, there are concerns about the safety and management 
of nuclear power installations in some o f Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria as 
mentioned above.53 Also, what became clear from the Fukushima nuclear power disaster 
inquiry was that Japan lacked some basic safety measures and had to rely on foreign
50 Chapter III, art.30 o f  the EURATOM Treaty
51 S. Tromans, Nuclear Law: The Law Applying to Nuclear Installations and Radioactive Substances in its 
Historic Context, 2nd Eds, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) 56. Note: presently, there is by contrast a 
significant overlap between nuclear safety and radiation protection. Nuclear safety has not only a 
technological but also radiation protection component and radiation protection seeks to limit exposures 
according to the ALARA principle through increased control over sources o f radiation such as nuclear 
installations. See: Commission v Council, Case C-29/99 at Para. 132
52 Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament: Nuclear Safety in the 
EU, COM (2002) 605, 6.11.2002. page 11
53 However, a more practical example is a case study on Nigeria’s move in adopting the nuclear option as 
an alternative source o f  low carbon energy supply. Although Nigeria is a country outside the EU, its 
earlier decision to exclude the nuclear option from energy mix because o f  the incompetent state o f  its 
nuclear watchdog (the Nigeria Nuclear Regulatory Authority(NNRA)) in ensuring the safety o f the use o f  
nuclear energy, is an example just to illustrate that there might still be some nuclear States with ill 
equipped safety procedures, but who may be adamant o f  taking on the nuclear option for energy 
production. See: NNRA < http://nnra.gov.ng>
countries for help.54 It is therefore only reasonable to think that it is unacceptable to give 
much power to Member States who have inadequate organised safety structure for 
management o f their nuclear industry.
Another criticism of the EURATOM although not necessarily related to nuclear 
safety, stems from the fact that the contemporary nuclear power industry operates in an 
energy industry where electricity generation should be competitive without state 
support.55 In contrast to this, the rationale for the commitments made by the EURATOM 
signatory states was that, as new technology in the 1950s, nuclear technology would be 
very costly and would need a great deal o f investment and support by the government.56 
Indeed, the drafters o f the EURATOM recognised that the development of nuclear 
energy requires large investment to be made at construction stage. To do so in recent 
years may be problematic from the point o f view o f state aid rules. At the same time, this 
also may directly go against the essentials o f a liberalized market,57 which perhaps may 
make it is easy for Member States to be caught liable against the EU principles of 
liberalization. However, countries like the UK has been careful to limit support of 
nuclear power development to only the decommissioning of its existing Magnox reactors 
after the privatisation o f its nuclear industry.58
In addition to the above, a further criticism o f the EURATOM Treaty relates to 
the fact that it does not contain any explicit provisions for environmental protection.59 
Instead, the EURATOM only requires Member States to establish facilities to carry out 
the continuous monitoring of the level o f radioactivity in air, water, and soil in order to 
ensure compliance with basic radioactive standards; including the transfer of 
information to the Commission so that an impact assessment o f disposal of radioactive
54 The New  York Times, N. Onishi, ‘Safety Myth Left Japan Ripe for Nuclear Crisis’, available at 
<http://www.nvtimes.com/201 l/06/25/world/asia/25mvth.html?pagewanted=all> last accessed 26 June 
2011
55 Art. 107 TFEU (ex article 87 TEC)
56 Chapters IV and V o f  the EURATOM Treaty
57 P. Barnes, “The Resurrection o f the EURATOM Treaty - contributing to the legal and constitutional 
framework for secure, competitive and sustainable energy in the European Union" in T. Etty and H. 
Somsen, (eds)(2008) The Yearbook o f  European Environmental Law, Volume 8, p 182-218, Oxford 
University Press, 183
58 DTI (1995), The Prospect fo r  Nuclear Power in the UK, (Cm 2860) May, HMSO
59 P. Bames, n 57above 188
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waste could be made.60 It was not until the 1970’s that the European Commission 
introduced the First Environmental Action Programme (EAP) in 197261 and in 1987 the 
first explicit statement of commitment to environmental protection appeared in the 
Single European Act.
As such, because the EURATOM Treaty is the first legal binding principle on 
nuclear power law in the EU, one may contend that the amendment o f the Treaty to 
effectively address these issues would be a huge step in promoting safety measures and 
towards the development o f nuclear power in the EU. Notable environmental groups 
such as Friends o f the Earth (FoE) have called for the EURATOM to be reformed or 
even in extreme cases to be scrapped. They challenge that “the EURATOM Treaty is a 
political oddity. Although public opinion is largely opposed to the expansion o f nuclear 
energy, and despite the fact that several Member States have phased out nuclear power 
or have begun to do so, the EU Member States continue to be members o f a Community 
whose main objective is the speedy establishment and growth o f nuclear industries. 
Having existed for nearly half a century, the treaty appears to have been largely 
forgotten about by politicians and citizens alike”.62 I believe that how soon such changes 
may occur will surely attract increasing significant interest than ever by the Commission 
considering the Fukushima event.
4.2.2.I. The Nuclear Safety Directive
For the first time in the EU since the establishment o f the EURATOM Treaty, the EU 
has adopted a binding requirement on the use o f nuclear energy in form o f the Nuclear 
Safety Directive (NSD).63 The adoption o f this Directive marks a new chapter in the 
acceptance o f acknowledged International nuclear energy safety principles in the EU, 
and it has been described by the European Commission as “a major step for achieving a
60 Art.35 & 37 o f  the EURATOM Treaty
61 OJ C 112, 20/12/1973. The First EAP established 11 principles including: prevention is better than cure, 
polluter pays principle, and that activities in a one Member State should not cause deterioration o f  the 
environment in another
62 FoE Europe, ‘Will the New EU Constitution Promote Nuclear Energy?’, available at 
<http://www.foeeurope.org/publications/2005/euratom and constitution mav2005.pdf> p 4, accessed 12 
February 2011
63 Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM o f  25 June 2009 establishing a Community Framework for the 
Nuclear Safety o f  Nuclear Installations OJ L 172, 02/07/2009
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common legal framework and a strong safety culture in Europe”.64 Although it is 
arguable that the adoption of this Directive is a response to some o f the lapses o f the 
EURATOM Treaty as we have seen above, however, the controversy that surrounded 
the adoption o f the provisions o f the Directive makes one to think otherwise.
The NSD is based on the IAEA Safety Fundamentals and the CNS above. The 
goal is to maintain and to promote the continuous improvement of nuclear safety and its 
regulations; and to ensure that Member States provide appropriate national arrangements 
for high level nuclear safety.65 It applies to any civilian nuclear installation operating 
under a licence granted under the jurisdictions o f a Member State at all stages covered 
by the licence, and does not prevent Member States from taking more stringent safety 
measures.66
The NSD provides that Member States shall ensure that the prime responsibility 
for nuclear safety of a nuclear installation rests with the licence holder and that this 
responsibility cannot be delegated. In terms o f regulatory standards, the Directive goes 
beyond the EURATOM Treaty. The EURATOM only requires each Member State to 
lay down the appropriate provisions, by legislation, regulation, or administrative action, 
to ensure compliance with basic standards established under the Treaty.68 Whereas, the 
Directive provides that Member States must establish and maintain a competent 
regulatory authority in the field of nuclear safety, and must ensure that it is functionally 
separated from any other body or organisation concerned with the promotion or 
utilisation o f nuclear energy, in order to ensure independence from undue influence in its 
decision-making.69 Although the UK national legislation and arrangements under the
64 European Commission (2009), ‘ The EU establishes a common binding framework on nuclear safety’, 
Press Release IP/09/1039, 25 June 2009
65 Art.l o f the NSD
66 Art.2 o f the NSD. The Directive expands the definition o f  “Nuclear Installation” to mean: an enrichment 
plant, nuclear fuel fabrication plant, nuclear power plant, processing plant, research reactor facility, spent 
fuel storage facility and storage facilities for radioactive waste that are on the same site and are directly 
related to the above mentioned facilities
67 Art.6 (1) o f the NSD
68 Art.33 o f the EURATOM Treaty
69 Art.4-5 o f  the Nuclear Safety Directive
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umbrella o f the Nuclear Directorate70 had been in existence before the adoption o f the 
Directive, it however represents an example o f a competent regulatory authority set by 
the Directive.
Another positive development is that the NSD makes it legally binding for 
Member States to at least every ten years arrange for periodic self-assessments o f their 
national framework and competent regulatory authorities, and to invite an international 
peer review.71 Though this is a reference to requirements under the International 
arrangement of the IAEA, it nevertheless, still shows some form o f commitment at the 
EU level to address the safety issues o f nuclear installations. Definitely, the adoption of 
a ten year periodic self-assessment is a very precise obligation which facilitates the 
safety o f nuclear installations in Member States. It is also an essential provision to assess 
national safety regulatory framework considering that Member States retain 
technological control over nuclear installations on their territories. It thus becomes a 
significant step forward in terms of nuclear safety, bearing in mind that it can easily lead 
to a breach o f Community law in the event of non-compliance by Member States.72
Having said this, it is surprising that none of the final provisions o f the NSD 
addresses the issues o f nuclear waste disposal and spent fuel. Clearly speaking, one 
expects an improvement in the provisions o f the Directive in that it should be more 
informed than the CNS which it is based upon. However with the issue o f national 
control of the management of nuclear installations that has developed since the 
establishment o f the EURATOM Treaty, there was no doubt that history would repeat 
itself. For example, in the build up to the adoption of the Directive, there was a separate 
proposal dealing with the management of nuclear waste and spent fuel and 
decommissioning.73 The European Council however, managed to exclude such 
provisions and other substantive provisions o f the CNS from the final draft o f the NSD.
70 From the 1st o f  July 2011, the Nuclear Directorate changed to the Office for Nuclear Regulation and it 
has absorbed all the elements o f  what was ND - the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (N il), the Office for 
Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) and the UK Safeguards Office (UKSO)
71 Art.9 o f  the Nuclear Safety Directive
72 M. Ferro, ‘Directive 2009/71/EURATOM: the losing battle against discrimination and protection o f  
sovereignty’, Int. J. Nuclear Law , Vol. 2, No. 4. 2009
73 COM (2003) 32 final o f  30.1.2003 -  Proposal setting out basic obligations and general principles on the 
safety o f nuclear installations. See also: COM (2004) 526 final o f 08.09.2004 - laying down basic 
obligations and general principles on the safety o f  nuclear installations
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The major reason for this is because countries like Spain, Italy, and the UK in particular 
were concerned about certain provisions of the initial proposal. The UK Government 
argued that there was no real benefit in introducing a regional layer of regulation below 
the framework of the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety and IAEA Safety 
Standards.74 As to this, it is arguable that the failure o f the Directive to recognise the 
issues o f nuclear waste may also have an effect in the context o f the acceptability of 
nuclear power. The latest EU survey on public opinion underlines this. Where nuclear 
waste is concerned, the survey reveals that an overwhelming majority of Europeans 
would find it useful to have European legislation on nuclear waste management.75 It 
adds that knowledge and information are crucial in determining public attitudes to the 
use o f nuclear power and that citizens would like to know more about nuclear waste 
management and environmental monitoring procedures. It is against these issues that 
attention is now drawn to the provisions o f the Directive on the Management o f Spent 
Fuel and Radioactive Waste (SFRWD).
4.2.2.2. Directive on the Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste
Arguably, in what turns out to be a response to the concern o f the public on nuclear 
waste and spent fuel on one hand, and on the other an indirect response to the 
Fukushima disaster in terms o f the effects o f nuclear waste and spent fuel that were 
stored on site, is the introduction of Council Directive 2011/70/EURATOM76 which has 
binding effects on Member States. The timing o f the adoption o f the Directive could not 
have been more appropriate following the events during the Fukushima disaster. Besides 
because discussions where ongoing before the disaster occurred, the introduction o f the 
Directive also stands to dispute the assertion that “societies find it easy to respond to 
disaster than to forestall it”.77 However to what extent the Directive disputes this 
assertion is considered by examining its provisions.
74 See: DTI, Nuclear Safety Directive, Consultation Document (2003)
75 European Commission, EUROBAROMETER 234: A Report on Europeans and Nuclear Safety, March 
2010
76 OJ L199/48 [2.8.2011] establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management 
of spent fuel and radioactive waste (SFRWD)
77 Review by A. Boyle, ‘Nuclear Energy Law after Chernobyl’, (1989) I.C.L.Q. 38(4) 979-981
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Just like the NSD, the SFRWD also builds on International standards contained 
in the Joint Convention. The objectives o f the SFRWD is to ensure the long-term 
management o f radioactive waste and spent fuel; to ensure a high level of safety in spent 
fuel management and radioactive waste management, protecting workers and the general 
public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations at all stages o f management 
o f radioactive waste and spent fuel; and also to maintain and promote public 
participation and information with regard to radioactive waste and spent fuel 
management policies.78
As the title suggest, the SFRWD deals with the issues o f the management of 
spent fuel and radioactive waste at the EU level. In so doing, there are many attributes 
one may attach to it; at least beyond the standards contained in the Joint Convention 
which it models. For example article 2(1) o f the SFRWD provides that the Convention 
applies to “all stages o f spent fuel management when the spent fuel results from the 
operation o f civilian nuclear reactors or is managed within civilian activities; and all 
stages o f radioactive waste management from generation up to disposal, when the 
radioactive waste results from civilian activities or is managed within civilian activities”. 
In contrast, the Joint Convention only lay down the similar measures regarding the 
management o f spent fuel as it does for radioactive waste.
In addition to the above and under general principles imposed on Member States 
by the SPRWD, there appears to be new provisions on spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management. An example is the provision o f article 4(4) which provides that 
“radioactive waste shall be disposed o f in the Member State in which it was generated, 
unless agreements are concluded between Member States to use disposal facilities in one 
o f them”. This provision is without doubt a novel provision o f which the Joint 
Convention falls short. Article 4(4) prohibits the disposal of radioactive waste outside
78 A rt.l(l-3 ) o f  Directive 2011/70/EURATOM. The obligations o f the Directive are: art.5 which deals 
with the provision o f  the establishment o f  national framework for spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management; art.6 which deals with the establishment o f  a competent regulatory authority in the field o f  
safety o f  spent fuel and radioactive waste management; and art.7 which deals with the responsibilities of  
licence holders. Others are: the provisions for the arrangement o f  expertise and skills to cover the need o f  
the national programme for spent fuel and radioactive waste management; ensuring transparency; 
provision for financial resources for the implementation o f  national programmes; and the provisions for 
the contentment o f  national programmes, to include, reporting and notification o f national programmes 
(art. 8-14)
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the EU. It also impedes the reprocessing o f spent fuel and storage o f radioactive waste 
outside the EU. However, it is not clear whether the reference to the provisions of article 
4 as “general principles” instead of “general requirements” is intended to imply a non­
binding nature in terms o f shipment o f spent fuel and storage o f radioactive waste 
outside the EU, or whether it was simply an attempt to adopt the same terminology as 
adopted in the IAEA Principles.79 However, it should be noted that exports to countries 
outside the EU is only permitted under strict and binding conditions. For example, the 
country outside the EU needs to have radioactive waste management and disposal 
programmes with objectives representing a high level of safety equivalent to the EU 
standard.80 Besides, shipment o f spent fuel and radioactive waste is prohibited to a State 
which is party to the Partnership Agreement between the members o f the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group o f States o f one part, and the European Community and its 
Member States, o f the other part (Cotonou ACP-EC Agreement) which is not a Member 
State.81
It is also worth mentioning that the peer review processes as provided for under 
the SPRWD is more precise than the requirements o f the Joint Convention. For example, 
Member States are required periodically and at least every ten years, to arrange self 
assessment and invite international peer review o f their national framework and nuclear 
programmes. The outcome o f which is to be reported to the Commission and other 
Member States.82 Arguably, the provision that Member States are to invite international 
peer review o f their national framework may as well be that the peer review process of 
the SFRWD could serve as a means o f building public confidence and trust in the 
management o f spent fuel and radioactive waste in the EU. However, considering the 
challenges o f nuclear waste in the UK for example, the concern is whether the ten year 
interval provided for is suitable in assessing compliance with issues o f spent fuel and 
radioactive waste.
79 A. Stanic, A Step Closer to EU Law on the Management o f Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel, Journal 
o f  Energy & Natural Resources law, 29 No. 1, 117, 145-146
80 Art.4(4)(b) o f  Directive 2011/70/EURATOM
81 A rt.l6(l)(b) o f  Council Directive 2006/117/EURATOM o f November 2006 on the Supervision and 
control o f shipments o f  radioactive waste and spent fuel
82 Art. 14(3) o f the SFRWD
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Looking at the above, it is clear that the requirements of SFRWD exceed that of 
the Joint Convention which it builds upon. Although at the same time, it should be noted 
that the provisions fall short o f the initial 2003 proposal on spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management in prescribing the content of national programmes, including waste
83disposal. However more important is that it provides the Commission the power to 
review national programmes on spent fuel and radioactive waste. This, alongside the 
provisions o f articles 141 and 143 o f the EURATOM Treaty to commence infringement 
proceedings, means that under the SFRWD the Commission is granted enforcement 
powers to enable it to ensure that Member States comply with the provisions o f the 
SFRWD.
Above all and in what is being considered as a significant step in improving 
nuclear safety standards in the EU is that the introduction o f the SFRWD shows that the 
general opposition by some Member States to prevent the Commission from adopting 
binding existing international nuclear safety measures at the EU level so far has been 
dropped. This is of course in contrast to the position o f Member States during the 
negotiation process o f the NSD where they were reluctant to accept further binding 
international principles at the Community level. For example, the adoption o f further 
measures beyond international safety principles only featured in the omitted provisions 
o f the NSD. Although these developments suggest some sort o f credit to the SFRWD, it 
is however yet to be seen whether the provisions are adequate in addressing the issues of 
nuclear waste and spent fuel in Member States. For example, it is provided for under the 
Directive that Member States will have to draw up national programmes and notify the 
Commission by 2015 at the latest and that the Commission is to examine such 
programmes and can require changes84 on plans with a concrete timetable for the 
construction o f nuclear waste disposal facilities, as well as a description o f the activities 
needed for the implementation o f disposal solutions. Yet drawing up such programmes 
within the time scale provided may also be challenging. This is because as discussed in 
Chapter 3 above, the identification of geological repository site in the UK as an example 
may not be as easy as one might think. My point o f course is that any difficulty
83 See also: A. Stanic, 79 above 145
84 Art, 14 o f  the SFRWD
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encountered in the process may lead to an unfavourable outcome in meeting obligations 
under the SFRWD. Thus depending on how one looks at this, any difficulty in meeting 
the obligations o f the Directive may be seen as a failure by the drafters o f the Directive 
to fully understand the challenges and concerns o f spent fuel and nuclear waste. Only 
time would tell how true this is.
4.2.3. UK Regulatory Regime
In addition to the above, the concern over the fear o f the release of radiation from 
nuclear installations into the environment in the UK as with other EU countries also 
distinguishes nuclear power safety measures from other low carbon energy sources. The 
first UK legislation to incorporate radiation protection into law is the Nuclear 
Installations Act (NIA) 1965. It is the primary source o f legislation covering the 
operation of installations including nuclear power stations and waste processing plants. 
It consolidates and replaces the requirements o f the Nuclear Installations (Licensing and 
Insurance) Act 1959, which focused on three aspects o f nuclear power sites namely: 
licensing o f nuclear sites, compensation for any damage to person or property from 
ionising radiation, and a scheme o f compulsory insurance;85 the Nuclear Installations 
(Amendment) Act 1965, which amends the definition o f nuclear reactor in section 1(6) 
o f the Electricity (Amendment) Act 1962; and also the United Nation Convention on 
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy 1960 (the Paris Convention), which 
provides that operators o f nuclear power plants are liable for any damage caused by
Q /r
them, regardless o f fault.
The NIA 1965 provides that no person shall use any site for the purpose of 
installing or operating any nuclear reactor (other than one comprised in means of 
transport, whether by land, water or air) unless a licence to do so has been granted in 
respect o f that site. Under the Act, a nuclear site licence is required for installations 
designed or adapted for: the production or use o f atomic energy; the carrying out o f any 
process whether preparatory or ancillary for the production or use o f atomic energy 
which involves or is capable o f causing the emission o f ionising radiations; or the
85 S. 1-8 o f  the Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959
86 Art.3 o f  the Paris Convention
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storage, processing, or disposal o f nuclear fuel or o f bulk quantities of other radioactive 
matter, being matter which has been produced or irradiated in the course o f production 
or use o f nuclear fuel; and anyone who contravenes shall be guilty o f any offence.87 In 
this function, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is the responsible body which 
legislates and grants licences for all nuclear activities from the time an application is 
first received to when the plant finally closes. The NIA 1965 also deals with certain 
liability and insurance issues as to the release o f radiation into the environment from 
nuclear installations. For example, it imposes a duty on the licensee of a nuclear site to 
secure that specified matters do not cause injury to any person, or damage to any 
property o f any person other than the licensee. This could be occurrence either on the 
licensed site; or occurrence involving matters which has been on the licensed site or in 
the course o f carriage; or occurrences involving nuclear matter being carried in the 
course o f carriage involving nuclear matters on behalf o f the licensee as licensee o f the 
site or perhaps in the course o f carriage to the site with the arrangement o f the licensee 
from relevant territories.88 In any case, the nuclear matter must not at the time o f the 
incident be on any other relevant site in the UK (for example, sites occupied for nuclear 
purposes by Government departments).89
Furthermore, the control o f radioactive substances is also subject to the 
Radioactive Substance Act 1993 (RSA 1993). The RSA 1993 defines radioactive waste 
as “waste which consists wholly or partly of: (a) a substance or article which if  it were 
not waste, would be radioactive material; or (b) a substance or article which has been 
contaminated in the course of the production, keeping or use of radioactive material, or 
by contact with or proximity to other waste falling within (a)” .90 There have however 
been some recent developments in UK legislation to regulate radioactive waste activities
87 S. 1(1) (a)-(b) and S. 1(3) NIA 1965
88 S. 7-21 NIA 1965
89 S. Tromans and J. Fitzgerald, The Law o f  Nuclear Installations and Radioactive Substances, (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1997) 113. Section 12 o f the Act also provides a right for strict liability. It states that 
where any injury or damage has been caused in breach o f any duty by the licensee, taking into account o f  
any relevant exclusion or reduction, there must be compensation in respect to the injury or damage caused 
in accordance with the act. Such claim must however, be brought within 30 years o f the date o f  the 
occurrence that gave rise to the claim or, where the occurrence was a continuing one, 30 years from the 
date o f the last event in the course o f  occurrence (S. 15 NIA 1965). Note that S. 16 caps the amount o f  
compensation payable
90 Art.2 RSA 1993
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in a number o f areas through the Environmental Agency (EA) under the Environmental 
Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations (EPR) 2 0 10.91. This is part of a wider plan 
to standardise the legislation on environmental permitting, with the object o f creating a 
simpler and less bureaucratic system.92 What this means is that applications and grant 
for permits, conditions, appeals, enforcement and other matters would become subject to 
common requirements and provisions.93 However, the definition, authorisation and 
accumulation o f radioactive waste regulation within the RSA 1993 remain unchanged. 
Under section 13 o f the RSA 1993, the disposal o f radioactive waste from licensed 
nuclear plants including reprocessing sites without authorisation to do so is prohibited. 
An operator is not allowed to dispose on or from the site o f radioactive waste without a 
permit to do so, knowing or having reasonable grounds for believing the material or 
waste to be radioactive material or radioactive waste. Also under section 14, the 
accumulation of radioactive waste with the view for subsequent disposal on any 
premises is also prohibited. Additionally under the EPR 2010, the EA must also ensure 
that limits on radioactive discharges are to be kept as low as reasonably achievable 
(ALARA), taking into account economic and social factors.94 These radiation limits and 
conditions are however binding on operators and the regulator must take reasonable care 
to allow safe disposal o f radioactive wastes.95
The UK law is also designed to ensure the health and safety o f workers at nuclear 
sites. Here, HSE is concerned with the control o f exposure to radiation arising from the 
use o f radioactive materials and radiation generators in work place activities in the 
nuclear industry and other related industry. Under the Health and Safety at Work Act 
(HSWA) 1974, an employer is required to ensure so far as is reasonably practicable that 
he does not cause harm either to his employees or to other people either on or off the
91 The EA is the principal regulator under the RSA 1993 for England and Wales. In Scotland, a separate 
agency, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) has this role. EPR 2010 replaces most o f  the 
RSA 1993. The does not change legal requirements, Government Policy or the technical requirements in 
relation to the regulation o f  radioactive substances on nuclear sites
92 S. Tromans, n 51 above 413
93 For example, section 16 o f RSA 1993 has been amended to change the procedure in relation to 
authorisations for the accumulation or disposal o f  radioactive waste on or from nuclear sites
94 Part 3(1) EPR 2010
95 The Environmental Agency, near-Surface Disposal Facilities on Land for Solid Radioactive Wastes: 
Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation, (Feb. 2009) Para. 2.1.4
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site.96 These are however consistent with article 9 and 10 o f the CNS respectively. The 
CNS obliges the UK as a contracting party to ensure that the prime responsibility for the 
safety o f the nuclear installation rests with the licence holder.
Also following the experience o f the Sizewell B inquiry as discussed in Chapter 
5 below, the government acted to bring forward the role o f the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) to require it to pre-licence nuclear power station designs. The reason 
for this is to enable companies to submit information on reactor designs in advance 
before committing significant sums o f capital to planning and construction.97 This is 
done via the GDA which is in line with the nuclear site licensing regime as seen under 
the IAEA CNS. For example, the Convention provides that parties are to take necessary 
steps in ensuring that the safety of an installation rests with the licence applicant to 
ensure that it meets the specified safety criteria.98 Thus, it is surely the case that licence 
applicant must show that it fully understands the hazards associated with its operations 
and knows how to control them. As such, the GDA should therefore be seen as a process 
that provides for safety, security, and environmental aspects o f the reactor design which 
should be o f one or two submitted designs (foreign modem design).
On completion o f the GDA process, a Design Acceptance Confirmation is issued 
by the HSE. This is a Statement of Generic Design Acceptability by the EA and a 
Generic Conceptual Security Plan Approval. As to this, any Design Acceptance 
Confirmation issued for generic design applies for a period o f ten years, subject to no 
significant new information arising during that the time frame which might call into 
question the original basis o f assessment.99 Indeed in light o f the Fukushima nuclear 
power disaster, one is forced to raise questions about the process o f GDA because not 
only was the disaster greater than the design basis at Fukushima power station, but also 
the need to examine why the design failed to reflect the accident and its impact. For 
example, because radioactive waste activities were been carried out on site during the 
disaster, the key question is whether planning for long-term managed spent fuel should
96 S.2 and 3 o f  the HSWA 1974
97 HSE at <w ww.hse.gov.uk/newreactors> accessed last 4 October 2011
98 Art.7(2) and 9 o f  the Convention o f  Nuclear Safety
99 HSE <http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/ngn03 ,pdf> last accessed 16 October 2011. Para. 63
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be an integral part o f reactor design? There are two reasons for these questions. The first 
is because the nuclear industry as seen so far has become internationalised in relation to 
its safety regulatory framework; and the second is because the future o f nuclear power 
installations in the UK in particular is based on adopted overseas designs. Thus for 
present purposes, the latter carries more weight and the ONR was quick to allay fears. It 
points out that the Fukushima nuclear reactors are of Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) 
which is different from those envisaged in the UK with the exception of the Sizewell B 
which is o f a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR). In its interim report, the ONR 
concluded that the current regulatory safety framework in the UK is satisfactory and that 
there are not any significant defects in the approach o f the GDA, nuclear site licensing 
and construction consents.100
i°° Qfflce for N uciear Regulation, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: Implications fo r  the UK Nuclear 
Industry: Final Report, September 2011. Available at <http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/fukushima/fina1- 
report.pdf> lasted accessed on 4 November 2011. See: Para. 386-401, 549, and Annex F respectively
4.3. DISASTER PREPAREDENESS
The Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 provided the platform for nuclear States to 
provide assistance and cooperate in cases where they are at risk from nuclear accidents 
and to take action on nuclear disaster management. The key scrutiny faced were 
regulations on health and safety, and as a result, further regulations were been 
introduced to facilitate such assistance and cooperation. However, since the occurrence 
o f the Fukushima nuclear power disaster which reaffirms that nuclear accident cannot be 
completely ruled out even by countries that are far more proficient in disaster 
management, it is only logical to think whether the responses in place can cope with 
highly dangerous situations that might arise; which thus becomes the focus o f this part. 
In addressing this concern, the approach used is quite similar to the preceding part. That 
is, an examination o f both the international and EU regulations as applicable to the UK.
4.3.1. Post Chernobyl Disaster: International Perspective
“It is an obvious truism that societies find it easier to learn from their mistakes than to
forestall them”.101
This quote fits the description o f the impact o f the Chernobyl nuclear disaster as early 
notification o f nuclear accidents made its mark in the international scene as no previous 
international Convention requires the prompt notification o f a nuclear accident.102 The 
genesis o f which is attributed to the late notification by the Soviet Union Government 
about the disaster, extent of the damage to reactor, including the areas that were 
contaminated by radioactive materials. For example, the Chernobyl accident began with 
a chemical explosion as the nuclear plant entered into a planned shutdown in 1986 and 
the world first heard o f the accident only after Sweden and Finland detected windblown 
debris and gases on their radiation monitors.103 Also, the maps indicating the towns and 
areas that were contaminated with radioactive material from the nuclear power plant
101 A. Boyle, n 77 above. Note: this quote however stand to be challenged by the introduction o f  the 
SFRWD
102 Although several agreements between individual states require the parties to advise each other 
promptly o f  any serious operating incidents at nuclear facilities. An example is the Agreement Relating to 
Information in the Nuclear Field between the USA and Canada o f  1976
103 J. Davis, Disaster Raises New Questions About Fate o f Nuclear Energy, Cong. Q. Weekly Report, May 
3, 1986, 964
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accident were not officially published until the early 1989, making it almost three years 
after what has been declared as the worst nuclear accident ever.104 The Soviet 
government however later admitted that the accident had occurred but were slow in 
reporting it.105
As a result o f the delayed tactics on the part o f the Soviet government, numerous 
international Conventions and bilateral Treaties were created. However, it should also be 
remembered that there had been various Conventions at the international level. 
Examples are the Paris Convention on the Prevention o f Marine Pollution from Land 
Based Sources 1974 and the Exchange of Notes between the UK and France on 
Radiological Consequences106 which deals with the prevention of pollution from land 
based sources. Nonetheless, the Convention on Early Notification o f Nuclear Accidents 
(Early Notification Convention) and the Convention on Assistance in the case o f a 
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention) in 1986 and 1987 
respectively were still adopted to address disaster response concerns; both o f which will 
now be examined.
4.3.1.1. The Convention on Early Notification o f a Nuclear Accident
The Early Notification Convention entered into force in 1986. It is designed to 
strengthen cooperation between states concerning the safe development and use of 
nuclear energy by providing relevant information about nuclear accidents as early as
107possible in order to have trans-boundary radiological consequences minimized.
The adoption o f the Early Notification Convention shows how sceptical nuclear 
States are about any future accident. This is because the Convention applies to nuclear 
accidents resulting from a wide range of activities, including any nuclear reactor 
wherever located; any nuclear fuel cycle facility; any radioactive waste management 
facility; the transport and storage o f nuclear fuels or radioactive wastes; the manufacture,
104 H. Ginzburg, ‘The Psychological Consequences o f the Chernobyl Accident: Findings from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency Study’ (1974) 108(2), 184-192
105 J. Davis, n 103 above 964
106 Cmnd. 9041
107 Preamble to the Early Notification Convention
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use, storage, disposal and transport o f radioisotopes for agricultural, industrial, medical 
and related scientific and research purposes; and the use o f radioisotopes for power 
generation in space objects, which result or may result in international trans-boundary 
release o f radiological material o f safety significance to another state),108 and by making 
provisions that States may notify other accidents as well.109 Under this Convention, a 
party experiencing a nuclear accident should immediately notify the IAEA and 
potentially affected States o f the location, time, and type o f accident, and must provide 
any available information to minimize radiological consequences to affected States.110 
Afterwards, the IAEA will pass on the information to other States by providing: the 
time, exact location where appropriate, and the nature o f the nuclear accident; the 
facility involved; the cause and the foreseeable development relevant to the trans­
boundary release; the general characteristics of the radioactive release; information on 
meteorological and hydrological conditions, necessary for forecasting the trans­
boundary release; the results o f any relevant environmental monitoring; the off-site 
protective measures taken or planned; and also the predicted behaviour over time o f the 
radioactive release.111 These requirements are important given the nature of nuclear 
accidents and the rapid changes which may occur in radiation levels.112
As to the above, reports suggest that the Early Notification Convention 
procedures were followed in response to the Fukushima nuclear power disaster. It was 
reported that in the early hours o f the event, the IAEA received the first request for 
information about the state of the safety of the power reactors in Japan. Since that time, 
the Agency has responded to requests for information from official contact points from 
State Parties to the Convention. Requests were received from organizations that are not 
officially nominated contact points and from members o f the public who also followed 
up by the relevant Agency technical division or the Division o f Public Information.
108 Art.l o f the Early Notification Convention
109 Article 3 o f  the Early Notification Convention. Note that notification o f  nuclear weapons is not 
mandatory. However, China, France, Russia, UK, and the USA as nuclear weapons states have also 
declared their intent to report accidents involving nuclear weapons
110 Art.2 and 5 o f the Early Notification Convention
111 Art.4, 7, and 5 o f  the Early Notification Convention
112 S. McBrayer, Chernobyl’s Legal Fallout-The Convention on Early Notification o f  a Nuclear Accident, 
17 Ga. J. In t’l & Comp. L. (1987) 303-319, 315
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Also, the International Emergency Centre (IEC) published on the Early Notification and 
Assistance Convention (ENAC) web site its first IEC Status Summary Report to inform 
relevant authorities o f the activities carried out by the Agency in response to the 
situation at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The document covers activities 
undertaken by the Agency from the time o f the activation o f the IAEA Incident and 
Emergency Centre immediately after news was received of the earthquake.113
Having said this, there are yet concerns that the IAEA must deal with nuclear 
emergencies more quickly than it did during the Fukushima nuclear disaster. For 
example reports suggest that the IAEA was in touch with the Japanese nuclear regulators 
within hours o f the earthquake and tsunami; however, it officials did not hold a press 
conference to give an indication of the situation in Japan until three days after the 
disaster, and its technical experts did not begin assessment for a full week.114 
Commentators were also quick to point out that the content o f briefing about the disaster 
by the IAEA led to mixed feelings at the international level because it was not outspoken 
enough to dispel the confusion around the impact o f the disaster.115 However, others116 
are o f the opinion that care must be taken in the way in which information on nuclear 
accidents are been divulged. They argue that such events are often made worse by the 
way the nuclear industry and governments handle the early stages o f disasters, as they 
reassure the public that all is fine. They also add that some statements are well 
intentioned but as things get worse, people wonder why early reassurances were issued 
when it is apparent that there was no basis for them .117
The above criticism is after all not surprising because some provisions o f the 
Early Notification Convention are less clear as it leaves interpretation o f certain terms to 
the discretion o f each contracting party. This stems from the fact that the Convention
113 IAEA, IAEA Activities in Response to the Fukushima Accident. Available at 
<http://vAvw.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/201 l/govin f20n  -8.pdf> Para. 19 and 20. Last 
accessed 29 November 2011
114 Nature (The International Weekly Journal o f  Science), Nuclear Agency Faces Reform Calls’, available 
at <http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110426/full/472397a.html> lasted accessed 2 December 2011
115 Ibid
116 A. Scott and J. Watson, “Quiet Voices Must be Heeded to Avert a Future Fukushima”, available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/201 l/mar/17/fukushima-iapan-nuclear-disaster> last accessed 
28 December 2011
117 Ibid
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does not give specific definitions of how quickly States must provide information on 
nuclear accidents within its territory and the decision as to what is prompt. Moreover 
besides notifying the IAEA of the accident, other States to be notified about the accident 
is entirely at the discretion of the Accident State. As to this, the drafters o f the 
Convention should have at least stipulated that States are required to give notice o f any 
nuclear accident no later than a specified period o f time after the accident may have 
occurred. Thus it is easy to argue that such a provision would have assured a reasonable 
application o f the Convention.
A closer look at the provision o f article 5(3) of the Early Notification Convention 
which includes the phrase “except when such information is provided in confidence by 
the notifying State Party”, also suggests that the application of the Convention may not 
be relied upon. This is because it allows a notifying State to restrict the use of 
confidential radiological information.118 Although, it may again be argued that this 
provision allows for secrecy based on national interest or for defence purposes. 
However, such provision may undermine the Convention’s purpose by allowing a 
notifying party to restrict information that is to be made available. It may be that by 
allowing a State to restrict the use of information concerning a nuclear disaster within its 
borders, the Convention undermines its effectiveness as a means o f minimizing trans­
boundary radiological consequences which may be o f detriment to the other party. In 
relation to this concern, the only justification for the accident State in this context is that 
the Convention reflects the realities of the 1980s when it was created, and not that of the 
twenty-first century119 where nuclear secrecy is a major concern for both the government 
themselves and the public.
Also, it should be noted that the definition and scope of article 1 appears yet to 
be another major concern. It states that the Convention shall apply in the event o f any 
accident involving facilities or activities o f a State party or persons or legal entities
118 M. Oxhom, The Norms o f Nuclear Accidents After Chernobyl, 8 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 375 
1992-1993,375-395,390
119 Y. Amano, ‘Introductory Statement to the Board o f  Governors’, available at
<http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/201 l/amsp201 ln007.html> last accessed 2 December 2011. 
Further concern relates to the fact that the scope o f  the convention is limited to accidents arising out o f  
non-military facilities
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under its jurisdiction or control, from which a release o f radioactive material occur or is 
likely to occur and which has resulted, or may result in an international trans-boundary 
release that could be o f radiological safety significance for another state. The wording of 
this provision suggests that it is for the Accident State to decide whether or not the 
release o f radioactive materials have a trans-boundary effect on another State. Besides, 
the provision o f article 1 may also be interpreted as only when the release o f radiation 
has a trans-boundary effect that the Accident State is required to notify other states of 
the accident. Thus, at what point does a release acquire safety significance? Or how do 
States determine if the accident could be o f radiological safety significance to another 
State? These questions may sound irrelevant, but it is indeed vital in the understanding 
of the application o f  the Convention, as it is arguable that the effectiveness o f the 
Convention is dependent on States possessing a basic radiological monitoring and 
assessment capability.120 Thus because the Convention does not stipulate the method in 
which the accident State may define the parameter of the significance of an accident to 
another State, it is perhaps also right to say that the Convention appears unclear in its 
applicability. For example, after the Chernobyl disaster, the attitude o f the Soviet 
government indicated that there was no radioactive release with detrimental effects to 
other States. Therefore where the Chernobyl disaster and the delayed tactics o f the 
Soviet government is concerned, it may well be that if the Convention had been in 
operation in the event that followed the disaster, the Soviet government may have 
justified its actions o f not notifying other states of the accident in that it had no 
significance to other states.121 Although, one should also remember that the late 
notification o f the disaster did have significance in terms o f response to environmental 
release o f radiation in other EU states.122
Furthermore, it is o f concern that the Convention may be limited in scope of the 
accidents it applies. For example, the Convention does not apply to nuclear accidents 
resulting from nuclear weapons. Article 3 o f the Convention does not provide that states
120 P.W. Bimie, n 3 above 515
121 N. Pelzer, Learning the Hard Way: Did the Lessons Taught by the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident 
Contribute to Improving Nuclear Law?, available at <http://www.oecd- 
nea.org/law/chemobvl/PELZER.pdF> at p.80. last accessed 4 December 2011
122 N. Hawkes and Others, The worst Accident in the World (Pan Books Ltd, London 1986) 155
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must notify surrounding states if accidents occur from nuclear accidents. As the 
Convention now reads, if a state sustains a major accident in testing nuclear weapons 
which has serious trans-boundary effects, that state is morally but not legally obliged to 
notify. As such, the consequences o f such inaction could severely harm the lives of
123many. However, one thing for sure is that the Convention appears to expand 
customary law on the notification o f accidents.124
4.3.I.2. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency
The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency is similar to the Early Notification Convention. This is because they have 
identical implementation and technical structures, but the former however strives to fill 
the gaps left by the latter.
The Assistance Convention provides for the facilitation o f prompt assistance by 
parties in the event o f a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its 
consequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of 
radioactive release.125 Article 2 o f Assistance Convention provides for assistance in the 
event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, whether or not such accident or 
emergency originates within its territory, jurisdiction or control to call for assistance 
from any other state party, directly or through the IAEA, and from the IAEA, or where 
appropriate other international intergovernmental organisations. It adds that a State party 
requesting assistance shall specify the scope and type o f assistance and to provide the 
assisting party with information to determine the extent to which the request will be met. 
However in the event that this is not practicable, it provides that the requesting State 
party and the assisting party shall, in consultation, decide upon the scope and type of 
assistance required, and the Agency also has with the duty o f spreading information 
across party states. It also provides that Parties shall make known to each other the
123 S. McBrayer, n 112 above 318
124 Ibid, 314
125 Art.l o f the Assistance Convention
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competent authorities and points o f contact;126 that assistance may be agreed upon 
without or with reimbursement o f costs;127 that the Parties shall seek to facilitate the 
transit o f personnel assistance through its territory o f duly notified personnel, equipment 
and property involved in the assistance to and from the requesting Party.128
Unlike the Early Notification Convention, only the Assistance Convention 
required changes in the UK law; at least in respect o f certain essential privileges and 
immunities as provided for under article 8 o f the Assistance Convention. For example, 
section 5 o f the Atomic Energy Act 1989 gives the force o f law in the UK to the 
provisions of article 8 which requires the UK to grant immunities to the personnel of the
• • 129 i • •assisting party. As to this, section 5(2) of the Act provides that the provisions of 
article 8 shall be construed as granting any privileges or immunity which they require to 
be afforded. Section 5(6) further adds that if in any proceedings any question arises 
whether a person is or is not entitled to any privilege or immunity by virtue o f this 
section, a certificate issued by or under the authority of the Secretary o f State stating any 
fact relevant to that question shall be conclusive evidence o f that fact.130
However just like the Early Notification Convention, it is possible to argue that 
the provisions o f the Assistance Convention are also imprecise for the purpose which it 
was established for. This is because there are concerns with the vague provision of 
article 2 o f the Convention. For example, it states that parties “may” call for assistance 
and the requested party will decide whether or not it may render the assistance requested 
and the scope and terms of the assistance that might be rendered. Clearly speaking, the 
use o f “may” provides the discretion for the assisting state in rendering assistance to the
126 Art.4 o f the Assistance Convention
127 Art.7 o f the Assistance Convention
128 Art.9 o f the Assistance Convention
129 These are: immunity from arrest, detention and legal process, including criminal, civil and 
administrative jurisdiction, o f the requesting State, in respect o f acts or omissions in the performance o f  
their duties; exemption from taxation, duties or other charges, except those which are normally 
incorporated in the price o f  goods or paid for services rendered, in respect o f the performance o f their 
assistance functions; afford the assisting party exemption from taxation, duties or other charges on the 
equipment and property brought into the territory o f the requesting State by the assisting party for the 
purpose o f  the assistance; and provide immunity from seizure, attachment or requisition o f  such 
equipment and property (art.8(2-3) o f  the Assistance Convention)
130 See also: J. Woodliffe, Chernobyl: Four Years on, In t’l Comp. L. Q., Vol.39, No.2 (1990) 461-471, 
462, for discussions on withdrawal o f declaration o f  the Assistance Convention in the UK
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accident State as the Convention does not oblige a response to nuclear emergency. This 
is however not surprising because the Convention also aims to give assisting States 
immunity from legal proceedings brought by the requesting State, and an indemnity for 
proceedings brought by others.131
Also similar to the Early Notification Convention is the discretion given to 
contracting parties. The discretion here relates to the direction and control o f assistance 
afforded. For example under article 3, the overall direction, control, co-ordination and 
supervision shall lie with the State that needs help. As such, the Convention creates no 
duty either to seek compulsory assistance, or to control the emergency sort for.132 Failure 
to do so may however incur responsibility on the Accident State if  it results in harm to 
others.
4.3.2. Bilateral Agreements
Although before the adoption o f the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions, 
there exist numerous bilateral and unilateral agreements between states in the field of 
environment safety such as the Paris Convention o f Marine Pollution133 and the 
agreement on radiological protection between the UK and France in 1983, which 
provides for the exchange o f information in the event o f emergencies occurring in one of 
the two states which could have radiological consequences for the other state.134 So also 
is the European Commission which has been in the capacity o f recommending 
negotiations between states on arrangements which will apply in the event o f an accident 
from nuclear installations.135 In spite of this, an important provision o f the Assistance 
Convention and the Early Notification Convention is that they provide impetus for the 
creation o f further bilateral agreements. This is o f great significance in terms o f nuclear
131 Art.8 and 10 o f  the Assistance Convention
132 P.W. Bimie, n 3 above 515
133 The Paris Convention o f  Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources 1974
134 1983/84 Cmnd. 9041 Treaty Series No. 60 (1983)
135 An example is 87/170/EURATOM: Opinion o f  the Commission o f  26 February 1987 Concerning 
Heysham 2 Nuclear Power Station (UK). OJ L 068, 12.03.1987. See also Para. 3.3.2. below
123
safety because it allows for more cooperation between two States since the Conventions 
appear to be weak in some relevant areas o f application.136
Since the Chernobyl disaster, the UK had concluded three bilateral arrangements 
on early notification o f  a nuclear accident and exchange o f information concerning the 
operation and management o f nuclear facilities with Denmark and Norway for
137example. These agreements focus on the exchange o f information concerning nuclear 
accidents. In several aspects, these bilateral agreements are wider in scope. For example, 
there is an obligation to notify if there is an accident involving a trans-boundary effect of 
radioactive safety. Article 2 o f the UK arrangement with Denmark as an example 
provides that “if there is an accident involving a nuclear facility or activity in the 
territory o f one party from which a release o f radioactive material results and if such a 
release could have an effect, outside the first party’s territory, o f radiological safety 
significance for the other party, the party in whose territory the accident has occurred is 
to immediately notify the other party directly. The party is also obliged to provide for 
such available as it is relevant to minimising the radiological consequences as identified 
in the Early Notification Convention”. Furthermore, the competent authorities o f each 
party as designated for the purposes o f the agreement are to exchange, on or before its 
entry o f the agreement into force, safety related information on nuclear facilities and 
activities, which is relevant to the risk o f abnormal release o f radioactive materials, and
138consequently the Parties shall periodically exchange any further information. It is in 
the context o f these bilateral agreements that one begins to appreciate the Early 
Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention. It is also towards these bilateral 
agreements that the UK government hopes will help reassure the public of its
1 T9commitment to nuclear safety.
136 Art. 12 o f the Assistance Convention and art.9 and 10 o f the Early Notification Convention
137 Cm.685, U.K.T.S. N o .l l  (1989) and Cm.371, U.K.T.S. No.30 (1988) respectively
138 Art.8(l) o f  the UK and Denmark Agreement. Also, art.6 is the obligation to notify the other party 
where abnormal levels o f  radiation are registered that are not caused by release form facilities or activities 
in the notifying state’s territory. Also under art.8(2), authorities undertake to notify each other promptly o f  
commissioning, decommissioning and other significant changes in nuclear facilities in their respective 
territories
139 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Press Release No. 150 (19 November 1987)
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4.3.3. Post-Chernobvl and the EU
Before the Chernobyl disaster, the EU had earlier issued Directives dealing specifically 
with early notification of a nuclear accident. An example is Directive 
80/836/EURATOM140 laying down the basic safety standards for the health and 
protection o f workers and the general public against the dangers o f ionising radiation. 
The Directive provides that Member States must notify as a matter of urgency 
neighbouring states o f  any accident which could expose the public to radioactivity.141 
The Directive does not however, state what information must be given other than the 
occurrence o f the accident. Considering on one hand that the Directive does not give 
specification as to the information that must be given other than the occurrence of an 
accident, and on the other that the IAEA Convention on Early Notification does not fully 
cover the exchange o f information,142 it is not surprising that the EU adopted further 
notification measures.
This led to the adoption of Decision 87/600/EURATOM on early exchange of 
information between Member States in the event o f a radiological emergency.143 The 
decision provides for the notification and provision o f information whenever a Member 
State decides to take measures of a wide-spread nature in order to protect the general 
public in case o f a radiological emergency following: an accident in its territory 
involving facilities or activities of radiation from which a significant release of 
radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur; or the detection, within or outside its 
own territory, o f abnormal levels o f radioactivity which are likely to be detrimental to 
public health in that Member State; or any other accidents in which radioactive material
occurs or is likely to occur; or which involves significant release of radioactive materials
. . . .  , 144occurs or is likely to occur.
In addition to the above, the EU also adopted Directive 89/618/EURATOM on 
informing the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to
140 No. L 246 o f 15.07.1980
141 Art. 45 o f  Directive 80/836/EURATOM
142 Commission o f  the European Communities, Report on Activities Undertaken by the Community 
Following the Chernobyl Accident, COM (89) 203 final, Brussels 25 April 1989 at p. 15
143 [1980] OJ L246
144 Art.l o f Decision 87/600/EURATOM
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be taken in the event o f a radiological emergency.145 According to the Directive, “a 
radiological emergency” means any situation: an accident in the territory of a Member 
State involving facilities or activities referred to in article 2(2) o f the Directive in which 
a significant release o f radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur, or detection, of 
abnormal levels o f radioactivity which are likely to be detrimental to public health, or 
other accidents other than those specified from which a significant amount o f radioactive 
material occurs within or outside its own territory,146 without delay.147 As such, it should 
be noted that the exposure o f the public to radiation doses is to be determined by the 
Basic Safety Standards discussed earlier, and that in normal circumstances the 
information provided should be primarily instructive and aimed at reassuring the general 
public that emergency plans exist, both at national level for hazards associated also with 
non-fixed installations or originating outside national borders, and at regional or local 
level for fixed installations.148 The Directive which closely follows the requirements of 
the Early Notification Convention also does not hinder the obligations o f member States 
under other bilateral or multilateral agreements.149 Above all, one thing for sure is that 
this Directive demonstrates that the provision of information to the general public forms 
an integral part o f emergency planning management.
4.3.4. UK Applicability
The above EU measures are transposed in the UK by the radiation (emergency 
preparedness and public information) Regulations 2001.150 It applies to any work with 
ionising radiation which involves having on premises radioactive substances containing 
more than specified quantities o f radioactive fissile materials, transporting material by 
rail, or transporting or conveying material other than by standard means such as road, 
rail, sea or air.151 It requires that before an activity is undertaken for the first time, a RA 
must be carried out by the operator or carrier to demonstrate that all hazards arising from
145 Official Journal L 357, 07/12/1989
146 Art.2 o f  Directive 89/618/EURATOM
147 Art.6 o f Directive 89/618/EURATOM
148 Commission Communication on the Implementation o f Council Directive 86/618 [COM(1991) 103/03]
149 Preamble to the Directive
150 SI 2001 N o 2975. Note that this implements also the Basic Safety Directive
151 Reg.3 o f  the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001
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that work with the potential to cause a radiation accident have been identified; and the 
nature and magnitude of the risks to employees and other persons arising from those 
hazards have been evaluated; and that where the assessment shows that a radiation risk 
to employees or other persons exists from an identifiable radiation accident, the operator 
shall take all reasonably practicable steps to prevent any such accident, and to limit the 
consequences o f any such accident which does occur.152 Regulation 7 provides for the 
operator to prepare an adequate emergency plan designed to secure, so far as is it 
reasonably practicable, the restriction of exposure to ionising radiation and the health 
and safety o f persons who may be affected by such reasonably foreseeable emergencies 
as are identified by the said assessment. Regulation 13 also adds that the operator shall 
take reasonable steps to put such emergency plan, or parts of it as necessary, into effect 
without delay when a radiation emergency occurs, or in any event in which could 
reasonably be expected to lead to a radiation emergency, and shall notify such 
occurrence to the relevant regulatory authority without delay. Operators are however 
responsible to ensure that members o f the public who are in the area where they are
likely to be affected by an emergency are supplied in an appropriate manner with the
1relevant information.
In addition, the government also deals with nuclear emergencies through the 
Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group (NEPLG). The NEPLG brings together the 
organisations with interests in off-site civil nuclear emergency planning, and it is a 
forum for discussing common problems, exchanging information and experience and 
agreeing improvements in planning, procedures and organisation.154 As to this, the 
Department o f Energy and Climate Change (DECC) has issued NELPG consolidated
152 R eg.4(l) and (2) o f  the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001
153 Reg. 16 o f  the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001. Further, 
Reg.9 deals with off-site emergency plan; reg.10 deals with the review and testing o f emergency plans; 
and reg.l 1 deals with consultation and co-operation in performing the duties imposed by regulators
154 Department for Business, Innovations & Skills (BIS), Nuclear Emergency Planning and Liaison Group, 
available at
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.Uk/-i-/http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/energy/sources/nuclear/k 
ev-issues/emergencv/neplg/page31040.html> last accessed 2 January 2012
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guidance155 to all those involved in the development o f site-specific emergency plans at 
local level and reviews the results o f off-site exercises to ensure lessons are learned.156
155 DECC, Emergency Planning Liaison Group: Consolidated Version, (January 2009) Chapter 1 at Para. 
1.3. The purpose o f  the Consolidated Guidance is however to bring together guidance into one document 
for general reference by planners and practitioners concerned with emergency response at nuclear sites.
156 Ibid
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4.4. LEARNING FROM DISASTER
As seen above, the Chernobyl disaster had a huge effect on the environment in general 
and also the safety regulatory framework o f nuclear power. On one hand, the 
environmental effects o f the release o f radioactive materials were felt at different 
countries. For example, the effect o f the disaster spread to Sweden, Finland in particular- 
The public in Denmark, South Germany and Switzerland also felt the impact. Also in the 
UK, the release o f radioactive substances into the environment where thought to have 
caused rain falling on high ground carried by radioactivity to farmland.157 On the other 
hand, managing these effects revealed the gaps in both international and regional levels 
for dealing with catastrophic disaster o f that magnitude, and lessons were learnt to 
improve nuclear safety standards. At this time, the disaster served as a constraint to the 
continuous use and further development of nuclear power. This was however in contrast 
to the position in the early 1950s and early 1970s when the law was seen as promoting 
the use o f nuclear pow er.158
Coincidentally twenty-five years after the anniversary o f  the Chernobyl disaster, 
the Fukushima nuclear power disaster further widens the concern on nuclear power 
safety. As such, it affords us the opportunity to revisit the provisions and effectiveness 
of nuclear safety regulations, and to examine whether there is need to review further 
these measures.
After examining the different safety regulations above, it is strongly su ggested  
that there is the need to review these regulations. Such review should be at the 
international level and it should have a legal binding effect on nuclear power States. This 
may however be controversial as some commentators may find it easy to contend that 
the continuing improvements being made in the safety o f nuclear installations should  
strengthen its safety measures.1591 argue otherwise and my reasons are set below.
157 European Communities, Consequences o f  the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: Opinion and Report 
(Economics and Social Committee, Brussels 1987)
158 P. Cameron, ‘The Revival o f Nuclear Power: An Analysis o f the Legal Implication’, J. Environmental 
Law (2007) 19(1): 71-87, 74
159 G.N. Kelly, Emergency Preparedness and Response Achievements, Future Needs and Opportunities, 
(European Commission, Brussels 1049 Belgium). Available at < 
http://www.irpa.net/irpal0/cdrom/01242.pdf>
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Indeed, a major challenge for the nuclear industry remains how to close the gap 
between safety challenges. Such challenges as seen above vary across issues such as 
dealing with natural disasters, spent fuel and radioactive waste management, increasing 
international nuclear cooperation, and also dealings in terms o f disaster emergency 
preparedness and response management. Surely, there are many ways in which these can 
be addressed.
One suggestion would be to unify the nuclear industry through the establishment 
o f a new International Nuclear Agency to ensure that there is a ground for a global 
nuclear regime such as a universally accepted standard o f nuclear safety and security, 
and adequate supervision that will allow nuclear States to meet their obligations. The 
Agency should focus on addressing the gaps in existing international environmental 
regimes such as the CNS, the Joint Convention, Early Notification and Assistance 
Convention, and also other IAEA safety principles (with focus on those relating to the 
disposal o f nuclear waste). Within the capacity of the Agency, it should be able to create 
legally binding safety obligations on contracting parties, and also compulsory incentives 
o f self-report o f safety obligations to the Agency by all States within a shorter period of 
time. These measures are considered vital in situations where nuclear States have control 
o f installations in their territory. For example in the context o f nuclear waste, it may be 
o f importance to create binding obligations on disposal methods, to include how and 
where waste is to be buried as an example, so as to ease the concern o f the public on risk 
related issues. Also o f particular importance is for the Agency to be able to facilitate 
proper and efficient safety implementations by placing sanctions on nuclear States for 
non-compliance. As to this, the Agency must introduce regulatory instruments of 
environmental standards which must be complied with, and non-compliance with these 
standards should attract penalties or sanctions. For example, the use of penalties and 
sanctions may include licence suspension or perhaps revocation o f licence160 in extreme 
cases o f violation o f safety standards. Indeed this is considered essential in the nuclear
160 C. Abbot, Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation: Strengthening Sanctions and Improving 
Deterrence (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009) 10
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industry in the absence of voluntary compliance161 if  the intended purpose of the Agency 
is to be achieved.
Having said this, it should be remembered that the proposal for the management 
o f nuclear power by an international body is not new. It is recalled in 1953, that the 
President o f the USA proposed at the General Assembly of the United Nations the 
creation o f an organization to promote the peaceful use o f nuclear energy and to seek to 
ensure that nuclear energy would not serve any military purpose.162 However, it is this 
proposal and compromise that led to the creation o f the IAEA which is now the body 
charged with the main tasks o f encouraging and facilitating the development and 
dissemination o f information on nuclear power, and ensuring that nuclear power is used 
for peaceful purposes only.163 Although events such as the Chernobyl disaster have led 
to the transformation of the focus o f the IAEA’s priority, for example in terms of 
measures to be adopted in preventing a nuclear accident and considerations after an 
accident. However, these IAEA measures are not legally binding on contracting parties; 
rather they are international standards and requirements that may be adopted by them at 
their own discretion and for use in national regulations in respect of their own activities.
However as to the establishment of a new International Nuclear Agency, the 
attitude o f nuclear power States to establish non-binding nuclear safety measures may be 
a major concern that is likely to hinder such development. From its beginnings, there has 
been sign o f States being reluctant to relinquish control o f nuclear installations, and this 
is now very often common in nuclear law. This is reflected in early treaties such as the 
EURATOM, which provides that the safety o f nuclear installations was to remain within 
the ambit o f Member States. For example, it provides that basic standards shall be laid 
down within the EU for the protection of the health of workers and the general public 
against the dangers o f radiation.164 Even at times when the EU needed to take uttermost 
action at times o f major criticisms o f its safety measures, the events that led to the 
adoption o f the NSD for example, again reveals the determination o f States not to give
151 Ibid
162 D. Fisher, History o f the IAEA: The First Forty Years, (IAEA, Vienna 1997) Chapter 1
163 Art.III (1-5) o f  the IAEA Statute
164 Chapter III, art.30 o f  the EURATOM Treaty
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up control o f nuclear matters within their jurisdiction. In the build up o f the Directive for 
example, there was a separate provision to include all necessary measures to ensure that 
international safety principles were binding upon EU Member States, some countries 
were however defiant about such provision.165 Perhaps, one reason for this is because the 
defiant States may be the ones that will be caught liable for breach o f obligation under a 
stringent regime. The UK for example, argued that there was no real benefit in 
introducing a regional layer o f regulation below framework o f the IAEA Convention on 
Nuclear Safety and IAEA Safety Standards.166 It is from this view that it is been argued 
that the lack o f an International Nuclear Agency with legally binding safety provisions 
may be a detriment in ensuring adequate and effective global nuclear safety standards. 
This should not come as a surprise to many o f us. After all, since the risk nuclear power 
respects no border, while should safety measures be limited in application?
The unwillingness to establish legally binding nuclear power safety measures at 
International level is all but more worrying in the context o f nuclear renaissance, with 
countries such as the UK planning to extend the life o f its nuclear plants and also build 
new ones, or even other countries with porous security systems who are weighing the 
nuclear option. However, a recent event in form o f the SPRWD suggests that the 
strength to hold on to national measures may be well over, at least at the EU level. This 
is also a greater step which arguably indicates that the EU is willing to reduce the power 
given to Member States under the EURATOM Treaty to have control over nuclear 
installations in their territory. But still, we should not forget that the ability to enforce 
such measures at the international level depends entirely on states agreeing on such 
development. How far the development in the EU will help lead the way forward at the 
international level is yet to be seen.
CONCLUSION
As discussed so far, it is obvious that much has been achieved in the past decade to 
improve the safe use o f nuclear power. However in light o f the Fukushima nuclear
165 COM (2004) 526 final
166 See: DTI, Nuclear Safety Directive, Consultation Document (2003)
132
power disaster, it appears that there is still need to maintain and improve nuclear power 
disaster emergency preparedness and response.
It is towards this that this chapter proposes the creation o f an International 
Nuclear Authority Agency to create binding legal nuclear safety requirements and to 
oversee the global nuclear industry, with institutions such as the EU being a legally 
binding party. Although, this may as well be a major challenge for nuclear States who 
are used to having control over nuclear installations within their territories, however, 
progress at the EU level may help facilitate such international negotiation.
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY
NUCLEAR POWER: THE UK PLANNING REGIME AND THE ISSUE OF 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
5.1. INTRODUCTION
As regards the pivotal case for the development o f nuclear power as discussed in 
Chapter 1, it is very important to have in place the right planning regulatory framework 
to promote its development. At the same time, this planning regulatory framework, 
alongside the regulatory regimes discussed in Chapter 4, may also help to ensure that 
adequate safety steps are taken in the development o f nuclear power.
Generally speaking, the land use planning regime for the construction o f Major 
Infrastructure Projects (MIPs) to include nuclear installations in the UK has been 
subjected to reforms by the government over the years. The rationale behind this is well 
understood. It dates back to 1999 when the government in its consultation on 
streamlining the processes o f MIPs through the planning system concluded that the 
former system “takes far too long to process major projects through a decision. It adds 
that the process is lengthy, unwieldy and expensive for all concerned. Delay is costly, 
leads to uncertainty and brings the planning system into disrepute; and the fact that these 
projects are relatively infrequent does not detract from the need to improve the 
procedures for dealing with them”.1 In 2007,2 the immediate past Labour government 
proposed to address these issues and to create a planning system that is “fit for the 
purpose o f the twenty-first century”.3
The Proposals set out in 2007 culminated in the Planning Act 2008 (hereinafter 
referred to as the “2008 Act”) which provided for a new regime for the authorisation 
procedure for MIPs are authorised. For present purposes, it provides for the 
authorisation o f MIPs by a Development Consent Order (DCO) which is made by the
1 DETR, ‘A Consultation Paper on Streamlining the Process o f  M ajor Infrastructure Through the 
Planning System  ’, 1999b
2 Department o f  Community and Local Government (DCLG), Department o f  Trade and Industry, and 
Department o f  Environment, Food and Rural Planning (DEFRA), Planning fo r  a Sustainable Future: 
White Paper, (Cm 7120) HSMO, 2007
3 Moving Towards the Planning White Paper: Speech by Ruth Kelly, the then Secretary o f State for 
Communities and Local Government, 29 January 2007
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independent Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) with reference to National 
Policy Statements (NPSs).4 Nonetheless, the Coalition government is presently 
legislating for the abolition o f the IPC through the 2010 Localism Bill to become a 
Major Infrastructure Planning Unit attached to the Planning Inspectorate.5 At this point 
one cannot state specifically what the new system will look like until the Localism Bill 
becomes law, however reports suggest that the functions o f the IPC are to remain largely 
unchanged, with the government expecting a smooth transition.6 It is through these 
measures that the government expects will expedite the land use authorisation process 
and deliver a more efficient system for dealing with applications for MIPs. Although as 
a general planning law, such measures are to have environmental safety at heart, the 
event in Japan however re-emphasises safety concerns.
Having said that, the issue now is whether the changes made to the planning 
system through the 2008 Act will fulfil expectations. This is because there is an inherent 
tension between a radically streamlined system and a process which provides acceptable 
levels of participation by national or local groups.7 More fundamental also in the context
Q
of climate change goals is whether the system provides for a speedy delivery o f low 
carbon sources o f energy such as nuclear power, and whether the system provides for a 
thorough safety assessment procedure.
Against this background, this chapter examines the land planning regime for 
nuclear new build in the UK. It analyses how the regime deals with the concerns of 
public participation in the decision-making process. In so doing, this chapter starts with
4 Art.33, 1 & 5 o f  the 2008 Act respectively
5 The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (p.l 1) <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/coalition- 
documents> accessed 15 February 2011. Other key provisions o f  the Bill are: to abolish Regional Spatial 
Strategies, amend the Community Infrastructure Levy, which allows councils to charge developers to pay 
for infrastructure. Some o f  the revenue will be available for the local community, provide for 
neighbourhood plans, which would be approved if they received 50% o f the votes cast in a referendum, 
provide for neighbourhood development orders to allow communities to approve development without 
requiring normal planning consent, and give new housing and regeneration powers to the Greater London 
Authority, while abolishing the London Development Agency
6 Communities and Local Government, ‘Major infrastructure stays on fast-track as planning quango 
closes’ available at <http://www.communities.gov.uk/news/corporate/1626220> accessed 29 October 
2011
7 . Tromans, Nuclear Law: The Law Applying to Nuclear Installations and Radioactive Substances in its 
Historic Context, 2nd Eds, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) 128
8 Department o f  Energy and Climate Change (DECC), UK Low Carbon Transition Plan: National
Strategy fo r  Climate and Energy (TSO, July 2009) Page 52
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an overview o f the Sizewell B public inquiry, it been the most recently built nuclear 
power station in the UK, to put into context these concerns. It also examines the 
planning regime for MIPs, to include primarily an examination o f the fundamental 
objectives o f the NPSs and the IPC9 and the requirements for securing DCO in dealing 
with these concerns; and also the implications o f the regime in operation. It however 
concludes by looking at the continuing concerns and the future o f land use planning 
regime in the UK.
9 Note: considering the fact that the Localism Bill has just passed the Committee stage at the House of 
Lords, this chapter discusses the IPC as part o f the existing regime; it will however, strive to make 
reference to the Localism Bill as appropriate
5.2. THE LAND USE PLANNING REGIME FOR THE LAST GENERATION OF
NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SIZEWELL B 
PUBLIC INQUIRY
Where the development o f nuclear power is concerned, an excellent starting point for 
examining the concerns o f the UK planning regime is the Sizewell B public inquiry 
(hereinafter referred to as “SB inquiry”). Although before the SB inquiry, there had been 
little public scrutiny o f the development of nuclear power in the UK. For example, 
safety questions where been considered at the Windscale Inquiry into the application to 
build a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.10 However, at no previous public inquiry into an 
application to build a nuclear power station had further relevant issues including nuclear 
safety and design been considered in depth.11
The SB inquiry remains the longest and most expensive nuclear power inquiry in 
the UK. It was based on the proposal for a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) by the 
Central Electric Generating Board (CEGB). It was held under the Electricity and 
Generating Stations and Overhead Lines (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1981 and ran from 
January 1983 to March 1985. Until 2009, inquiries in the UK were authorized under 
many different Acts o f Parliament and could take a considerable period of time to reach 
a decision by either the local planning authority or as called in by the Secretary of State 
(SoS), usually based on the recommendation o f a planning inspector.12 The SB inquiry is 
no exception to this as it was held to advise the SoS for energy on whether to approve or 
reject the CEGB’s proposal.
The SB inquiry was a wide ranging one. It featured a detailed examination o f the 
economic, environmental and safety aspects o f the proposal for PWR through the 
planning process. The issues that were discussed included: the need for nuclear power, 
safety, waste management and the local implications of the proposal; and the 
government was prepared to allow its evidence to be challenged. Safety issues in 
particular were discussed in depth. On one hand, it is because the government was aware 
o f public sensitivity as to safety of PWR design following the Three Mile Island incident
10 G. Greenhalgh, After Parker: A Review o f the Windscale Inquiry and Subsequent Developments 
(International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) Bulletin) Vol. 20, No. 6
11 F.H.B. Layfield, Sizewell B Public Inquiry: Report, (HMSO, London 1986), Para. 9.2
12 S. 76A 4(b) o f the Town and Country Planning Act (TCP A) 1990
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in the United States of America (USA), which also involved a PWR although o f a 
different design to that proposed for the SB. On the other hand, because of the lack of 
previous public scrutiny o f nuclear safety, the many suspicions, and fears surrounding 
nuclear power in the public’s mind.13 Besides, safety issues were also discussed because 
the government had also repeatedly stressed that the safety o f nuclear power installations 
is o f the greatest importance as it features relevant issues in the design, construction, 
operation o f the station, and in particular to get the views o f the Nuclear Inspectorate as 
the licensing authority as to such development.14
Given the enormous range o f issues examined at the SB inquiry, special 
arrangements were made to ensure a fair and thorough inquiry as it was desirable to 
ensure as far as possible that objectors had a proper opportunity to make critical 
examination o f the proposal.15 As such, parties were able to submit written evidence, 
with other supporting documents which were presented by expert witnesses. A number 
o f independent witnesses were also invited to give evidence to the inquiry to assist in 
areas where there was not sufficient evidence.16 Further, the inquiry process allowed for 
effective cross-examination of evidence through pre-inquiry meetings to deal with the 
division o f matters, and the scope o f evidence that was allowed to be challenged by 
objectors. There were also a number o f so-called “side room meetings” where parties 
were able to exchange information in order to identify and reduce matters to be 
canvassed in the formal inquiry sessions. Overall, it is believed that the objectors which 
the inquiry was designed to accommodate welcomed these arrangements because it 
afforded them the opportunity to participate on issues of nuclear power safety and 
environmental risk decision-making process.17
13 F.H.B. Layfield, n 11 above at Para. 9.3. See also: S. Tromans and J. Fitzgerald, n 203 above 74
14 Ibid, 9.1
15 O ’Riordan et al, Sizewell B-An Anatomy o f  the Inquiry (MacMillan Press, 1988) Para. 9.41
16 Ibid
17 R. Davies, The Effectiveness o f the Sizewell B Public Inquiry in Facilitating Communication about the 
Risks o f  Nuclear Power, Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 12, No. 3/4, (1987) 102-110, 104
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5.2.1. The Issues of the Sizewell B Public Inquiry
Generally speaking, nuclear power projects are usually contentious in nature. As a result, 
there is usually the balance between public or economic need and environmental harm 
which must be struck. Besides, they often extend to the boundaries of geographic areas 
and statutory control regimes, and sometimes much o f the evidence both for and against 
the proposal will be highly technical. Even also in the process o f securing permission 
there is tension between public participation, due process and accountability which must 
be struck.18 Indeed as one commentator puts it, “the overall arrangement of the SB 
inquiry could best be described as quasi-judicial and the procedures adopted were 
similar to those o f a High Court proceeding” .19 Clearly, this is not hard to imagine 
because o f the contentious nature o f the SB project. Parties were allowed to submit 
written evidence, with supporting documents, which were presented by experts in order 
to ensure as far as possible that they had the opportunity to scrutinise the CEGB’s 
proposal. This sort o f approach however also suggests that there is a clear chain o f cause 
and effect in the SB inquiry process which give rise to a number o f important issues, 
such as environmental and local issues which have to be resolved before securing 
planning consent.20 As such, it is arguable that examining these issues may lead to 
further consequences in an inquiry process. However, whether an inquiry o f this nature 
is suitable for securing land use consent where nuclear power is concerned remains a 
discussion within this chapter. But first, it is important to identify and examine the 
obvious immediate issues of the SB inquiry.
There is, quite noticeably, the provision for public participation. Both the 
government and the promoter (CEGB) hoped that this could help guarantee the public to 
support nuclear power by providing a transparent process to command their confidence. 
As a matter o f fact, the government once admitted that “the Sizewell B project would 
only be approved if  it received the endorsement of an inquiry at which a full public
18 K. Lindblom and R. Honey, Planning for a New Generation o f Power Stations, J.P.L. (2007), 843-862, 
843-4
19 R. Davies, 17above 103
20 K. Lindblom and R. Honey, n 18 above 847
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discussion o f every aspect o f the proposal would be held”.21 Undoubtedly, the SB 
inquiry provided the opportunity for the public to participate in the decision-making 
process but the outcome was a lengthy and expensive process (for both the promoters 
and objectors).
5.2.1.1. The Duration of the Inquiry
The reason behind the length o f the SB inquiry and the time taken to reach a decision is 
clearer when looked at through the consideration o f safety factors with no precise policy 
statement to indicate what exactly and how exactly it should be examined. Rather, 
considerations were given to all national policy issues thought to be relevant to the 
construction o f a nuclear power station. For example, the inquiry engaged in issues such 
as, energy conservation, fossil fuel prices and availability, and the ability to build the 
PWR on time and to budget.22
Also, the rules o f natural justice require decision-makers to hear “both sides” of 
considerations. As to this, case law suggests that the Inspector was required to ensure 
that the evidence produced by the public and the promoter were examined and 
challenged. For example, in the case o f Errington v Minister o f  Health24 where the local 
authority made a draft clearance order under housing legislation, it was argued that after 
receiving the inspector’s report, the Minister had entered into further correspondence 
with other government officials who had visited and conferred on the site. The objectors 
then successfully claimed that in hearing further evidence o f one party behind the back 
o f the others, the Minister had been guilty o f a breach o f natural justice. Although the 
decision in this case is quite old, it nonetheless illustrates that decision-makers are 
expected to comply with the rules o f natural justice in processes which in turn result in 
decisions. The issue o f natural justice was also considered in Bushell v Secretary o f  State 
fo r  the Environment?5 This case concerns a local public inquiry which was held
21 W. Patterson et al, Critical Decision: Should Britain Buy the Pressurised Water Reactor? (Friends o f  
the Earth Trust, London 1986) 16
22 S. Tromans, n 7 above 128
23 V. Moore, A Practical Approach to Planning Law (1 1th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) 
345
24 [1935] 1 KB 249 (CA)
25 [1980] AC 75
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following the objection to two proposed motorway schemes. In this case, the Inspector 
disallowed cross-examination o f Department o f the Environment witnesses designed to 
test the reliability and accuracy o f a Department publication for assessing future traffic 
growth and the need for new motorways. The SoS however recommended the schemes 
after the inquiry. Despite the later innovation of new methods o f traffic growth 
prediction, revealing slower growth, the SoS denied the objectors' requests for a re­
opening o f the inquiry. He agreed to allow the objectors' an opportunity to comment on 
his disagreement with the Inspector's recommendations if the new methods led him to do
so. The objectors' appealed against the dismissal o f their application to quash the
26schemes, contending inter alia that disallowing cross-examination had been wrong in 
law and that the SoS had considered previously undisclosed information which might 
reasonably have caused the Inspector to reach other conclusions. On appeal, the Court 
considered the grounds for refusing cross-examination were unacceptable stating that 
“there is a massive body of accepted decisions establishing that natural justice requires 
that a party be given an opportunity o f challenging by cross-examination witnesses 
called by another party on relevant issues”.27 Also more recently in R. (on the
9 ftapplication o f  Hillingdon LBC) v Secretary o f  State fo r  Transport, where the 
claimants, a group o f local authorities and organisations applied for judicial review of 
the SoS decision to confirm policy support for a third runway and new passenger 
facilities at Heathrow airport, it was held that until a NPS was concluded, the SoS could
29 •not limit the scope o f permissible debate about airport expansion. Thus in the present 
context where safety factors relied on complex engineering approaches to demonstrate 
environmental concerns as seen in the SB inquiry, this may take time due to the need to 
take into consideration all parties’ submissions.
An example o f a similar project which also led to a long public inquiry, although 
not energy related, is the Heathrow Terminal 5 inquiry which was even much longer 
than the Sizewell B inquiry. The Terminal 5 proposal attracted a great deal of opposition
26 Bushell v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Environment, 76 L.G.R. 460; 91978) 36 P. & C.R. 363; [1978] 
J.P.L. 310; (1978) 122 S.J. 110
27 [1980] AC 75 at 116
28 [2010] EWHC 626
29 Ibid, at Para. 64
141
and as a result the inquiry lasted for 524 days over a period o f 46 months. There was 
also a period o f twenty-one months from the close o f the inquiry to the production o f the 
final report from the inspector and a further eleven months from the report to reach a 
decision. In sum, the whole process from the submission o f the proposal to when the 
decision was made lasted for nearly seven years.30
5.2.I.2. High Cost
High cost also proved to be a key issue o f the inquiry process from the outset. It is 
evident that the overriding problem for some objectors (Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and private individuals) during the inquiry was finances.31 With 
regard to the presentation o f safety features, the wider public were represented by 
experts who had considerable expertise and experience as applicable to give evidence; of 
course, the same cannot be said o f a layman. Nearly all the objectors had to raise funds 
through appeals to the wider public and other different ways they considered appropriate 
to mount a respectable case against what they classified to be a massive threat to the 
environment. Moreover, because the inquiry lasted for a long period of time there was 
failure to deliver more timely outcomes. As a result, most objectors where faced with the 
difficulty o f the cost involved in seeking and retaining the services of experts and 
professional advocates to help present their evidence over a long period o f time. For 
example, Friends o f the Earth (FoE) in particular took no further effective part after their 
initial evidence and cross-examination of CEGB witnesses, due to lack o f funds.
Considering this, high cost of participation raises an important point about the 
nature o f the inquiry process. This is because o f the mere reason that the inquiry was 
dominated by those who could employ professional advocates for a longer period of 
time is a concern. In this case, it was the CEGB; the promoter and a state-owned
30 Kate Barker, Review o f  Land Use Planning: Final Report and Recommendations (HMSO, December 
2006) 183
31 F.H.B. Layfield, n 11 above at Para. 9.42
32 Lord Justice Brooke, David Hall Memorial Lecture: Environmental Justice: The Cost Barrier, (2006) 18 
(3): 341-356 J. Env. Law 2006. It was considered from its beginnings to fund objectors to help prepare 
their cases, but such consideration was rejected by the SoS. See: F.H.B. Layfield, n 11 above at Para. 1.28
33 Walt Patterson, ‘A Report on Sizewell’ available at (1984) Available at 
<http://www.waltpatterson.org/sizewellrpt.pdf> accessed 5 October 2010
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company whose costs were bom out o f public tax. Although it is fair to mention that 
attempts were made by the Inspector to remedy the difficulties of high cost by 
introducing measures such as the innovation o f “counsel to the inquiry” to cross- 
examine witnesses independently and “invitation o f independent witnesses” to educate 
the inquiry on specific technical topics, indications were that such measures only helped 
the proponents more than the opponents.34 This was also the case in the Windscale 
public inquiry into the British plan for a thermal-oxide reprocessing plant (THORP) 
where hundreds o f individual organizations testified at the inquiry to assess conflicting 
arguments. With no source o f funding, objectors had great difficulties in developing a 
coherent and coordinated position to counter the arguments.35 Thus, because objectors 
were handicapped in presenting their views, one is forced to ask questions about the 
credibility, fairness, thoroughness and legitimacy o f the process. Did the inquiry fulfil 
the participatory objective o f the government? Or did it sufficiently reflect the values of 
the public? Certainly, I believe the answers to these questions should be the basis for any 
reform whatsoever to the planning system in the UK because planning outcomes affect 
everyone in the society and care must be taken to involve the public in the process.
Also important for consideration is the length of time taken by the Inspector to 
publish the report o f the inquiry. This raises concern about the outcome and legitimacy 
o f the process. Commentators36 argued that the inquiry was not sufficient as a basis for 
the approval o f the CEGB proposal. This argument is based on the fact that the inquiry 
ended before the accident at Chernobyl and it is believed that the changes in the oil and 
gas industry may have altered the economics of the proposed PWR, and that the SoS 
would have put into account new evidence relating to the Chernobyl disaster; none of 
which would have been discussed at the inquiry. Going back to the decision in the cases 
above, there are clear grounds to contend that the decision o f the inquiry may have been 
reached in an unfair manner.
34 R. Davies, n 17 above 104
35 B. Wynne, “Nuclear Debate at the Crossroads” New Scientist, 349-360, August 3, 1978
36 M. Purdue, The Layfield Report on the Sizewell B Inquiry, Public Law (1987) 162-75, 172
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5.3. THE LAND USE PLANNING REGIME FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NUCLEAR POWER IN THE UK
As seen above, the construction o f a nuclear power station in the UK requires land use 
development consent. It also constitutes a practice which requires a licence,37 in 
particular the issue o f Generic Design Assessment (GDA), intended to provide a 
structured assessment o f the safety o f nuclear installations;38 justification in radiological 
protection terms; and the arrangements which will have to be in place for 
decommissioning and waste management programmes.40 As the title suggests, this part 
examines the land use planning regime for the construction o f a new nuclear power 
station in the UK, with particular focus on processes and requirements in the decision­
making process.
5.3.1. Background to Policy Formation
Following the SB inquiry, the government reconsidered the land use planning regime for 
NSIPs in three separate policy reviews in 2006.
The first is the 2006 “Energy Challenge”41 report o f the UK energy review. This 
report considered in details the land use planning regime and applications for 
infrastructure projects under the Electricity Act 1989. The review revealed that the 
planning system resulted in delay in the decision-making process, high cost for the 
promoters and also uncertainty o f the decision process. Issues highlighted included 
individual energy projects being part o f large national systems that provide benefits 
enjoyed by all communities; lack o f clear government policy highlighting the strategic 
national need o f a particular development; and the overlap between the various consent
37 These requirements are provided for under the Nuclear Installations Act (NIA) 1965. S. 1 o f the Act 
states that “no person shall use any site for the purpose o f installing or operating any nuclear reactor 
(excluding those comprised in a means o f  transport) for the production o f  use o f  atomic energy; or the 
carrying out o f any process which is preparatory to the production or use o f atomic energy and which 
involves or is capable o f  causing the emission o f radiated matters; or the storage, processing or disposal on 
nuclear fuel ....unless a licence to do has been granted in respect o f the site in question”[....]
38 Office o f  Nuclear Regulator (ONF), Guidance-Assessment o f New Nuclear Power Stations. Available at 
<http://www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/guidance.htm> last accessed 15 August 2011.
39 DEFRA, ‘The Justification o f Practices Involving Ionising Radiation Regulations 2004: Guidance on 
their Application and Administration ’ (May 2008). See also: Chapter 2(B) above
40 See: Part 3 o f  the Energy Act 2008 & Part 4 o f  the Energy Act 2010
41 Department o f  Trade and Industry (DTI), Energy Review. The Energy Challenge, (Cm 6887) July, 
(HSMO, 2006)
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regimes and other processes governing health and safety and environmental matters. It 
however proposed that the government was to introduce fundamental change into the 
planning system for infrastructure projects with the recognition o f local government 
involvement, the importance o f environmental impact assessment of proposed 
developments, and public participation and public inquiries.42 The report considered
these provisions as necessary elements to maintain a decision-making process that is
fair, transparent, and encourages public support. It also added that the consideration of 
safety, and the need and benefits issues should be excluded from the inquiry system by 
establishing a new system to consider and decide issues in the national context in
advance o f any particular application. This sort o f approach was considered vital to
ensure that safety issues are not raised at inquiries, and that inquiries will only give 
considerations to local implications o f projects at specified locations, including 
environmental impacts. The aim is that this will avoid national issues arising as part o f 
the consideration o f every proposal, and therefore it should appropriately allow public 
inquiries to focus on local and other relevant issues 43
Arguably, this approach should enable all local impacts to stand up against 
national considerations that are already established. However, when one begins to 
consider the safety o f nuclear power and further down the line in terms o f environmental 
effects o f the risk o f nuclear waste, it actually becomes worrying that the issue of safety 
is excluded from the inquiry process. The reason for this is because, as seen from the SB 
inquiry, an inquiry that includes safety considerations may give the public the 
opportunity to scrutinise competent bodies involved in nuclear safety and detailed 
engineering problems 44 If not, members o f the public may well feel they have been 
denied the opportunity in environmental decision-making, leaving them with less 
confidence in decisions that result from such process. In this regard, the consideration of 
safety issues may on one hand help to restore public’s confidence given that the UK 
nuclear new build is to be o f a foreign design, o f which the Fukushima nuclear power 
disaster (although the Fukushima reactors are of different design) has done little to help
42 Ibid, Para. 5.136
43 Ibid, Para. 7.1, 7.2, and 7.36 consecutively
44 F.H.B. Layfield, n i l  above at Para. 4.17
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raise confidence. On the other, if safety issues are considered at inquiries, it may also 
help the decision makers to further scrutinise safety principles most especially and as 
expected, the licence applicant will need to fulfil the terms o f transfer o f the necessary 
knowledge and expertise of the engineering and safety case o f reactor design from the 
vendor to the licensee during the Generic Design Assessment.45
The second policy review is the Kate Barker report on land use planning 46 Kate 
Baker, in her report recognised that it is a necessary part o f the planning system that 
decisions should be informed by the relevant economic, social and environmental and 
resource factors through proper consultation; but that this is likely to be costly and time- 
consuming, particularly for major projects. She added that because planning often 
involves making complex judgements, there will inevitably be some complexity in the 
decision-making process and that it is important that such complexity is avoided.47 She 
recommended the introduction o f a new system for dealing with NSIPs based around 
National Statement o f strategic objectives and an Independent Planning Commission to 
determine applications.48 Similarly, Rod Eddington’s Transport Study49 also analysed a 
range of transport projects and found that many projects took over two years from the 
start o f inquiry to make a decision. He recommended the reform o f the planning process 
for MIPs to provide greater clarity and certainty without compromising fairness and 
thoroughness. He also proposed that this should be carried out in particular by providing 
greater clarity about government policy through Strategic Statements of transport 
objectives, and introducing an Independent Planning Commission to take the final 
decision on specific applications.50
Subsequently, as mentioned in the introductory part o f this chapter, the 
government proposed in the 2007 Planning White Paper a radical overhaul of the system 
based on the above recommendations. The White Paper laid the foundation for the
45 HSE, Applying for a Nuclear Site License for New Nuclear Power Stations: A Step by Step Guide, 
Paras. 22-24. Available at <www.hse.gov.uk/newreactors/ngn02.pdf> accessed last 15 October 2011
46 Kate Barker, n 30 above
47 Kate Barker, Barker Review o f Land Use and Planning: Interim Report and Analysis, (July 2006) 
Executive summary at Para. 1.15
48 Ibid, Para. 1.11 & Final Report and Recommendations at Para. 3.13
49 The Eddington Transport Study: Transport’s role in sustaining the U K ’s productivity and 
competitiveness (TSO, December 2006).
50 Ibid, p 59
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current planning regime under the 2008 Act by introducing a new system for securing 
consent for NSIPs. In an effort to addresses the issues o f the planning regime as 
discussed at 5.2.2 above, the government introduced a new streamline process in the 
2008 Act. The main features of the 2008 Act include: the introduction o f a single DCO 
for the construction o f NSIPs, which override the need for any other planning consent or 
permission that is required;51 and a new Community Infrastructure Levy and new 
emphasis on pre-application engagement with local authorities and community groups to 
ensure applicants on NSIPs fully develop their proposals before submission.52 It also 
establishes a new body called the IPC, which deals with applications of these projects; 
and the NPS which is issued by the SoS and which sets out the government’s policy on 
specified developments to which an application is determined.53 Thus, the question now 
is whether this regime will effectively address the issues it is created for? In answering 
this question, both the roles and functions o f the IPC and NPS that are relevant for 
present discussions are examined below.
5.3.2. National Policy Statement
The NPSs set out the national policy framework o f particular national infrastructure. It 
integrates the government’s objectives for infrastructure capacity and development with 
its wider economic, environmental and social policy objectives, including climate 
change goals and targets, in order to deliver sustainable development.54 Against a 
backdrop o f the issues o f the inquiry process at the SB inquiry, it is clear that the 
purpose of the NPSs is to set out the government’s policy for specific development of 
NSIPs before an application is being considered by the IPC, to help reduce the time 
taken for authorisation.
By the introduction o f the NPSs, the SoS will for the first time set out and be 
accountable for Overarching Policy. Under section 5 of the 2008 Act, a statement is
51 S .14-30 o f  the 2008 Act. The DCO removes the need for certain consents to be obtained, such as those 
under S.36 and S.37 o f  the Electricity Act 1989. Note: NSIPs are projects o f  capacity o f  more than 50 
megawatts if  onshore and 100 megawatts if  offshore
52 Part 11 o f the 2008 Act
53 Schedule 1 and Part 2 o f  the 2008 Act
54 Cm 7120 Para. 3.4
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designated as NPS if the statement is, issued by the SoS and sets out national policy in 
relation to one or more specified descriptions o f development.55 Section 5(5) allows for 
the NPS to set out, in relation to a specified description o f development, the amount, 
type or size o f development which is appropriate for a specified area; to set out criteria 
to be applied in deciding whether a location is suitable for a specified description of 
development; the relative weight to be given to a specified criteria; identify one or more 
locations as suitable (or potentially suitable) or unsuitable for a specified description of 
development; identify one or more statutory undertakers as appropriate persons to carry 
out a specified description of development; and to set out circumstances in which it is 
appropriate for a specified type o f action to be taken to mitigate the impact of a specified 
description o f development.
The revised draft Overarching Policy Statement for energy (EN-1) explains the 
need for new energy infrastructure. It sets out policies which are relevant to more than 
one type of energy infrastructure and it instructs the IPC on how to assess the impacts 
which are common to more than one type of energy infrastructure, including the impacts 
of infrastructure that should be addressed by the promoters when making applications 
for consent for the projects concerned.56 However in the context o f nuclear power, the 
revised draft National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation (EN-6)57 
establishes the need for new nuclear power stations in the UK that need to be developed 
significantly earlier than the end o f 2025.
The EN-6 can be described as the first stage in the development of nuclear 
power. This is because besides establishing the need for nuclear power development, it 
also lists the sites that the government has judged to be potentially suitable for the 
construction of new nuclear power stations. These lists are judged through the process of 
a Strategic Site Assessment (SSA) which sets out criteria for deciding on potential sites 
and indicates how potential sites meet specific criteria. The issues considered by SSA 
include: proximity to military activities, civil aircraft movements and hazardous
55 Note: Clausel30 o f the 2010 Localism Bill as amended by the House o f Lords if  it becomes law will 
introduce further Parliamentary procedures for the designation o f NPSs
55 DECC, Planning fo r  New Energy Infrastructure: Consultation on the Revised Draft National Policy fo r  
Energy Infrastructure (HSMO, 2010)
57 DECC, Revised Draft NPS fo r  Nuclear Power Generation (EN-6), Volume I o f  II (October 2010)
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industrial facilities and operations; coastal processes and flooding, storm surge and 
tsunami; designated sites o f ecological importance; areas o f amenity, cultural heritage 
and landscape; size o f site to accommodate operation, and also access to suitability 
sources o f cooling.58 As the SSA would have been engaged through a consultation 
process,59 the government’s expectation is that planning inquiries should not be made to 
re-assess the question o f whether there are alternative sites for a nuclear new build or 
whether the proposed site is viable.60 It is clear that this process o f site selection is in 
contrast with the approach taken during the SB inquiry where all issues relating to the 
development o f nuclear power were discussed. The aim o f the government is however to 
reduce the duration o f the inquiry system by not allowing the IPC to consider the 
question o f alternative sites, since the suitability o f a site will already have been 
considered through the SSA consultation process. However, in as much as the 
government feels it is inappropriate to embark on the issue o f site suitability during 
inquiries at least in the context of expediting the inquiry process, concerns remain on 
whether a specific location that is judged appropriate will be the best available option, or 
perhaps whether alternative sites should be considered during inquiries, or solely by the 
decision-maker.61 Thus, it is arguable that the SSA may not have credibility unless it 
involves hearings at which high-level environmental impacts o f potential sites are 
challenged and examined during the inquiry process. In any event, it is however unlikely 
that the SSA will rule out arguments on whether a proposed site is the best available
option. The reason for this is because case law suggests that the availability of
• 62alternative sites should be a material consideration in planning applications.
Although the features o f the NPSs as discussed so far, particularly the suitability 
o f a site which makes the NPS an important and influential statement in the development 
o f nuclear power in the UK, it is also arguable that NPSs may be politically influenced 
when describing the need for a particular type o f national infrastructure. While this
58 Ibid, Para. 2.3. Note that the SSA criteria contribute to the achievement o f  SEA objectives discussed 
below at FN 529
59 DECC, n 56 above at Para. 41
60 BERR, Towards a Nuclear National Policy Statement: Consultation on the Strategic Siting Assessment 
Process and Siting Criteria fo r  New Nuclear Power Stations in the UK  (2008), Para. 1.13
61 S. Tromans, n 7 above 140
62 Secretary o f  State fo r  Environment v Edwards (P.G.) (1995) 69 P. & C.R. 607, at 613
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remains a possibility, section 5 of the 2008 Act provides for a number of safeguards and 
procedural requirements before the NPSs are being designated. These are: before 
designating a statement as an NPS, policy makers are faced with the task o f ensuring 
that there is adequate environmental investigation of the policy they intend to put 
forward. They are to carry out an ‘Appraisal o f Sustainability’ (AoS) that also 
discharges all the requirements o f the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), a 
compulsory environmental requirement in regards to plans and programmes adopted by 
the SoS, at least when identifying specific sites.63 The key requirements of the SEA 
which is also similar to the requirements o f the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
are the preparation of an environmental report, with consultation o f relevant authorities 
and the public on the draft plan or programme.64 Certainly, this sort of arrangement must 
allow the authorities and the public an early and effective opportunity within appropriate 
clear timeframes65 to express their opinion on the draft plan or programme, and the 
accompanying environmental report before the adoption o f the plan or programme or its 
submission to the legislative procedure.66 Such opinion must however be taken into 
account during the preparation o f the plan or programme and before its adoption or 
submission to the legislative procedure.67 Likewise, the proposals for a NPS may only be
63 Directive 2001/42/EC -  implemented into UK through the Environmental Assessment o f  Plans and 
Programmes Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/1663). Nuclear NPS meets the test o f  the SEA. These are: is there 
a specific legislative, regulatory or administrative requirement for the plan or programme?; does the plan 
or programme set a framework for future development consents?; does it relate to a subject matter 
contemplated by the Directive?; and is it likely to have significant environmental effects? See: Directive 
2001/42 Art.2(a), 3(4), 3(2)(a), and 3(1) and also Environmental Assessment o f  Plans and Programmes 
Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/1633) reg. 2(1), 5(1-2), and 9(1). See also: Bard Campaign v Secretary o f  State 
fo r  the Communities and Local Government [2009] EWHC 308 (Admin) which establishes that SEA is 
required when alternative sites for a particular development is being considered; S.5(3) o f the Planning 
Act 2008
64 Art.6(4) o f  Directive 2001 /42/EC
65 Seaport Investment Ltd v Department o f the Environment (No 1) Court o f  Appeal in the Northern 
Ireland and the High Court [2007] NIQB 62
66 Art.6(2) o f  Directive 2001/42/EC
67 Art.8 o f  Directive 2001/42/EC. Further, the NPS in setting out policy in relation to a particular 
description o f  development must set out the criteria to be taken into account in the design o f that 
description o f  development; it must give reasons for the policy set out and such reasons must in particular 
include an explanation o f how the policy set out in the NPS takes account o f  government policy relating to 
the mitigation of, and adaptation to climate change. There are also further provisions under section 6 o f  
the 2008 Act, and procedures for reviewing an NPS and for suspending the operation o f  an NPS pending 
review under section 11. However, these are only likely to occur when there is a significant change in 
circumstances
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designated as one if the consultation, public requirement, and parliamentary 
requirements set out in the 2008 Act have been complied with.68
Considering the above requirements, especially the requirement for consultation, 
public and Parliamentary, there is no denying that they are essential procedures for a 
transparent and accountable decision-making process. However, as examined below, the 
issue is whether it addresses particular issues o f public participation in the decision­
making process. For example, whether there is the opportunity for the public to engage 
thoroughly in discretions covered by the NPS, particularly on issues that are location 
specific.
5.3.3. The Infrastructure Planning Commission
Section 1 o f the 2008 Act establishes a new body called the IPC. The IPC, which 
comprises o f a Chair person, Deputies, and Commissioners as appointed by the SoS, is 
an independent body charged with the examination o f applications on energy projects, 
transport, waste, water, and applications for harbour development. It makes the final 
decision on MIPs where there is a relevant NPS in force and it is not directly 
accountable to the Parliament for its decisions; but there will be circumstances where the 
SoS will be responsible for the final decision. This is when there is no NPS in force, or 
when it is decided that there is a significant and unanticipated change of circumstances 
which means that the NPS is no longer up to date and there is an urgent need to decide 
an application before national policy can be reviewed; or in cases o f defence, or national 
security, where the SoS is satisfied that intervention would be in the interests of defence 
or national security”.69
In order to ensure accountability on the part o f the IPC, its members are 
subjected to pre-appointment scrutiny by the Parliament Select Committee which 
requires the IPC to provide the Committee with information relating to particular
68 S.5(4)-(9) o f  the 2008 Act. Note that the Coalition Government is legislating to introduce a requirement
through the Localism Bill for there to be Parliamentary approval o f  an NPS. As such, an NPS can only be 
designated after it has been considered in the House o f  Commons and either approved within the 
consideration period o f  21 days or if  no resolution is passed that it should be proceeded with within those 
21 days. See: Clause 109 o f the Localism Bill as amended in Committee 
59 S .108-112 o f  the 2008 Act
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developments.70 In addition to this, the IPC must also issue a code o f conduct expected 
o f the Commissioners in connection with the performance o f the Commission’s 
function. The code includes the provision requiring each Commissioner to disclose 
financial and other interests in accordance with the procedure established under the Act 
and any such provision as the SoS may direct.71
In an effort to expedite the planning process, the immediate past Labour 
government believed that the IPC will help to avoid the need for many o f the range o f 
separate consents which previously had to be obtained under separate legislation and 
from different government agencies, departments and local authorities. The reason for 
this is to have a single consent regime which will simplify and speed up the planning 
process for NSIPs. Examples are planning permissions, authorisations for compulsory 
acquisition of land, approvals under the relevant acts and so on.72 However, a 
cumulative result o f the power o f the IPC has led to criticisms o f its role in determining 
applications and the changes brought by the 2008 Act.
Commentators73 argue that the introduction of the IPC represents a fundamental 
departure from a democratic planning system and that the advantages associated with the 
streamlined process and single consent regime are outweighed by a lack o f democratic 
accountability. The start point for assessing this argument is the decision o f the court in 
R. (on the application o f  Holding & Barnes Pic) v Secretary o f  State fo r  the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions.74 This case elaborates more on the democratic 
standards of independent bodies who make decisions on matters that affect the public. It 
assesses whether such decisions are compatible with the Human Rights Act o f 1998. It 
was held in this case that “to substitute for the SoS an independent and impartial body 
with no central electoral accountability would not only be a recipe for chaos: it would 
also be profoundly undemocratic”.75 Thus in light of the decision in this case, and a 
closer look at the IPC’s power to grant consents across a wide range o f regimes
70 Hansard HC col 349 (25 June 2008)
71 S.2 o f the 2008 Act
72 IPC, Introducing the Infrastructure Planning Commission: A Guide to its Role (IPC, 2009)
73 B. Kelly, The Planning Bill: Implications o f the Proposals for a New Regime for Major Infrastructure 
for Democracy and Delivery, [2008] J.P.L. Iss. 13,
74 [2001] UKHL 23
75 Ibid, Para. 60
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including the compulsory acquisition o f land, there is an overwhelming concern that 
such function or power may undermine the accountability of the decisions that are made 
by the IPC. It is not so hard to make a case that giving such power to the IPC, which is 
an unelected body, is wholly unprecedented and may likely lead to an erosion o f human 
rights and democracy.76 On the other hand, Kelly argues that these arguments would 
have weight if  Ministers are not involved in deciding infrastructure development.77 By 
using the NPS as an example, he added that Ministers set out a clear policy framework; 
they make the case for their policy through public consultation; and they are subjected to 
Parliamentary scrutiny.78
Having said this, it is arguable that developments in areas o f land use planning 
consent in the UK in form of the Localism Bill is a response to the concerns surrounding 
the democratic accountability o f the IPC.79 One key provision o f the Bill is to abolish the 
IPC and replace it with the MIPU within the planning inspectorate, so as to strengthen 
the roles of the Parliament and SoS in the planning regime. If the Localism Bill becomes 
law as expected, the IPC is set to transfer its functions o f decision-making to the 
Ministers because the government believes that the existing planning procedure for 
NSIPs under the IPC needs to be more democratic, transparent and accountable for it to 
effectively facilitate development.80 As such, it is also arguable that the issue of 
democratic accountability of the IPC will no longer surface in the creation of the MIPU 
as it is the Ministers that will make decisions on MIPs within the clear constraints o f a 
detailed statutory framework agreed by Parliament and with reasons for decisions, 
including to the Parliament which should be subjected to judicial review.81
76 B. Kelly, n 73 above 1
77 Ibid 10
78 Ibid
79 The Conservative Manifesto 2010 titled “Invitation to join the Government o f  Britain”, p.20. Available 
at <http://media.conservatives.s3.amazonaws.eom/manifesto/cpmanifesto2010 hires.pdf> last accessed 2 
November 2011
80 Department for Communities and Local Government, Localism Bill: Major Infrastructure Projects: 
Impact Assessment (2011) page 1. Available at
<http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovemment/pdf/1829675.pdf> last accessed 7 June 
2011
81 Clausel30 o f  the 2010 Localism Bill
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However, the issue remains whether these Parliamentary constraints will protect 
certain conflicting views such as, the issue of national considerations outweighing local 
issues in policy formation. In any event, it is more likely that the former will outweigh 
the latter. This therefore suggests that the views o f the public may still be overlooked in 
the decision-making process even after the creation o f the MIPU.
5.3.4. The Regime in Operation
I have established above that the provisions o f the NPSs and the IPC are o f particular 
importance in examining individual applications for MIPs, and that the government is 
set to abolish the IPC when the Localism Bill becomes law. Attention is now drawn to 
the planning regime and how the proposed changes may affect the system. This section 
will assess the requirements faced by each applicant before making an application and 
after the initial application is made. This is discussed under two main sub-headings 
namely: the pre-application process and the examination process.
5.3.4.I. Pre-application Process
The pre-application stage being the second stage o f the planning process is a front- 
loaded process.82 It introduces a new legal requirement that imposes a number o f 
requirements on applicants and seeks to reduce substantially the usage o f public 
inquiries. For example, it provides for extensive safety considerations, pre-application 
consultation, notification, and publication to statutory bodies and stakeholders, local 
authorities, persons with direct land interests, and local communities before an 
application for development consent is made so as to expedite the process. For recent 
purposes, these requirements are sub-divided under three main headings for an easy 
understanding o f how the system actually works. These are: the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), and other relevant bodies or persons as required.
82 R. Owen and S. Anwar, The Major Infrastructure Regime Under the Planning Act 2008-Yet Fit for 
Purpose? J.P & Env. Law (2011) 849-859, 854
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5.3.4.I.I. Environmental Impact Assessment
The promotion o f a high level o f environmental concern is identified by Directive 
85/337/EEC83 on the assessment of the environmental effects o f certain public and 
private projects as amended by Directive 97/11/EC84 which requires an environmental 
assessment o f development that is likely to have significant effects on the environment. 
The development process for any nuclear new build falls under the types o f specified 
schedule 1 projects under the Directive and as a result, an application for the 
construction o f a nuclear power station will have to be accompanied by an EIA 
statement.
According to W ood,85 the EIA process includes the following: “the EIA refers to 
the evaluation o f the effects likely to arise from a major project (or other action) 
significantly affecting the natural and man-made environment. Consultation and 
participation are integral to this evaluation”. Indeed as stated in the Directive, the EIA 
shall identify, describe and assess the direct and indirect effects o f a project on 
prescribed factors, with trans-boundary consultation with other Member States that may 
be affected by the project in terms o f the risk o f accident or disposal of waste produced, 
and also making such information available and consulting the public within a 
reasonable time, so as to give those concerned the opportunity to express an opinion 
before any development consent is granted.86 He adds that EIA is the “process that 
supplies decision-makers with an indication o f the likely consequences o f their actions, 
and if properly used it should lead to informed decisions about potentially significant
87actions and to positive benefits to both proponents and the population at large”.
However where the EIA provides that the public must be consulted, case law 
suggests that consultation is not always carried out. An example is the case o f Berkeley v
83 O. J. No L 175/40, 5/7/85 -  On the assessment o f  the effects o f  certain public and private projects on the 
environment
84 O. J. L073, 14/03/1997 -  amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment o f  the effects o f  certain 
public and private projects on the environment
85 C. Wood, Environmental Impact Assessment: A Comparative Review  (Longman, Harlow UK 1995) 1-3
86 Art.3-6 o f  Directive 97 /11/EC
87 C. Wood, n 84 above. See also: In R. (on the application o f  Burkett) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC 
(N o .l) [2002] UKHL 23, it was held that the EIA process is designed to redress to some extent the 
imbalance in resources between promoters o f  major developments and those concerned, on behalf o f  
individual or community interests, about the environmental effects; see: Para. 15
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Secretary o f  State fo r  the Environment.88 In this case, B who had objected to a 
development containing 30 flats, appealed against a decision that the development did 
not require an environmental impact assessment to be carried out.89 B argued that if 
properly construed, the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact 
Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 1999 Reg.9(2) imposed a duty on an 
inspector to refer to the SoS for him to determine whether to direct that an EIA was 
required before an application could be determined; and that since the situation could 
arise in which it could plausibly be argued that a certain development would have 
serious environmental consequences without an environmental impact assessment being 
required under the Regulations, the Regulations had not properly been transposed under 
Directive 85/337/EEC as amended by Directive 97/ll/E C . In dismissing the appeal, it 
was held that the SoS was not obliged to make a direction under Town and Country 
Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 1999 
Reg.4(8), and that a planning authority or an inspector could grant planning permission 
without an EIA having been carried out even if a plausible submission had been made 
that the development was one in respect o f which the SoS could make a direction under 
Reg.4(8).90 Also, that Annex III to the Directive set out the selection criteria to be 
applied by Member States in specifying the relevant parameters, and if Member States 
failed to apply those criteria, the relevant legislation would not comply with Community 
law.91
Where nuclear power is concerned, any proposed site is to undergo an EIA. This 
is regardless o f whether the site has been identified as suitable in the NPS. This is 
because the outcome o f the SSA and SEA cannot remove or avoid the need to identify, 
describe and assess in an appropriate manner the effects o f nuclear power projects. 
However, the SEA may as well be the appropriate starting point of the process. For 
present purposes, Tromans92 points out that the issue at hand is how far such an 
examination needs to go, and how far the IPC will be able to rely on such matters being
88 [2002] Env. L.R. 14
89 [2001] Env. L.R. 32
90 [2002] Env. L.R. 14 at Para. 45
91 Ibid, Para. 47
92 S. Tromans, n 7 above 157
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adequately controlled by other bodies. Arguably, disputes may arise on how issues 
should be handled in the environmental report, but it is expected that the report should 
include a description of the likely significant effects resulting from the existence of the 
project. For example, a likely issue is how to deal with nuclear waste. As such, before 
development consents for new nuclear power stations are granted, the IPC will need to 
be satisfied that effective arrangements exist or will exist to manage and dispose of the 
waste they will produce. In this regard, the government has identified that geological 
disposal is technically achievable as long as a suitable site can be identified for the 
disposal of higher activity radioactive waste. The government is however satisfied that 
safe, secure and environmentally acceptable interim storage arrangement will Ijc 
available until a geological disposal facility can accept the waste;93 and as a result, the 
examining body need not consider this question.94 It therefore becomes a matter of 
concern whether there will be adequate information available in order to identify and 
allow proper assessment o f the effects o f dealing with nuclear wastes; and above all to 
allow the requirements for the EIA to be satisfied. To mention again, such requirements 
may prove difficult to complete because o f the uncertainty that surrounds the effects of 
nuclear waste on the environment. For example, the production o f poor environmental 
statement may be as a result of uncertainty. However, the law plays down this concern 
as it gives room for incomplete environmental statements. For example, it was held in R 
(Blewett) v Derbyshire County Council95 that in an imperfect world it is an unrealistic 
counsel o f perfection to expect that an applicant’s environmental statement will always 
contain the full information about the environmental impact o f a project. Nonetheless, it 
is still expected that the applicant should identify at local and regional levels any socio­
economic impacts associated with the construction, operation and decommissioning of 
new nuclear power stations.96 This is also to include the impacts associated with interim
93 DECC, n 55 above at Para. 2.11
94 DECC, Draft NPS for Nuclear Power Generation (EN-6), (November 2009) Part 4
95 [2003] EWHC 2775, Para. 41
96 DECC, National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation (EN-6), Volume I o f  II (July 2011) at 
Para. 3.11.3
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storage facilities for Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) and spent fuel as part of the EIA 
process as stated in the EIA Directive.97
Considering the above, it is also arguable that the Fukushima nuclear power 
disaster may on one hand intensifies the concern o f having a thorough environmental 
statement o f proposed nuclear new build, and on the other hand, questions the 
government’s policy on nuclear waste and its relationship with the examining authority. 
As a result, questions over the location of interim facilities for new nuclear wastes to be 
produced are probably going to be a primary concern for nuclear power objectors, and 
this may ensue during inquiries. If care is not taken, the public may also challenge any 
exclusion o f the long term effect o f radioactive waste from a nuclear power project in 
the environmental statement. Although, such an issue may well be a matter for the 
examining authority to decide whether the information provided in the environmental
no
statement is sufficient or not, care must nevertheless be taken by the government and 
the applicant in producing an environmental statement to avoid legal challenges.
5.3.4.I.2. Consulting Other Relevant Bodies or Persons
In addition to the EIA requirements above, an applicant must prepare a statement setting 
out how it proposes to consult the people leaving in the vicinity o f the land. This is 
known as the Statement o f Community Consultation (SOCC).99 It involves the applicant 
promoting a judgement o f what vicinity means and in any which way will need to satisfy 
the examining authority that they have acted reasonably.100
Surprisingly, it is the responsibility o f the promoter to design the consultation 
exercise without need to seek formal approval from the local authority or the examining 
authority before it begins consultation.101 O f course how such consultation will be 
carried out will probably be a concern for the public in terms o f quality and acceptable
97 Annex I o f  Directive 97/11/EC. See also: DECC, Appraisal o f  Sustainability o f the Revised Draft 
Nuclear National Policy Statement: Main Report (October 2010) at Para. 3.8.15
98 Atkinson v Secretary o f  State fo r  Transport [2006] EWHC 995 (Admin), it was held that it is a matter 
for the SoS to decide whether the information is sufficient. Para. 38
99 Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Guidance “Planning Act 2008: Guidance 
on pre-application consultation”, Para. 26
100 Ibid, Para. 53
101 DCLG, Planning Act 2008: Guidance for Local Authorities, (March 2010) Para. 42
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decisions. In any event, it will be expected that the promoter should follow the principle 
set out in R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p. Coughlan.102 These are first, 
that consultation process must be at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage; 
second, the proposer must give sufficient reasons for any proposal to allow for 
intelligent consideration and response; and third, adequate time must be given for 
consideration and response; and lastly, the product o f consultation must be 
conscientiously taken into account in finalising and proposals.
5.3.4.2. Examining an Application under the Planning Act 2008
This is the third stage o f the application process. Under the 2008 Act where the 
examining authority receives an application, it must by the end o f the period of 28 days, 
decides whether or not to accept the application.103 Section 56 provides for the 
notification of an accepted application. It requires the examining authority to give notice 
o f the application to persons, authorities, owners and occupiers of relevant land; and 
where the application includes a request for the compulsory acquisition of land, section 
59 requires the applicant to notify persons who are affected by the application. In 
addition to this, the applicant must give notice to each relevant local authority inviting 
them to submit a local impact report within a specified period o f tim e.104
Accordingly, a decision is to be made by the authority who decides on how the 
application should be decided. The 2008 Act provides that the Chairperson of the IPC 
may decide whether the application should be examined by a Panel o f Commissioners or 
by a single Commissioner.105 Where nuclear power is concerned, the application is more 
likely to be handled by a Panel of three or more Commissioners because o f the level of 
detail that is usually involved. The constituted Panel thus has the discretion to decide
102 [2001] QB 213
103 S.55 o f  the 2008 Act
104 S. 102 (5)-(9) o f the Planning Act 2008. A local impact report is defined in S.60 (3) as a report in 
writing giving details o f the likely impact o f  the proposed development on the authority’s area (or any part 
o f  the area). Note: Clause 138 o f  the Localism Bill as amended by the House o f  Lords makes further 
provisions for local authorities to be notified
105 S.61, 64 & 78 o f the Planning Act 2008 respectively. Note: it is the duty o f  the Panel to decide or make 
recommendation in respect o f application. Under S.75, such decision by the Panel requires the agreement 
o f a majority o f its members. The Chair o f the Panel has a second (or casting) vote in the event o f a tie.
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how the process is to be conducted with regard to any guidance given by the SoS or by 
the Chairperson o f the IPC, as long as it is relevant to how the application should be 
examined. The Panel may in examining the application may however disregard 
representations if  they are vexatious or frivolous or relate to the merits o f the NPS or are 
even in relation to compensation for compulsory acquisition o f land. Also after having 
made an initial assessment o f the principal issues arising on the application as required, 
the Panel is required to hold a meeting with the applicant and interested party such as the 
public, on how the application should be examined before making any procedural 
decision106 so as to encourage interested parties to gain an understanding of the proposed 
application and to reach consensus between them .107
5.3.4.2.I. The Inquiry
Everything about the IPC is about discretion and to speed up the authorisation process.
For example by focusing on the relationship between the proposal and the local plans,
108and local environmental impacts in the context of NPSs during inquiries, section 89 of 
the 2008 Act provides that wherever possible, the examination of applications by the 
IPC is to take the form o f consideration of written representations. This is quite different 
from the role o f the Inspector under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 
1990) where the SoS appoints an Inspector to consider an application.109 The reason for 
this is to speed up the process o f considering an application as it may help reduce the 
need for repetitious oral evidence giving.110 Furthermore, the IPC also decides hearings 
on specific issues, open floor hearings, or perhaps to include consideration of oral 
representations about a particular issue to ensure adequate examination of issues or that 
an interested party has a fair chance to put a case forward.111 However, there are also 
exceptions to this process. For example, if the application includes a request for an order 
granting consent to authorise compulsory acquisition, then the affected person is given
106 S. 87-89 o f  the Planning Act 2008
107 DTI, “Updating the Electricity Generating Stations and Overhead Lines Inquiry Procedure Rules in 
England and Wales: An Energy Review Consultation”, (November 2006) Para. 2.10
108 S.60 o f  the Planning Act 2008
109 S.76 o f  the TCPA 1990
110 Kelly, n 73 above 5
111 S.90-93 o f  the Planning Act 2008
160
the opportunity to say that he wishes hearing to be held and to make oral representations. 
However at any hearing, the examining authority is to apply the principle that any oral 
questioning o f a person making representations at a hearing should be undertaken by the 
examining authority except where the examining authority thinks that oral questioning 
by another person is necessary to ensure the adequate testing o f any representations or 
that a person has a fair chance to put the person’s case.112 In certain circumstances, the 
examining authority may also allow cross-examination where it feels it is necessary to 
do so in order to ensure the adequate testing o f any representations.113
In line with the streamlined process, the IPC is however under a duty to 
complete the examination of the application in six months beginning with the day after 
the start day o f the application.114
5.3.4.2.2. Challenges
Under the 2008 Act, section 118 provides for decisions to be challengeable by a claim 
for judicial review only if the claim is filed within six weeks o f the day on which the 
order is published, or if later, the date on which the statement o f reasons is published. An 
objector may challenge: first, a decision under section 55 not to accept an application for 
an order granting development consent; secondly, a decision in relation to an error or 
omission in a decision document; third, a decision to make a change to an order granting 
development consent; and fourthly, a decision to make a change to, or revoke, an order 
granting development consent. In addition to this, it is also clear that the Court may 
entertain proceedings for questioning anything else done, or omitted to be done, by the 
SoS or the commission in relation to an application for an order granting development 
consent only if  the proceedings are brought by a claim for judicial review and the claim 
form is filed during the period of six weeks beginning with the relevant day.
However as seen in the next part, there are concerns that both the pre-application 
process and the application process are not compatible with the provisions o f the
112 S.94(7) o f  the Planning Act 2008
113 DCLG “planning act 2008: guidance for the examination o f applications for development consent for 
nationally significant infrastructure projects”. Para. 106
114 S.98 o f  the Planning Act 2008
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European Convention o f Human Rights and the Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matter 
(Aarhus convention).
162
5.4. THE EFFICACY OF THE LAND USE PLANNING REGIME
“The outcome o f planning affects everyone, and everyone must therefore have the 
opportunity to play a role in delivering effective and inclusive planning”.115
I have explained above that the introduction o f the NPSs and the examination process of 
the IPC will prevent the consideration of certain issues such as safety and site selection 
at the inquiry stage. The question remains as to the extent at which the system provides 
for adequate public involvement in the decision-making process. Thus there is the need 
to give answers to the following questions - Does the system operate in a fair manner? 
Does it respect the rights o f the public?
In view o f the above questions, there have been extensive and tense debates on 
how the planning regime operates. In this regards, commentators tend to be divided into 
two camps. Some argue that the consultation requirements, combined with the 
opportunities given to people to participate and challenge decisions, make it impossible 
for development to be delivered in an efficient way; while others argue that the changes 
made to the system do not afford the public the opportunity to participate fully in the 
decision-making process.116 This part argues in light o f the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the Aarhus convention that there are limited opportunities 
for the public to participate in the decision-making process. My reasons are discussed 
below.
5.4.1. The European Convention of Human Rights
The rights o f the public as regards to implications o f the planning regime arise in a 
number o f contexts. The main Convention rights that are likely to be relevant to the 
planning regime are set out in articles 1, 6, and 8 o f the Conventions; with article 6 
raising the most serious concerns.
Article 6(1) o f the ECHR which provides that “in the determination o f his civil 
rights and obligations or o f any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
115 Office o f  the Deputy Prime Minister, Planning Policy Statement: 1 Delivering Sustainable 
Development, (2005), Para.40
116 B. Kelly, n 72 above 1
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and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law”, might allow objectors to the site selection criteria by the SoS after 
only consultation and not any form o f hearing. For example, the issue o f the right to a 
fair trial was considered in the Alconbury decisions. This consists o f four applications 
been made to the High Court for declarations that the planning process in each case was 
not compatible with article 6(1) o f the ECHR. The Alconbury case itself involved an 
appeal against a refusal o f planning permission recovered by the SoS under sections 78 
and 79 o f the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (1990 Act). Two o f the other cases 
involved decisions by the SoS to call in applications for planning permission under 
section 77 o f the 1990 Act for determination by himself. The Fourth case involved the 
proposed use by the SoS o f highway orders and related compulsory purchase orders in 
connection with a scheme to improve the A34/M4 road junction. In all four cases the 
Divisional Court o f Queen’s Bench Division was prepared to grant the declarations of 
incompatibility sought. Appeals were pursued in three o f the cases: R (on the application 
o f  Alconbury) v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Environment, Transport and the Regions', R 
(on the application o f  Holdings & Barnes) v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions', and Secretary o f  State fo r  the Environment, Transport and
117the Regions v Legal and General Society Ltd.
In Alconbury, the House of Lords agreed that the determination o f administrative 
matters such as planning decisions involved the determination of civil rights and 
obligations under the meaning of article 6 of ECHR, and that the SoS had not claimed 
that in dealing with a called-in application or a recovered decision, he was acting as an 
independent tribunal and could not be seen as impartial.118 This is based on European 
jurisprudence o f reference to combined process o f inquiry and judicial review as 
described in Bryan v UKU9 for example. This case concerns the subject of an 
enforcement notice requiring B to demolish two buildings on his property which had 
been erected in breach of planning control. It was said that “whether the power of 
judicial review is sufficiently wide to satisfy the requirements o f Article 6 must depend
117 [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1389
118 Ibid, Para. 43
119 (1995) 21 E.H.R.R. 342, Para. 187
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on a number o f considerations, including the subject matter o f the dispute, the nature of 
the decision o f the administrative authorities which is in question, the procedure, if any, 
which exists for review o f the decision by a person or body acting independently of the 
authority concerned and the scope o f that power of review”.120 Thus for present 
purposes, there may the infringement o f article 6 because it is also the case that the 
determination o f site selection on one hand lacks the process o f inquiry, and on the other 
hand, the SoS is not an independent and impartial tribunal for the purpose of the ECHR 
in the same way that it was accepted in Alconbury.
In addition to the above, the provision of article 6 might also allow those that are 
not satisfied by the IPC decisions on grounds o f fair hearing a ground for challenge. 
However, as seen in Balmer-Schafroth v Switzerland121 which involves the request for 
the refusal o f an extension of the operating licence and the order of immediate and
permanent closure of a nuclear power station, it was held that the risk from a nuclear
100power station was too remote for the article 6 right to a fair hearing to be engaged. It 
should however be noted that neither the Strasbourg nor the English courts specify any 
procedure to which the hearing must be conducted. For example in R (Vetrelein) v 
Hampshire County Council}21 it was held that a “fair” hearing does not necessarily 
require an oral hearing; much less does it require that there should be an opportunity to 
cross-examine. Whether a particular procedure is “fair” will also depend upon all 
circumstances, including the nature o f the claimant’s interest, the seriousness of the 
matter for him and the nature o f any matters in dispute.124 Also in Brugger v Austria}25 
it was held that each case must be determined on its merits. Such determination may 
however depend on whether the matter on which an oral hearing is said to be required is 
one involving the application o f discretion and judgement, or whether there are disputed 
facts that can only be tested fairly by oral evidence.
120 Ibid, Para. 47
121 (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 598
122 Ibid, Para. 39
123 [2002] Env. LR 198
124 Ibid, Para. 68
125 No. 76293/01 2006
165
Thus, the question now is whether an oral hearing fulfils a requirement o f a fair 
hearing where nuclear power is concerned? Either way, there is no denying that an 
occupied home or accumulation o f another’s property will surely engage article 6 o f the 
ECHR as property rights are protected by the First protocol which states that “every 
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment o f his possessions”. In this 
regard, the decision in Lopez Ostra v Spain,126 in regards to pollution from a chemical 
factory shows that human rights must be considered in the planning process. That is, the 
right to respect one’s home and family, and article 1, the right to the peaceful enjoyment 
o f possessions.
As it stands, a person making claims under article 6 in any way as it relates to 
nuclear power must show that their civil rights are beyond doubt engaged. Even though, 
it is still a matter for the UK Court to decide. For example, in the case o f Athanassoglou 
and others v Switzerland?21 where A along with others living close to a nuclear power 
plant, complained that they had been denied an effective judicial means of challenging a 
decision to renew the plant’s operating licence, the Court considers that “how best to 
regulate the use o f nuclear power is a policy decision for each State to take according to 
its democratic processes, that article 6 cannot be read as dictating any one scheme rather 
than another. What article 6 requires is that individuals be granted access to a Court 
whenever they have an arguable claim that there has been an unlawful interference with 
the exercise o f one o f their rights recognised under domestic laws.”128 However in 
considering the effects o f the planning regime on human rights in the UK, it should be 
remembered that the government had once assessed the implications that decided that no
129changes were required in order to avoid legal challenges.
126 (1994) 20 E.H.R.R. 40 ECHR. However, in Buckley v UK [1996] JPL 1018 (ECHR), where the 
applicant had been refused planning permission for the siting o f a caravan on her own land, she alleged,
inter alia, a breach o f  art.8. It was held that art.8 did not go so far as to allow an individual’s preference as
to his place o f  residence to override the general interest; and that since the regulatory framework within 
which the decision was made contained adequate procedural safeguards protecting the applicant’s interest, 
there had been no breach o f art.8
127 (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 13
128 Ibid, Para. 54. See also: Alconbury decisions, FN 118 above
129 Parliamentary Question in the House o f Commons, 15 October 2001
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5.4.2. Aarhus Convention
Having said this, the Courts are more likely to entertain claims under the Aarhus 
Convention which commits the government to guaranteeing public participation in 
decision-making processes. As it applies to the ongoing discussion, article 6 applies to 
the procedure for decision-making by the IPC. Arguably, this is not protected under the 
UK planning regime. Under article 6, “the public must be informed early in 
environmental decision-making procedure and in an adequate and timely manner; the 
public participation procedures must include reasonable time frames allowing sufficient 
time for informing the public; parties must provide for public participation when all 
options are open and effective public participation can take place; each party must 
encourage prospective applicants to identify the public concerned and engage into 
discussions with them; the authority must provide access for the public examination 
upon request and also submit in writing whatever comments, opinion or information it 
regards as relevant”.
In this regard, one area where there is likely to be a legal challenge is how the 
question of alternatives has been dealt with by the SoS in cases o f NSIPs that are bound 
to have some significant effects. For example as stated under the SEA Directive where 
an environmental assessment is required, an environmental report shall be prepared in a 
way in which the likely significant effects on the environment o f implementing the plan
130or programme, and reasonable alternatives are taken into account. In Bard Campaign 
v SoS fo r  the Communities and Local Government,131 a challenge to the government’s 
Eco Town policy was pursued on the basis that it failed to take into proper account 
alternatives. It was argued that various documents including a Housing Green Paper, an 
Eco Towns prospectus and a consultation document “Eco Towns-Living a Greener 
Future” together with the process by which bids for eco-town status were solicited and 
in some cases rejected, all combined to be a plan or programme in which alternatives 
had been inadequately considered due to the absence of formal SEA having been 
undertaken. The High Court dismissed the case on grounds that on a fair reading o f the 
documents in question they had not progressed to a sufficiently advanced state that could
130 Art.4 o f  Directive 2001/42/EC
131 [2009] EWHC 308 (Admin)
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be treated as a plan or programme that required SEA. As one commentator 132 puts it, 
this case was dismissed only because there was still a stage at which a policy document 
would be drafted in which the government would shortlist sites for eco-town status in 
favour o f sites that would be discarded from the process. Thus, it is possible that the 
preparation o f an NPS which identifies specific locations as suitable by ruling out other 
options could engage article 6. Such a challenge may however be upheld depending on 
the measures and thoroughness o f the SSA stage.
It also seems clear that the process o f SSA which provides for the consultation of 
the public may be caught under article 7 o f the Convention. Under article 7, “each Party 
must make appropriate practical and/or other provisions for the public to participate 
during the preparation o f plans and programmes relating to the environment, within a 
transparent and fair framework, having provided the necessary information to the public, 
and to the extent appropriate, each party shall endeavour to provide opportunities for 
public participation in the preparation o f policies relating to the environment”. As seen 
here, the obligation for participation is somewhat stronger under Article 7 and it seems 
there might be possible violation of this provision especially when consultation is seen 
as mere tokenism. In this regard, Lindblom and Honey133 point out that the process of 
the SSA which requires public consultation at an early stage o f sites selection is not the 
same as public participation. They argue that public participation involves involvement 
in the decision-making process through dialogue, consideration and response. Although 
one may argue that their definition o f public participation gives preference to a 
deliberative form o f participation as it encompasses its features, but the fact remains that 
the purpose o f consultation is not much a challenge to decision-makers about what 
should be done but rather to legitimize those actions by the involvement of all affected 
parties in the policy process.134 As such, one area where the government will be 
cautious, and all parties will be looking very closely, is how the question of alternatives 
would be dealt with.
132 P. Robinson, Energy Planning in 2009 -  All Systems Go?, J.P.E.L. 2009, 53-77, 60
133 K. Lindblom and R. Honey n 18 above
134 J. Pierre, Public Consultation and Citizen Participation: Dilemmas o f Public Advice in ‘Taking Stock: 
Assessing Public Sector Reforms', edited by B. Guy Peters et all, (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1998). See also: Chapter 2 o f  this thesis
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Besides, such challenges may also arise when the matter comes to be examined 
by the IPC, new or further information was considered and such where not consulted in 
the NPS or perhaps in the preparation of NPSs which identifies specific locations. In this 
regard, case law however shows that one cannot rule out the possibility o f further 
considerations by the government even after the consultation process had been 
completed. As such, it is possible for objectors to apply for judicial review as seen in the
135 •Hillingdon LBC  case. For example in R. (Greenpeace Ltd) v Secretary o f  State fo r  
Trade and Industry concerning the Energy Challenge Review Report, Greenpeace 
brought a claim that the document was “seriously misleading” in that it did not inform 
consultees about the report o f the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 
(CoRWM) on nuclear waste programme which was a significant determinant o f nuclear
117new build.
Also, since nuclear power station is under the list o f activities in Annex I o f the 
Aarhus Convention; it is not hard to imagine that if a person is denied access to written 
representation, cross-examination, or hearing in specified environmental activities, the 
affected person may challenge such procedural arrangement under article 6. For example 
in Nicholson v Secretary o f  State fo r  Energyu% where the applicant objector was 
prevented by the inspector from cross-examining witnesses called by various local 
authorities at a public inquiry into a proposal for open-cast mining, it was held that 
persons or bodies opposed to a project are expected to take an active, intelligent and 
informed part in the decision-making process. Also in Bushell v SSE,]39 it was held that 
there is a massive body o f accepted decisions establishing that procedural fairness 
requires that party be given an opportunity o f challenging by cross-examination witness 
called by other parties on relevant issues.
In addition to the above, it is also likely that the judicial review process o f the 
IPC decisions may be challenged under article 9(4) o f the convention which requires 
procedures for access to justice to be fair. The assumption here is that sufficient time
135 FN 28 above
136 [2007] EWHC 311. See also:
137 [2007] EWHC 311, Para. 109
138 (1977) 76 LGR 693
139 [1981] AC 76
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will be required by objectors to bring a meaningful challenge. The six week period is 
indeed a demanding timescale even for well experienced NGOs given the contentious 
nature o f nuclear power installations; although, it may not be much o f a problem to well- 
organised NGOs. Arguably, this may create an indirect division between those that are 
well organized to challenge decisions within a stringent time frame and those that 
cannot. As such, one begins to wonder whether the system actually benefits the public or 
it directly aims to include favourable conditions for specified groups. If it benefits the 
latter, then it will be more difficult for the public to effectively enforce their rights.140
5.4.3. Possible Implications of Legal Challenges
Considering the above discussions, it is arguable that the amount o f time that could 
actually be saved through the introduction o f the NPSs and IPC may be limited. This is 
because there could be legal proceeding to secure a mandatory order, a prohibiting order, 
or judicial review, particularly in relation to the process o f SSA and the examination 
procedure o f the IPC. The decision in the Greenpeace case (2007) shows that Courts are 
prepared to consider challenges to the procedures adopted in the formation of policy and 
that the government cannot by-pass its obligations under the Aarhus convention no 
matter how much it would like to fast-track the planning process.
A substantial point however arises in relation to legal challenges. Where the 
development o f nuclear power is concerned, challenging cases in Court may result to 
delay in the authorisation process of new build. This is because cases may take time to 
be dealt with, and in fact may lead to an uncertain outcome. Thus, it is arguable that this 
in turn is likely to have an impact on the UK low carbon goals. An example is the case 
o f R v Secretary o f  State fo r  Business and Enterprise, ex p  North Devon Council141 
which shows the risk involved in legal challenges. This case relates to claims for judicial 
review o f the Secretary of State’s decision to grant planning permission for a wind farm 
at Devon. The developer was granted planning permission by the Secretary o f State on 
9th o f October 2007 to build wind turbines but was set back by the Council’s application
140 R. Mccracken QC, Infrastructure Planning Commission: Challenge or Opportunity, J.P.L. [2009] Iss. 
13 ,7 -23 ,21 .
141 Case Reference CO/11543/2007
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for a judicial review. It was however not until nine months after that proceedings started 
in the Administrative Court. In this instance, it is also arguable that the reason for the six 
weeks cap for challenges is to lessen the likelihood o f any delays whatsoever during 
proceedings.142 Having said this, the reality however is that the overall amount o f time 
the government hopes to save during the planning process of nuclear power 
development may be lost depending on the challenges levied against the NPSs, and the 
IPC examination procedures.
CONCLUSION AND CONTINUING CONCERNS
As discussed so far in this chapter, the introduction of the NPSs and the IPC through the 
2008 Act is a step further by the government in tackling the procedural issues o f the 
planning system and to expedite the land use authorisation process. As such, some 
commentators are keen to contend that we have entered a new era o f energy consenting 
in which it is not enough to say that one would like to install some form o f power 
generation because one is confident that one can sell electricity, or at least one is willing 
to take the risk. Rather one is to explain by reference to whatever objective standards 
one has and why there is a need for this type o f development.143
Having said this, there are concerns in that the regime aims to speed up the 
development o f nuclear power by removing consideration o f matters such as safety and 
site selection away from the inquiry process; and as discussed so far, this may have 
implications on public participation in the decision-making process. Thus, it is perhaps 
right to say that the law appears to serve as a promoter o f nuclear power. This however, 
should not come as a surprise because the government made it clear in its 2006 Energy 
Review that energy projects will continue to enjoy special treatment and that the 
planning system is aimed at ensuring a greater likelihood that consent is granted for such
144projects.
142 As a matter o f  fact although not subjected to legal proceedings, there has been considerable delay in the 
designation o f  NPSs, mainly because o f the change in government and the recent events in Japan. See: 
The “Plan for Growth” document published alongside the Budget 2011 at p.47
143 P. Robinson, n 132 above 55
144 Cm 6887
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To this point, I believe that all policies need thorough reviews at all times; 
however, introducing new reforms within a short period of time does not always address 
certain issues. Instead these issues may recur in some cases. Also, the government incurs 
cost on itself,145 and may even expose the planning system to uncertainty when policies 
are changed frequently. Although in the case that policy is changing in the present 
context, the big question remains whether the proposed MIPU will actually address the 
issues o f public participation when the Localism Bill becomes law.
145 B. Van der zee, ‘Labour’s fast-track planning body: £9.3m to run a year and no punters4 available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2010/apr/21/infrastructure-planning-committee> assessed 
28 October 2010
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
From its beginnings, nuclear power has been tipped to address energy security concerns 
in terms o f  the distribution o f energy supply. However over the past decades, human 
influence on the climate through increased use o f fossil fuels, and the fear that carbon 
source energy is being depleted have led to other environmental attractions o f nuclear 
power. In spite of these attractions, the nuclear benefits have been over shadowed by the 
impacts o f the Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet Union. The disaster showed the 
lapses o f the international community in nuclear power disaster prevention, 
preparedness, and management. As a result, it necessitated changes and improvements in 
international nuclear safety regulations1 by focusing on the prevention of possible future 
nuclear accidents and mitigation of the consequences should a nuclear accident occur 
again in the future. The EU and other nuclear States also joined to address their 
obligations under these regulations, and most importantly to fill the gaps left at the 
international level.
Having said this, the Fukushima nuclear power disaster in Japan put the post- 
Chernobyl safety regulations back in the spot light. As such, it affords us the opportunity 
to assess existing international, EU, and national nuclear power safety regulations. In so 
doing, it is clear from discussions in Chapter 4 that there are still concerns over these 
regulations at the international, EU, and national level. For example, there are still 
concerns in areas o f nuclear waste management and the reprocessing of spent fuel, 
disaster prevention through the design o f existing nuclear reactors, and also disaster 
preparedness and management measures. Also, more fundamental is that the disaster has 
shown a new way in which a nuclear disaster may occur. It shows that the combination 
of natural disaster and human behaviour can lead to a catastrophic disaster with which 
the safety regulations in place may find it difficult to cope.
1 N. Pelzer, Learning the Hard Way: Did the Lessons Taught by the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident 
Contribute to Improving Nuclear Law?; available at <http://www.oecd- 
nea.org/law/chemobvl/PELZER.pdf> last accessed 4 December 2011
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As discussed in Chapter 2, there have been clear signs o f rethinking about the use 
of nuclear energy by governments in a number o f countries as a result o f the Fukushima 
disaster. Surely, this is an effort to reduce the risks that are associated with the use of 
nuclear power. For example, countries such as Germany that has agreed to stick to the 
planned moratorium on nuclear power and on the road to shut down all its nuclear plants 
by the year 2022.2 However, the role played by nuclear countries such as Germany in 
other countries raises particular concerns in terms o f the possible consequences o f a 
moratorium on the use of nuclear energy. As such, it remains to be seen whether a 
moratorium on nuclear power would have implications in addressing the carbon 
concerns, and the risks posed by nuclear power.
With regard to the above, it is only reasonable to think that a moratorium on 
nuclear power will lead to reliance on other sources o f energy. Thus, it is worrying in 
terms o f climate change that this may lead to crisis o f confidence between developed 
and developing countries. In this regard, it has been argued that because under­
developed and developing countries indirectly look up and benefit from the assistance 
rendered by developed countries in combating the carbon concerns, developed countries 
may be sending out wrong signals to under-developed or developing countries to expand 
the use o f  fossil fuels or substituting nuclear power for other low carbon sources.3 This 
is indeed a possibility as revealed under the Kyoto Protocol where developing country 
parties rely on developed country parties in meeting climate change objectives.4 For 
example, Nigeria is a developing country that is already seeking aid to help it cope with 
the effects o f the changing environment.5 More certain is the situation in Australia which 
reaffirms this argument. In response to the Fukushima disaster, Australia’s Labour party 
has recently argued that because countries such as Germany, Switzerland and Italy were 
reducing their commitment to nuclear energy, it will be absurd under these
2 Guardian Newspaper, Germany Votes to End Nuclear Power by 2022, available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 l/iun/30/germanv-end-nuclear-power-2022> assessed 19 July 2011
3 N. Netzer and J. Steinhilber, Nuclear Waste a Crisis...Green Light for a Sustainable Energy Supply, in N. 
Netzer and J. Steinhilber, The End o f  Nuclear Energy? International Perspectives After Fukushima, p .l 1- 
12. Available at <http://librarv.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08289.pdf> accessed 15 September 2011
4 Art. 11(3) o f  the Kyoto protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2008
5 BBC, ‘Nigeria Seeks Climate Change A id’ available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 
16084988> last accessed 9 December 2011
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circumstances to expand their nuclear capabilities.6 Although Australia is a developed 
country, its decision against the nuclear option based on the policy of other developed 
nations shows how keen nations maybe in adopting foreign policy measures in matters 
o f environmental risk. However, contrary to this assertion, some commentators also 
argue that it is not necessary to have nuclear energy to meet climate change objectives as 
there are a variety o f ways o f getting to a particular emissions target.7 As to this, various 
analyses of future energy use have also shown that excluding nuclear option would put 
significantly more pressure on energy supply and the use of other technologies, such as 
Carbon Capture Storage (CCS) which are unproven.8 Besides, what this also means is 
that for the UK, there must be provision o f other alternative source o f low-carbon energy 
supply to replace the existing 18% of electricity that is being generated from nuclear 
energy.9 This may even prove difficult to attain as there appears to be barriers to the 
growth o f other low-carbon sources of energy.10 Clearly, this is also a hint that other 
law-carbon sources o f energy may not be developed in time to meet the climate change 
targets in the UK, while the continuous use o f fossil fuels adds to the concerns over 
carbon sources o f energy. Also as it relates to the risks of nuclear power, it is worth 
mentioning that the use o f nuclear power has created a large amount o f nuclear wastes 
that have been stored temporarily on sites over the years in the UK and other nuclear 
States around the world. My point o f course is that even when a moratorium is placed on 
the use o f nuclear power, it may not necessarily be a solution to the manifestation o f its 
risks.
Thus where new nuclear build is concerned in the UK, it is important to address 
its inherent issues for nuclear power to have a place in the society. Indeed, such 
acceptance relies on public acceptability o f the risks o f nuclear power. This is not
6 BBC, Australia’s Labour Party Backs Uranium Sales to India’, available at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16021428> last accessed 5 December 2011
7 D. Helm, Nuclear Power, Climate Change, and Energy Policy, in D. Helm and C. Hepburn, The 
Economics and Politics o f  Climate Change, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) 262
8 House o f  Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology: Nuclear Research and Development 
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surprising because the risks that are associated with the use o f nuclear power have the 
potential to affect every member o f the society including future generations. As such if 
the public are to consent to the use o f nuclear power, solutions will have to be found to 
the obstacles that are currently presented in the decision-making process; particularly in 
policy formation and planning. As such it is of outer most concern that the decision­
making processes would have to be compatible with the considerable body of 
international and EU law in relation to public participation.
To this point, there is the ultimate need for a legal response to the law and policy 
issues o f nuclear power. At the same time, because nuclear power appears to be the most 
legally controlled energy source in the world due to the fact that it is subject to a very 
high degree o f regulations at the international, EU, and national level, care must be taken 
in addressing its law and policy issues because any proposed measures must also be 
compatible with regulations across jurisdictions. For present purposes, such measures 
may define the level o f acceptability o f nuclear power.
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